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This year￿s Trade and Development Report demonstrates that the conditions for achieving
the Millennium Development Goal of halving extreme poverty by 2015 have improved
considerably over the past three years, as economic growth in the developing world has become
more broad-based and embraced many of the poorest countries.
At a time when the forces of economic expansion in some major developed countries
have been slackening, China and India have become major engines of growth for the world
economy as a whole. Rapid economic development in both countries has helped reduce levels
of extreme poverty at home, by generating employment and boosting incomes. It has also had
positive effects beyond the two countries￿ borders, in particular in many other developing
countries.
However, the Report stresses that progress remains far too slow in certain regions. In
sub-Saharan Africa, which has the highest proportion of people living in extreme poverty, per
capita income growth is still too low to make decisive progress. This only underscores the
need for further action by the international community to achieve and maintain strong global
growth dynamics with broad-based participation.
The recent rise in the prices of many primary commodities has provided some economic
breathing space in commodity-dependent economies, but this must not lead to complacency.
On the contrary, this breathing space should be viewed as an opportunity for many developing
countries to accelerate the process of structural change and capital accumulation, and indeed
to reduce their dependence on exports of such commodities. This would boost progress towards
all development goals, and have positive effects in countries with more advanced manufacturing
sectors that provide the machinery and equipment needed for such change.
Our challenge is to sustain the recent positive developments. The Report argues that it is
important not only that the fast-growing Asian countries make the right policy choices, but
also that developed countries take appropriate policy measures to overcome the persistent
imbalances and inequities in the international trading system. A global approach, based on
international action with the effective participation of developing countries in global policy
coordination, is in the interest of all, developed and developing countries alike.
The Goals can still be reached ￿ worldwide and in most, or even all, individual countries
￿ but only if we break with business as usual. The information and analysis contained in this
Report should contribute to the debate about how best to make the global partnership for
development a reality ￿ and how to help many millions of people realize their long-standing
hopes to live in dignity and peace. In that hopeful spirit, I recommend this volume to a wide
global audience.v
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Explanatory notes
Classification by country or commodity group
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analytical convenience and does not necessarily imply any judgement concerning the stage of devel-
opment of a particular country or area.
The major country groupings used in this report follow the reclassification by the United Nations
Statistical Office (UNSO). They are distinguished as:
» Developed or industrial(ized) countries: in general the countries members of OECD (other than
Mexico, the Republic of Korea and Turkey) plus the new EU member countries which are not
OECD members (Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Slovenia).
» The category South-East Europe and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) replaces what
was formerly referred to as ￿transition economies￿.
» Developing countries: all countries, territories or areas not specified above.
The terms ￿country￿ / ￿economy￿ refer, as appropriate, also to territories or areas.
References to ￿Latin America￿ in the text or tables include the Caribbean countries unless otherwise
indicated.
Unless otherwise stated, the classification by commodity group used in this Report follows generally
that employed in the UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2004 (United Nations publication, sales no.
E/F.05.II.D.2).
Other notes
References in the text to TDR are to the Trade and Development Report (of a particular year). For
example, TDR 2004 refers to Trade and Development Report, 2004 (United Nations publication, sales
no. E.04.II.D.29).
The term ￿dollar￿ ($) refers to United States dollars, unless otherwise stated.
The term ￿billion￿ signifies 1,000 million.
The term ￿tons￿ refers to metric tons.
Annual rates of growth and change refer to compound rates.
Exports are valued FOB and imports CIF, unless otherwise specified.
Use of a dash (￿) between dates representing years, e.g. 1988￿1990, signifies the full period
involved, including the initial and final years.
An oblique stroke (/) between two years, e.g. 2000/01, signifies a fiscal or crop year.
A dot (.) indicates that the item is not applicable.
Two dots (..) indicate that the data are not available, or are not separately reported.
A dash (-) or a zero (0) indicates that the amount is nil or negligible.
A plus sign (+) before a figure indicates an increase; a minus sign (-) before a figure indicates a
decrease.
Details and percentages do not necessarily add up to totals because of rounding.xiv
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OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
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RCA revealed comparative advantage
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Y2K year 2000Looking at recent trends in the world economy from the perspective of the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the good news is that in 2004 growth
in the developing countries was rapid and more broad-based than it had been
for many years. Strong per capita income growth continued in China and
India, the two countries with the largest number of people living in absolute
poverty. Latin America has seen a rebound from its deep economic crisis, and
a return to faster growth, fuelled by export expansion. Africa again reached a
growth rate of more than 4.5 per cent in 2004. Moreover, relatively strong
growth in many African countries is envisaged in the short-term, owing to
continuing strong demand for a number of their primary commodities. The
bad news is that even growth rates of close to 5 per cent in sub-Saharan
Africa are insufficient to attain the MDGs, and that the outlook for 2005,
overshadowed by increasing global imbalances, is for slower growth in the
developed countries with attendant effects on the developing countries.
Since the beginning of the new millennium, the performance of the world
economy has been shaped by the increasingly important role of China and
India. Rapid growth in these two large economies has spilled over to many
other developing countries and has established East and South Asia as a new
growth pole in the world economy. Their ascent has been accompanied by
new features of global interdependence, such as a brighter outlook for ex-
porters of primary commodities, rising trade among developing countries,
increasing exports of capital from the developing to the developed countries,
but also intensified competition on the global markets for certain types of
manufactures.
OVERVIEWII
Global prospects and imbalances
The slowdown in global output growth in 2005 is mainly due to a deceleration in the major
developed economies and some emerging economies in Latin America and East Asia. The temporary
weakness in the United States economy has not been compensated by stronger growth performance in
the euro area and in Japan. Both continue to lack the dynamism needed to redress domestic imbalances
and to contribute to an adjustment of the global trade imbalance. Indeed, beginning in the second half
of 2004, output growth in the euro area and Japan has slowed down markedly, causing forecasts for
2005 to be revised downwards. While greatly benefiting from the global expansion over the past three
years, and especially the Asian boom, neither the euro area nor Japan has managed to revive domestic
demand.
Another reason for concern about global economic prospects is the increase in oil prices, which
have doubled since mid-2002, to reach $58 per barrel in July 2005, despite flexible supply adjust-
ments on the part of oil producers. However, the much feared shock of surging oil prices on economic
activity and inflation in developed countries, an impact of the kind witnessed in the 1970s, has so far
not occurred, for two reasons. First, developed countries have become less oil dependent, as energy is
being used more efficiently. At the same time, the share of services in their GDP has gained in impor-
tance at the expense of industry, where more energy is used per unit of output. Second, the recent oil
price increase was not the result of a big supply shock, but of a gradual increase in demand. Under
these conditions, the wage and monetary policy responses in the developed countries have been meas-
ured, and have not jeopardized price stability or output growth.
The recent surge in oil prices has a stronger impact on oil-importing developing economies,
especially in countries where industrialization has led to greater dependence on oil imports. In Brazil,
for example, the oil intensity of domestic production is 40 per cent higher than the OECD average; in
China and Thailand it is more than twice as high, and in India almost three times as high as in the
OECD countries. Therefore, it is primarily in developing countries where inflationary pressures
resulting from further rising oil prices imply risks for the sustainability of the growth process. Even
though inflation has so far been modest, monetary policy has already been tightened in some coun-
tries.
On the other side, not only oil exporters but also many developing countries exporting non-oil
primary commodities benefited from increased demand and rising prices for their exports. Since 2002,
strong demand from East and South Asia, in particular China and India, has been the main factor
behind the hike in commodity prices. In the markets for some primary commodities, emerging supply
constraints have also contributed to the strong price reaction. Asian demand for primary commodities,
particularly for oil and minerals such as copper, iron ore and nickel, as well as for natural rubber and
soybeans, is likely to remain strong, boosting the earnings of the exporters of these products. But
further developments on the markets for primary commodities will also critically depend on howIII
much additional supply capacity will be created by recent new investments, how fast this capacity will
go on-stream, and how commodity demand from developed countries will be affected by the need to
correct the existing trade imbalances.
Despite the increasing importance of the fast growing developing countries for international com-
modity markets, developed countries, which still account for two thirds of global non-fuel commodity
imports, will continue to play an important role. It is unlikely that the growing imports of primary
commodities by China and India alone will bring about a permanent reversal of the declining trend in
real commodity prices. Indeed, in real terms, commodity prices are still more than one third below
their 1960￿1985 average. Moreover, the sharp fluctuations in commodity prices constrain the ability
of many developing countries to attain a path of stable and sustained growth and employment creation
that could benefit all segments of their population and allow them to reach the MDGs.
The large global current-account imbalances represent the greatest short-term risk for stable growth
in the world economy. The United States trade deficit has continued to grow despite the depreciation
of the dollar: it has lost 18 per cent of its value on a trade-weighted basis since February 2002. And the
United States current-account deficit accounts for two thirds of the combined global surpluses. The
deficit has increased in recent years vis-￿-vis virtually all its trading partners; the increase has been
the most pronounced in trade with Western Europe and China. On the other hand, China￿s trade is in
surplus not only with the United States but also with many other developed countries. However, despite
these surpluses, China￿s imports from these countries have also increased rapidly, as have its imports from
neighbouring countries and other developing countries.
A well coordinated international macroeconomic approach would considerably enhance the chances
of the poorer countries to consolidate the recent improvements in their growth performance. Such an
approach would also have to involve the major developing countries and aim at avoiding deflationary
adjustments to the global imbalances.
East and South Asia as a new growth pole
Asia has been a region of economic dynamism over the past four decades, with different econo-
mies in the region successively experiencing rapid growth. The large size of the countries that entered
this process most recently, China and India, has established the East and South Asian region as a new
growth pole in the world economy. Due to the high dependence of these large Asian economies on
imports of primary commodities for industrial output growth, in particular fuels and industrial raw
materials, and the resulting linkages with other developing countries, variations in their growth per-
formance will have strong repercussions on the terms of trade and export earnings of other developing
countries. This inevitably raises the question of the sustainability of the pace of growth of these two
economic powers in the medium and long term.
In terms of per capita GDP, both China and India still have a long way to go to approach the
levels of the leading economies. Their potential for catching up is enormous. To realize this potential,
it will be crucial for both countries to achieve further productivity gains in manufacturing activitiesIV
and ensure that all segments of their population participate in income growth. Broad-based income
growth is essential for accelerating the eradication of poverty and gaining widespread social accept-
ance of the required structural changes; but wage increases throughout the economy in line with rising
productivity are also a central pillar for the expansion of domestic consumption and, thus, the
sustainability and stability of output growth. Fixed capital formation depends on favourable demand
expectations in general, and not just on exports, which are subject to the vagaries of the world market
and to changes in international competitiveness.
Shifting trade patterns in China and India
Sustained rapid growth and rising living standards in China and India have been accompanied by
a dramatic increase in Asia￿s shares of world exports and raw material consumption. Given the large
size of the Chinese and Indian economies and their specific patterns of demand, changes in their
structure of supply and demand have a much larger impact on the composition of world trade than did
those of other late industrializers in Asia during their economic ascent. The impact of China￿s growth
on international product markets and global trade flows is already apparent. India￿s merchandise trade
structure may follow a sequence of changes similar to that of China, with a lag of one or two decades,
if industrialization in India gains the same importance in its further economic ascent as it did in the
other fast growing Asian economies.
Metal use in China ￿ and to a lesser extent in India ￿ has strongly increased over the past few
decades, particularly since the mid-1990s. In China, growth in the use of aluminium, copper, nickel
and steel now exceeds that of GDP. Part of this recent increase coincides with very high rates of
investment, especially in infrastructure. However, this recent rapid rise in China￿s intensity of metal
use, and the concomitant increase in its imports of minerals and mining products, may well slow down
once investment growth, especially in construction and infrastructure, decelerates. By contrast, India￿s
intensity of metal use has remained fairly stable over the past four decades, reflecting the country￿s
slower pace of industrialization and the relatively small share of investment in infrastructure in its
GDP.
China￿s energy use has steadily increased since the 1960s, but at a slower rate than its GDP. Its
future energy use will depend on how opposing trends play out: on the one hand, continued rapid
industrialization, higher living standards and improved transport infrastructure will tend to further
increase energy use; on the other hand, there remains considerable potential for the adoption of energy-
saving technologies. In either case, China￿s energy demand is likely to continue to outpace the future
growth of domestic supply.
Agricultural imports will be determined by a number of factors. To the extent that imports of raw
materials for industrial use are needed as production inputs for the expanding domestic market, import
demand will grow further. This is likely to be the case for rubber and wood. On the other hand, imports
of cotton, which to a large extent have depended on the production of textiles and clothing for export,V
can be expected to slow down as the composition of exports shifts to more technology-intensive
products.
A continuous increase in average living standards and further progress in poverty reduction in
China will also lead to higher demand for food and to a change in its dietary composition. So far,
China has remained largely self-sufficient in all major food items. But with increasing consumption it
is likely to become more dependent on food imports in the future, notwithstanding possible productivity
and output growth in its domestic agricultural sector as a result of recent agricultural policy reforms.
Given the size of its economy, even small changes in self-sufficiency ratios can have a considerable
impact on China￿s agricultural imports.
Since the mid-1980s China has substantially upgraded its export basket, in which labour- and
resource-intensive manufactures and, increasingly, electronics, have become dominant. China￿s ex-
ports still have a relatively high import content, but there are indications of a rise in the share of
domestic value added in China￿s processing trade, particularly in the electronics sector. India has not
experienced the kind of manufacturing export boom that has characterized the other rapidly growing
economies in Asia. It has become a leading exporter of software and IT-enabled services, particularly
to the United States, but it is highly uncertain whether their share in India￿s export earnings can rise
much further. Over the next few years, the absolute value of these services￿ exports may continue to
grow, but export dynamism in manufacturing is likely to become stronger.
The growth dynamics in China and other Asian economies have positive effects for many devel-
oped and developing countries. This is true for those countries that benefit directly from the surge in
import demand from the fast growing Asian economies. It is also true for those that benefit indirectly
through the positive growth effects in the economies of their main trading partners. Still others have
achieved higher export and income growth as a result of the rise in commodity prices, even though
their exports to the fast growing Asian economies are relatively small. But it also has to be recognized
that China￿s increasing participation in international trade poses new challenges for many countries.
Its weight in international markets due to the very large size of its economy may contribute to a fall in
the export prices of manufactures that it produces and exports along with other developing countries,
such as clothing, footwear and certain types of information and communication technology products.
The rise of China￿s clothing exports, in particular, occurred at a time when several developing coun-
tries had adopted more outward-oriented development strategies, and many had developed production
and export activities in the clothing sector partly in response to the quota regulations under the Multi-
Fibre Arrangement.
There is little doubt that the pace of development in the populous Asian economies, and espe-
cially in China, requires accelerated structural change in many other countries ￿ developing and
developed alike. In some sectors, such as the clothing industry and, more generally, in activities at the
low-skill end of the economy, the adjustment pressure is stronger than in others where there is less
competition from low-wage producers with relatively high productivity. There are widespread fears in
many countries that the pace of structural change could result in higher unemployment and lower
output. Paradoxically, among the developed countries, those with large deficits in their trade balance,
such as Australia, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States, have performed much better in
terms of domestic growth and employment than countries that have been recording large trade sur-
pluses and greater competitiveness, such as Germany and Japan. Challenging the commitment of all
countries to develop a global partnership for development and responding to the integration of large
and poor countries by giving in to protectionist pressures would be counterproductive: most of the
earnings of developing countries from their exports to the developed countries are translated into
higher import demand for advanced industrial products, and thus flow back, directly or indirectly, to
the latter.VI
The growing importance of South-South trade
Trade among developing countries has sometimes been promoted as an alternative to the tradi-
tional trade pattern where developing-country trade relies mainly on primary commodity exports to
developed countries in exchange for imports of manufactures. The rapid rise in the importance of
South-South trade, particularly over the past two decades, reflects a number of factors. First, there has
been an upswing following the downturn of such trade during the 1980s. Second, the move towards
the adoption of more outward-oriented development strategies, along with trade reform and regional
trade agreements, in a wide range of developing countries has significantly improved access to their
markets, including for imports from other developing countries. But the most important reason for the
rapid growth of South-South trade is that output growth in some large developing economies, particu-
larly China, has been much faster than in the developed countries. Moreover, these countries￿ buoyant
growth performance has been closely linked with increasing intraregional specialization and production-
sharing.
While increased South-South trade is a fact, recent developments in the developing countries as
a whole require a careful assessment of the statistical data. Indeed, such an assessment calls for a
number of qualifications to the prima facie impression that trade among developing countries has
grown massively over the past decade or so, and that exports of manufactures account for much of that
rise.
The growing role of developing countries in world trade flows appears to be the result, above all,
of the above-average growth performance of a few Asian economies, and the associated shifts in the
level and composition of their external trade. A substantial part of the statistical increase in South-
South trade in manufactures is due to double-counting associated with intraregional production-sharing
in East Asia for products eventually destined for export to developed countries. It is also due to double-
counting associated with the function of Hong Kong (China) and Singapore as transhipment ports or
regional hub ports. The important role of triangular trade in the measured rise of South-South trade in
manufactures implies that the bulk of such trade has not reduced the dependence of developing countries￿
manufactured exports on aggregate demand in developed-country markets. As long as final demand
from developed countries ￿ notably the United States, which is East Asia￿s most important export
market ￿ remains high for products for which production-sharing within East Asia plays an important
role, triangular trade and, thus, South-South trade, will remain strong. On the other hand, the economic
rebound in Latin America has improved the prospects for South-South trade in manufactures that is
not related to triangular trade.
The rise of South-South trade in primary commodities appears more modest in trade statistics.
However, it has involved a larger number of countries than the strong rise of South-South trade in
manufactures. It has allowed Africa, as well as Latin America and the Caribbean to recoup some of the
market shares in total South-South trade that they had lost in the 1980s. Indeed, the rise in South-VII
South exports of primary commodities to the rapidly growing Asian developing countries is likely to
evolve into the most resilient feature of what has come to be called the ￿new geography of trade￿.
The promotion of South-South trade remains a desirable objective for a variety of reasons. First,
sluggish growth in developed countries and their continued trade barriers against products of export
interest to developing countries implies that developing countries need to give greater attention to
each other￿s markets to promote export growth in order to achieve their economic growth targets.
Second, the vast size of the rapidly growing Asian economies reduces the need for developing coun-
tries to seek developed-country markets in order to benefit from economies of scale. Third, continued
dependence on developed-country markets exposes developing countries to possible pressure that
links better access to those markets with binding commitments to rapid trade and financial liberaliza-
tion, protection of intellectual property and an open-door policy for FDI. More generally, it also en-
tails the risk of increasingly narrowing the policy space for developing countries.
Terms of trade revisited
The recent and ongoing changes in international trade, with respect to both product composition
and direction of trade, is affecting developing countries in different ways, depending on the product
composition of their exports and imports. On the export side, the impact differs according to the
shares of manufactures and primary commodities, and on the import side, it is especially the depend-
ence on fuels and industrial raw materials that determines the outcome for individual countries.
The same factors that improved the terms of trade of some groups of countries, especially the
higher prices of oil and minerals and mining products, led to a worsening of the terms of trade in
others. In some countries, particularly in Latin America, but also in Africa, the positive effect of price
movements on the purchasing power of exports was reinforced by an increase in export volumes;
whereas in others, gains from higher export unit values were compensated, or even over-compensated,
by higher import prices. Since 2002, economies with a high share of oil and minerals and mining
products in their total merchandise exports have gained the most from recent developments in interna-
tional product markets. The terms of trade of countries with a dominant share of oil exports increased by
almost 30 per cent between 2002 and 2004, and those of countries with a dominant share of minerals
and mining products in their exports increased by about 15 per cent. Terms-of-trade developments
have varied the most among economies where agricultural commodities have dominated total mer-
chandise exports. This reflects large differences in the movement of prices for specific products within
this category, differences in the shares of other primary commodities in their exports and the share of
oil in their merchandise imports.
Developing countries for which manufactures are the dominant category of exports, and which
are at the same time net importers of oil and minerals and metals have seen a deterioration in their
terms of trade in the past two or three years. The deterioration, due to the combined effects of rising
prices of imported primary commodities and stagnating or falling prices of their manufactured exports,
could well become a longer term feature in their external trade. There are two reasons for this: first,
there are indications that the prices for their manufactured exports are falling relative to the prices ofVIII
the manufactures they are importing from the developed countries; second, prices for primary com-
modities are likely to remain strong as long as industrial growth remains vigorous in the large Asian
economies and the imbalances in the developed world can be settled without entering into a recession.
Indeed, the terms-of-trade losses of exporters of manufactures among the developing countries
are partly explained by the pace of the catch-up process in some of these countries, particularly in
China and India. This process has been driven by higher productivity in the export sectors, which has
given them a competitive edge and led to higher import demand. The variations in the global pattern
of demand and their impact on individual countries have resulted in a redistribution of income, not
only between developed and developing countries, but also, and to an increasing extent, between
different groups of developing countries. However, it is important to recognize that a change in the
distribution of real income does not necessarily imply absolute losses. As long as output growth is
strong enough, all countries can gain in terms of real income, with some gaining more than others,
depending on the structure of their exports and the international competitiveness of their producers: a
terms-of-trade deterioration can be compensated by rising export volume. The probability for this to
happen is much greater if exports consist of manufactures, for which the price elasticity of demand is
high, than if they consist of primary commodities.
The productivity gains in Asia have led not only to higher company profits, but also to higher
wages; they have also benefited consumers at home and abroad through lower prices. Higher export
earnings, despite lower export prices, have enabled Asian countries to pay higher prices for imported
inputs, which, in turn, has represented terms-of-trade gains for many primary commodity exporters.
Moreover, exports from Asia also benefit from rising demand in those developing countries that have
seen their export earnings rise thanks to growing Asian demand for their commodities.
Policies for managing the new forms
of global interdependence
Although continuing growth in East and South Asia and recovery in other regions of the developing
world are likely to sustain the demand for primary commodities, the basic problem of instability in
these prices and their long-term tendency to deteriorate in real terms vis-￿-vis the prices of manufactures,
especially those exported by developed countries, remains unresolved. Therefore, it is imperative for
developing countries not to become complacent about industrialization and diversification. There is a
risk that the recent recovery of primary commodity markets could lead to a shift away from invest-
ment ￿ both domestic and foreign ￿ in the nascent manufacturing sectors of commodity-exporting coun-
tries in favour of extractive industries. While higher investment in that area may be beneficial in terms
of creating additional supply capacity and raising productivity, this should not be at the expense of
investment in manufacturing. Exporters of primary commodities that have recently benefited from
higher prices and, in some cases, from higher export volumes, have to continue their efforts towards
greater diversification within the primary commodity sector, as well as upgrading their manufacturing
and services sectors. The recent windfall gains from higher primary commodity earnings provide an
opportunity to step up investment in infrastructure and productive capacity ￿ both essential for boosting
development.IX
At the national level, this raises the question of the sharing of export revenues from extractive
industries, which has always been a central concern in development strategy. Higher global demand
and international prices for fuels and mining products have been attracting additional FDI to these
sectors in a number of developing countries, and this may increase the scope in these countries for
mobilizing additional resources for development. However, government revenues from taxes on profits
in these sectors have typically been very low, partly due to a policy since the beginning of the 1990s
of attracting FDI through the offer of fiscal incentives. Such a policy risks engaging potential host
countries in ￿a race to the bottom￿ which, clearly, should be avoided.
Additional sources of fiscal revenue from primary export-oriented activities may be royalties,
the conclusion of joint ventures or full public ownership of the operating firms. However, efforts to
obtain adequate fiscal revenue should not deprive the operators, private or public, of the financial
resources they need to increase their productivity and supply capacity, or their international competi-
tiveness. Recent upward trends in world market prices of fuels and minerals and mining products as a
result of growing demand from East and South Asia provide an opportunity to review the existing
fiscal and ownership regimes. Such a review ￿ which is already under way in several countries ￿ and
possible strategic policy adjustments could be more effective if oil and mineral exporting countries
would cooperate in the formulation of some generally agreed principles relating to the fiscal treatment
of foreign investors. Moreover, a higher share of the public sector or consumers in the rent generated
by extractive industries does not automatically enhance development and progress towards the MDGs;
it has to be accompanied by strategic use of the proceeds for investment that would enhance productive
capacity in other sectors, as well as in education, health and infrastructure.
At the international level, recent increases in the prices of some primary commodities and im-
provements in the terms of trade of a number of developing countries may not have changed the long-
term trend in real commodity prices or altered the problem of their volatility. Wide fluctuations in
primary commodity prices are not in the interest of either producers or consumers. This has also been
recognized by the IMF￿s International Monetary and Financial Committee, which, at its April 2005
meeting, inter alia, underscored ￿the importance of stability in oil markets for global prosperity￿ and
encouraged ￿closer dialogue between oil exporters and importers￿. Although primary commodities
other than oil may be less important for the developed countries, they are nevertheless equally, if not
more important for those developing countries that depend on exports of such commodities. And since
in many of the latter countries extreme poverty is a pressing problem, the issue of commodity price
stability is of crucial importance not only for the achievement of the MDGs but also for global pros-
perity in general. Consequently, in the spirit of a global partnership for development, the international
community might consider reviewing mechanisms at the global or regional level that could serve to
reduce the instability of prices of a wider range of commodities, not just oil, to mitigate its impact on
the national incomes of exporting countries.
In the short term, however, the central policy issue concerns the correction of existing global
trade imbalances. It is often argued that the decision of central banks in the developing world, and in
particular in Asia, to intervene in the currency market is the main reason for these imbalances. Indeed,
most of the intervening countries explicitly try to avoid currency appreciation that could result from
speculative capital inflows, in order to ensure that the international competitiveness of the majority of
their producers is not put at risk. Most of the East Asian countries adopted a system of unilateral fixing
of their exchange rates following the Asian financial crisis, while most Latin American turned to
managed floating. In both cases, the aim has been to maintain the real exchange rate at a competitive
level while gaining a certain degree of independence from international capital markets.
In the absence of a multilateral exchange rate system that takes account of the concerns of small
and open developing economies, such unilateral stabilization of the exchange rate at a competitive
level appears to be an effective means of crisis prevention. Individual central banks do have the capacityX
for successful and credible counter-attacks when their own currency is under ￿threat￿ or pressure to
appreciate. By contrast, they are practically powerless to stabilize an exchange rate that has come
under threat or pressure to depreciate, even if central banks have accumulated huge reserves of inter-
national currency. It would require multilateral cooperation and policy coherence to address this type
of asymmetry. The premature liberalization of capital markets has seriously heightened the vulner-
ability of developing countries to external financial shocks. Moreover, it has become clear that strengthen-
ing domestic financial systems is not enough to significantly reduce that vulnerability.
For a smooth redressing of the global imbalances, it is essential to avoid a recession in developed
countries ￿ where growth has been depending excessively on the United States economy ￿ and a
marked slowdown in developing countries. A scenario which seeks to correct the global imbalances,
and most importantly the external deficit of the United States, through massive exchange rate appre-
ciation and lower domestic absorption in China and other developing countries in Asia, will almost
inevitably have a deflationary impact on the world economy. It will not only jeopardize China￿s at-
tempts to integrate a vast pool of rural workers and, more generally, reduce poverty, but will also
adversely affect the efforts of other developing countries towards achieving the MDGs.
By contrast, adjusting the global imbalances will be less deflationary if demand from the euro
area and Japan grows faster. It should not be forgotten that much of the counterpart to the United
States￿ external deficit is to be found in the surpluses of other developed countries. The current-account
surpluses of the euro area and Japan with the rest of the world are mushrooming ￿ despite rising
import bills for oil and other primary commodities. Indeed, Japan and Germany together accounted
for $268 billion or about 30 per cent of the combined global current-account surplus in 2004. This
compares with an overall current-account surplus of $193 billion in East and South Asia. China, the
country on which revaluation pressure has been most intense, accounts for just over one third of this
amount, or less than 8 per cent of the combined global surplus.
International initiatives to alleviate poverty and to reach the MDGs should not ignore the impor-
tance of a smooth correction of the global imbalances so as to ensure the sustainability of the ￿Asian
miracle￿. Indeed, further economic catch-up by China and India will have expansionary effects for
most developing countries. Any slowing down or disruption of this process would carry the risk of
intensifying global price competition on the markets for manufactures exported by developing countries,
while weakening the expansionary effects resulting from the growing demand from Asia.
Supachai Panitchpakdi
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The world economy is still growing at a
steady pace but the risk of a relapse hangs in the
balance. The moderate slowdown registered in the
first half of 2005 indicates that the world￿s main
engine of growth, the United States economy, may
not be able to drive forward global growth with-
out the support from other parts of the world.
Meanwhile, the euro area is stuck in stagnation,
and Japan￿s growth shows a moderate deceleration.
Growth performance in the developing coun-
tries was generally good and the populous East
and South Asian countries, in particular China and
India, acted as the second engine of worldwide
growth. As a result of their vigorous expansion
and their strong demand for imports of raw mate-
rials, many other developing countries have
experienced windfall revenues from rising com-
modity prices and surging demand for intermediate
products. Even Africa posted a growth rate of
about 4.5 per cent in 2004 and it is expected to
expand by close to 5 per cent this year. Although
these growth rates allow for an increase in per
capita income, in sub-Saharan Africa they are still
insufficient to attain the Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs) by 2015. Section B of this chapter
assesses the global growth record and regional
performances.
The sustainability of the present growth path
is facing several threats. Serious multilateral ac-
tion to unwind global current-account imbalances
without endangering the growth process has been
missing. Instead, political pressure on some coun-
tries to take unilateral measures is mounting, as
analysed in section C of this chapter. It is shown
that the European Union, in its own interest,
should do more to accelerate domestic demand
growth and enhance absorption.
Section D of this chapter focuses on the ef-
fects of the oil price hike on the world economy
from a historical perspective. It shows that the
direct impact of quickly rising oil-import bills on
the developed countries has been much less pro-
nounced than in the period which followed the oil
price shocks of the 1970s. Moreover, there are so
far no signs of negative indirect effects on infla-
tion and interest rates. On the other hand, the oil
price hike has had, and continues to have, a sig-
nificant impact on the economies of many
oil-importing developing countries.
Section E examines some aspects of the
present economic expansion in China and India,
and compares it with the rapid growth episodes
experienced by Japan and the Republic of Korea
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in the period following the Second World War. It
highlights the role played by profit-investment
linkages, the sectors driving the economy, the need
of establishing a balance between expanding do-
mestic and foreign demand, and the importance
of supportive macroeconomic policies.
B.  The world economy: growth performance and prospects
The world economy grew by almost 4 per
cent in 2004, recording its best performance since
2000. Global growth continued into 2005 ￿ albeit
at a slower pace ￿ and is expected to fall to around
3 per cent. Most of this deceleration is attribut-
able to the slowdown in developed economies,
although some developing countries are also
showing signs of losing momentum. Developing
economies as a whole are expected to grow by
5 to 5.5 per cent, down from 6.4 per cent in 2004
(table 1.1).
1. Economic activity in developed
countries
Domestic demand was the main driving force
of growth in the United States in 2004, with pri-
vate domestic investment growing at a two-digit
rate and personal consumption maintaining a sig-
nificant rate of growth, especially in durable
goods. The volume and value of United States
exports grew at a brisk pace in 2004 and the first
months of 2005, in part because of the real depre-
ciation of the dollar. However, imports grew even
faster and, as a consequence, trade contribution
to gross domestic product (GDP) growth continued
to be negative. Trade and current-account deficits
widened, with the latter rising to 6 per cent of GDP
in the last quarter of 2004, raising the question of
what supplementary policies would be needed if
the United States current account is to be signifi-
cantly reduced (see section C).
Annual growth in the United States is fore-
casted to be around 3.5 per cent in 2005 (Klein and
Ozmucur, 2005). Indeed, personal consumption
expenditures and fixed investment have slowed
in the first quarter 2005.1 It is an open question
whether these are the first signs of a persistent
deceleration of growth. On one hand, recent in-
creases in labour income and corporate profits may
support future private expenditure while, on the
other hand, their positive effects may be offset by
slower productivity gains, high energy costs, and
the fading of temporary factors such as tax cuts
and the depreciation of the dollar. Moreover, di-
minishing fiscal and monetary stimulus may
eventually affect domestic demand. Fiscal policy
is set to be less expansive than in previous years,
as it aims to reduce the public deficit from 3.6 per
cent of GDP in 2004 to 1.8 per cent by 2009. This
may require some cutbacks in expenditure, espe-
cially if reforms involving fiscal costs, such as
those associated with the social security system,
are carried out while higher interest rates weigh
on public debt services. Even if interest rates re-
main at historically low levels, rising rates may
have a negative effect on the consumption of du-
rable goods and on fixed investment. More
generally, interest rate movements may have size-
able economic effects, as domestic debt levels inCurrent Issues in the World Economy 3
non-financial sectors reached $24.8 trillion at the
end of the first quarter of 2005 ￿ roughly twice the
size of GDP.
Rising interest rates and/or a decline in
housing prices may also affect other developed
countries ￿ such as Australia, Canada and the
United Kingdom ￿ where private consumption has
been partly sustained by booming house prices and
rising household indebtedness. This contribution
to growth is most likely coming to an end as house-
hold saving ratios recover from their current low
levels. Real appreciation has hampered export
volumes and boosted imports in Australia and
Canada, resulting in a negative contribution of net
exports to GDP growth; however, these countries
have benefited from significant gains in terms of
trade, in large part due to their primary commod-
ity exports. Australia, Canada and the United
Kingdom are expected to experience a moderate
decline in their GDP growth in 2005, to a rate close
to 2.5 per cent.
Economic growth in the euro area has slowed
since mid-2004. Most forecasters have reduced the
2005 growth expectations (set in the Autumn of
2004) from 2 per cent to 1.5 per cent or even
slightly below. The economic slowdown was
mainly attributed to a fall in the growth rate of
exports (induced by the appreciation of the euro)
in concert with sluggish domestic demand in many
countries. As pointed out by UNCTAD over the
Table 1.1
WORLD OUTPUT GROWTH, 1990￿2005a
(Percentage change over previous year)
 1990￿
Region/country
b 2000
c 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
d 2005
e
World 2.7 2.9 4.0 1.3 1.8 2.5 3.8 3.0
Developed countries 2.4 2.7 3.5 1.0 1.3 1.7 3.0 2.3
of which:
Japan 1.4 0.1 2.8 0.4 -0.3 1.4 2.6 1.8
United States 3.4 4.1 3.8 0.3 2.4 3.0 4.4 3.5
European Union 2.1 2.9 3.6 1.7 1.1 0.9 2.1 1.5
of which:
European Union-15 2.1 2.9 3.5 1.6 1.0 0.8 2.0 1.4
Euro area 2.0 2.8 3.5 1.6 0.9 0.5 1.8 1.2
France 1.7 3.2 3.8 2.1 1.2 0.5 2.1 1.5
Germany 1.6 2.0 2.9 0.9 0.2 -0.1 1.0 0.8
Italy 1.6 1.7 3.0 1.8 0.4 0.3 1.0 -0.4
United Kingdom 2.7 2.8 3.8 2.1 1.7 2.2 3.1 2.0
South-East Europe and CIS -4.3 3.4 8.1 5.6 4.9 6.9 7.5 6.0
Developing countries 4.8 3.5 5.4 2.4 3.5 4.7 6.4 5.4
Developing countries, excluding China 4.0 3.0 5.0 1.5 2.7 3.9 5.7 4.6
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2004; United Nations, Department of
Economic and Social Affairs (UN/DESA), Development Policy and Planning Office, Project Link estimates; national
sources; IMF, World Economic Outlook, April 2005; JP Morgan, Global Data Watch, various issues; Economic Intelligence
Unit (EIU), Country Forecast, various issues; and OECD, Economic Outlook No. 77.
a Calculations are based on GDP in constant market prices based on 1995 dollars.
b Region and country groups correspond to those defined in the UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2004.
c Average.
d Preliminary estimates.
e Forecast.Trade and Development Report, 2005 4
past three years, the biggest European countries
have not been able to reach a higher and sustain-
able growth path despite receiving enormous
stimulus from the world economy. This inability
is attributed to depressed domestic demand as a
result of a mixture of deflationary wage policies
(i.e. in Germany, where a 0.8 per cent growth rate
expected in 2005) and losses of market shares (i.e.
in Italy, whose GDP is expected to fall in 2005).
France, with a more moderate deflationary policy
than Germany, remains in the middle of the group,
with growth forecasted at around 1.5 per cent.
Spain is estimated to grow at a rate of about 3 per
cent in 2005 owing to sustained domestic demand.
As no fundamental changes in economic policy
within the euro area are foreseen, an acceleration
of growth in the near future cannot be expected.
The 2005 outlook for the ten new members of the
European Union is more upbeat and growth rates
are expected to exceed 4 per cent.
All in all, Europe is not positioned to help
reduce global imbalances in the next two years.
Its overall current-account deficit is rather low
(0.3 per cent of GDP) but the imbalances of coun-
tries inside the European Monetary Union in-
creased dramatically in the last three years. For
example, Germany￿s surplus of $110 billion (3.8 per
cent of GDP), forecasted for 2005 by IMF (2005a),
is much larger than China￿s surplus.
In 2004, Japan recorded a growth rate of
2.6 per cent, which was driven by private and pub-
lic consumption, non-residential investment and
brisk export performance. Growth was strong in
the first quarter of 2004, but faded in the second
half of the year, as domestic and foreign demand
weakened. In the first months of 2005, high cor-
porate profits and the reversal of the long-lasting
downward trend in employment and wages indi-
cate that the sluggishness of domestic demand in
the second half of 2004 may be over. Recent data
on export performance are, however, less positive.
They show a year-on-year deceleration of exports
in late 2004, due to a slowdown in electronics ex-
ports. This is partly related to rising foreign direct
investment (FDI) and production relocation to
China (see chapter II). As a result, in 2005 trade
is not expected to make a positive contribution to
real GDP growth as it had in 2004. The forecast
for 2005 points to a moderate deceleration in real
growth to 1.8 per cent.
2. Economic activity in developing
countries
In 2004, all developing regions posted sig-
nificantly higher growth rates than in previous
years (table 1.2). With a GDP growth of 4.6 per
cent, Africa continued to grow at the same rate as
in 2003 ￿ the highest level reached in about a dec-
ade. However, the overall figures for the region
mask considerable differences across countries,
with growth rates ranging from an expansion of
31 per cent (Chad) to a contraction of over 8 per
cent (Zimbabwe). The strong growth performance
in Africa was fuelled mainly by higher prices of
primary commodity exports, particularly petro-
leum, on the back of strong global demand.
Economic growth was also supported by greater
political stability and the improved agricultural
performance resulting from favourable weather
conditions. The continued growth in domestic
demand is also credited to increased levels of ex-
ternal resource inflows via aid and debt relief, with
the latter contributing to lower fiscal deficits. The
general level of inflation went down from over
10 per cent to about 8 per cent.
Real GDP growth in 2004 was widespread in
both sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa. High
oil prices underscored output growth in Central
Africa, which recorded the highest subregional
growth rate at just over 7 per cent, and North Af-
rica, with a growth rate of around 5 per cent.
Economic performance in East and West Africa
benefited from a combination of higher agricul-
tural output and rising commodity prices. However,
economic growth in West Africa was subdued, due
to political instability in C￿te d￿Ivoire and a lo-
cust invasion in Mali, Niger and Senegal. Despite
higher growth in South Africa, the Southern African
region recorded the worst economic performance
of all the African subregions, largely due to the
continued economic contraction experienced by
Zimbabwe as a consequence of drought and eco-
nomic uncertainties.
Twelve African countries posted real output
growth of 6 per cent or more in 2004, eight of
which are either oil exporters (Chad, Equatorial
Guinea, Angola, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and
Sudan), or are recovering from a very low base
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public of the Congo). Thus, once again, most coun-
tries have fallen short of the 7 per cent annual
growth rate that is needed to attain the MDGs. A
modest improvement is expected in the region￿s
economic performance in 2005 on the back of
continuing macroeconomic and political stability
and high commodity prices; although domestic
prices and external accounts in oil-importing coun-
tries will continue to suffer from high oil prices.
However, even in oil-exporting countries that have
been growing at two-digit rates over the past few
years, poverty levels will not be significantly re-
duced unless governments manage to channel a
significant part of the oil revenues into financing
of non-oil economic sectors (including social and
economic infrastructure), where the great major-
ity of population is employed.
West Asia performed strongly in 2004, reach-
ing 6.2 per cent growth in comparison to 5.3 per
cent in the previous year. These performances are
directly related to the massive injection of wind-
fall revenues flowing into oil exporting countries,
which also benefited indirectly most of the other
countries in the region through increased demand
for their exports, capital inflows and workers re-
mittances.
Export revenues of the major oil exporters
in the region (excluding Iraq) reached $292 bil-
lion in 2004,2 32 per cent more than in the previous
year, owing mainly to higher international oil
prices. The volume of oil production also in-
creased (4.2 per cent for the group as a whole),
contributing significantly to real GDP growth.
These additional revenues, on average, repre-
sented 12 per cent of these countries￿ GDP, and
boosted domestic expenditure. In particular, govern-
ment revenues augmented significantly, allowing for
an increase in public expenditures and, simulta-
neously, a significant fiscal surplus. Part of the
surplus has been used to accumulate reserves, but
another part was used to reduce indebtedness. As
in some countries (notably Saudi Arabia) the bulk
of public debt is held by nationals, debt repay-
ments have further expanded private liquidity and
demand. Expansionary trends have continued into
2005. Oil prices rose by 30 per cent in the first
half of the year; if such price levels persist, oil
revenues will increase in 2005 at a similar rate as
in the previous year. Oil production is set to in-
crease further in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and
will probably be maintained at the current high
levels in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Qatar and
the United Arab Emirates. In addition, several in-
vestment projects are on line, covering the energy
sector (oil, gas and refineries), infrastructure, tele-
communications and real estate. At the same time,
government expenditure is set to continue its up-
ward trend; and it is aimed, in part, at addressing
social problems related to high unemployment.
Other economies within the region, such as
Jordan and Lebanon, also experienced accelerated
growth in 2004, mainly driven by domestic de-
mand that was stimulated by the expansion of
regional tourism and higher workers remittances
(ESCWA, 2005). Also, capital inflows into real
estate investments boosted the construction sec-
tor. These countries managed to expand exports
and profit from higher regional demand, includ-
ing from Iraq. However, imports also expanded
significantly and public debt remains high. These
circumstances limited the room for manoeuvre of
economic policies, making them highly depend-
ent on continued inflows of capital, tourism and
remittances.
Turkey posted a 8.9 per cent growth rate in
2004, propelled by strong domestic demand, in
particular private consumption and fixed invest-
ment. An economic slowdown began in the second
half of that year and extended into the first months
of 2005.3 However, GDP growth in 2005 is estimated
to remain at around 5 per cent. Macroeconomic
policy has to deal with the ￿twin￿ deficits prob-
lem. Overall fiscal balance remained negative in
2004, despite a primary surplus of 6.5 per cent of
GDP, due to a public debt stock amounting to three
quarters of GDP and high real interest rates. More-
over, although exports were growing significantly,
the current-account deficit reached 5 per cent of
GDP in 2004, as a result of booming imports and
interest payments. These deficits remain a chal-
lenging issue for the Turkish economy. On the
other hand, the continued reduction of interest
rates by the central bank may play an important
role in the sustainability of public debt and in pre-
venting an excessive economic slowdown.
With 7.1 per cent growth in 2004, East and
South Asia recorded its strongest expansion since
the 1997 financial crisis. China led the boom with
output growing by 9.5 per cent, but growth wasTrade and Development Report, 2005 6
Table 1.2
GDP GROWTH IN SELECTED DEVELOPING ECONOMIES,
SOUTH-EAST EUROPE AND CIS, 1990￿2005a
(Percentage change over previous year)
 1990￿
Region/economyb 2000c 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004d 2005e
Developing economies 4.8 3.5 5.4 2.4 3.5 4.7 6.4 5.4
Latin America 3.3 0.2 3.8 0.4 -0.6 2.0 5.7 4.2
of which:
Argentina 4.1 -3.4 -0.8 -4.4 -10.9 8.7 9.0 7.5
Bolivia 4.0 0.4 2.3 1.5 2.8 2.9 3.6 3.5
Brazil 2.9 0.8 4.5 1.5 1.5 0.6 4.9 3.0
Chile 6.6 -0.8 4.2 3.1 2.1 3.3 6.1 6.0
Colombia 2.9 -4.2 2.9 1.4 2.5 2.0 4.0 3.5
Ecuador 2.2 -6.3 2.8 5.1 3.8 3.1 6.9 3.0
Mexico 3.1 3.6 6.6 -0.2 0.9 1.3 4.4 3.3
Paraguay 2.2 0.5 -0.4 2.7 -2.3 2.6 4.0 3.0
Peru 4.6 0.9 2.8 0.3 4.9 4.0 4.8 5.5
Uruguay 3.4 -2.4 -1.4 -3.4 -11.2 2.5 12.3 5.5
Venezuela 1.6 -6.1 3.2 2.8 -8.9 -7.5 17.9 8.0
Africa 2.6 3.0 3.5 3.4 2.9 4.7 4.6 4.9
of which:
Algeria 1.9 3.2 2.4 2.1 4.1 6.7 5.8 7.5
Cameroon 1.8 4.2 5.3 4.6 4.0 4.0 4.8 4.5
Cape Verde 6.0 8.6 6.8 3.0 4.6 5.0 4.0 6.0
C￿te d￿Ivoire 3.3 1.9 -2.7 0.1 -1.2 1.8 -1.0 -1.0
Democratic Republic of the Congo -4.9 -4.3 -6.9 -1.1 3.1 5.0 6.8 7.0
Egypt 4.2 5.4 3.5 3.2 3.1 2.8 3.2 5.0
Ethiopia 3.9 6.3 5.4 7.9 1.2 -3.8 11.6 6.0
Ghana 4.3 4.4 3.7 4.2 4.5 4.7 5.8 5.0
Kenya 2.1 1.3 -0.2 1.1 1.0 1.8 2.6 3.0
Morocco 2.3 -0.1 1.0 6.3 3.2 5.2 3.7 4.0
Nigeria 2.9 2.8 5.8 2.8 1.5 10.7 5.1 4.5
South Africa 2.1 2.0 3.5 2.7 3.6 2.8 3.7 4.0
Tunisia 4.7 6.1 4.7 4.9 1.7 5.6 5.7 5.0
Zimbabwe 2.5 -0.7 -4.9 -8.4 -5.6 -13.2 -8.2 -3.0
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.6 2.9 3.9 3.2 3.0 4.8 4.4 4.4
Asia 6.0 5.3 6.6 3.2 5.5 5.9 6.9 6.0
Asia, excluding China 4.9 4.8 6.2 1.9 4.7 4.8 6.0 4.8
 West Asia 3.2 -0.6 4.6 -0.1 4.3 5.3 6.2 5.2
of which:
Iran, Islamic Republic of 3.5 4.2 2.8 3.2 8.0 6.7 5.4 5.5
Jordan 4.6 1.5 2.7 3.5 4.9 3.0 6.2 5.0
Lebanon 6.3 4.0 2.0 1.4 2.0 3.0 4.0 2.0
Saudi Arabia 1.7 -0.8 4.9 1.2 0.1 7.2 5.3 5.5
Turkey 3.8 -4.7 7.4 -7.5 7.8 5.8 8.9 5.0
United Arab Emirates 2.6 2.5 5.4 5.0 1.6 6.3 5.9 6.0
Yemen 5.5 3.7 5.1 3.9 3.3 4.2 2.0 3.0
East and South Asia 6.6 6.5 7.0 3.9 5.7 6.0 7.1 6.1
of which:
China 10.4 7.0 7.9 7.5 8.0 9.1 9.5 9.0
Hong Kong (China) 4.0 3.4 10.2 0.5 2.3 1.5 8.1 5.0
India 6.0 7.1 4.0 5.5 4.3 7.8 6.7 6.5
Indonesia 4.2 0.8 4.9 3.4 4.3 5.0 5.1 6.0
Malaysia 7.0 6.1 8.3 0.5 4.1 5.3 7.1 5.5
Pakistan 3.5 4.3 2.6 2.9 5.8 5.3 6.3 7.5
Philippines 3.3 3.4 6.0 3.0 4.4 4.7 6.1 4.0
Republic of Korea 5.8 10.9 9.3 3.1 6.4 3.1 4.6 3.5
Singapore 7.7 6.4 9.4 -2.4 3.2 1.4 8.4 2.5
Taiwan Province of China 6.3 5.3 5.8 -2.2 3.9 3.3 5.7 3.5
Thailand 4.2 4.4 4.6 1.8 5.4 6.7 6.1 4.0
Viet Nam 7.9 4.8 6.8 6.9 7.0 6.0 7.7 7.0
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also strong in most other countries in the region
(table 1.2). Economic growth was generally fuelled
by a combination of strong foreign demand and
robust domestic demand. Exports have been a
major driving force: in 2004, exports of goods
from the region grew by 22 per cent in volume
terms (table 1.3). China￿s exports led the expan-
sion, with export volume growing by 33 per cent,
but several other countries that participate in re-
gional production networks associated with China
also benefited from its strong export performance.
The region￿s exports continued to grow at double-
digit rates in 2004, partly as a result of the dynamism
in the global market for electronics. In general,
exchange rate stability helped to maintain inter-
national competitiveness in most countries, although
in Singapore, Taiwan Province of China and Thai-
land, and recently in China as well, managed
floating led to a moderate appreciation vis-￿-vis
the dollar. This softened the impact of the rising
price of primary imports, without leading to a sig-
nificant appreciation of the real effective exchange
rate. Other countries maintained a fixed exchange
rate vis-￿-vis the dollar, or even depreciated their
currency as in Indonesia. Only the Republic of
Korea underwent a significant real appreciation
of its currency, but so far this has not restrained
exports from growing briskly.
With the exception of the Republic of Korea
where private demand was constrained by high
indebtedness of households and small firms, do-
mestic demand contributed considerably to the
region￿s growth. Private consumption provided a
strong stimulus to growth in China, India, Indo-
nesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Viet
Nam, with fixed investment being the main driver
of growth in China and Taiwan Province of China.
Inflation, as measured by consumer prices, showed
a moderate increase in some countries during 2004,
but remained modest in most East and South Asian
countries. Monetary policy maintained an accom-
modative stance and real interest rates have mostly
been declining. On the whole, high income growth
South-East Europe and CIS -4.3 3.4 8.1 5.6 4.9 6.9 7.5 6.0
CIS -5.0 5.6 9.3 5.8 5.0 7.6 7.8 6.3
of which:
Belarus -1.7 3.5 5.8 4.7 5.0 6.8 11.0 7.0
Kazakhstan -4.1 2.7 9.8 13.2 9.9 9.2 9.4 8.5
Russian Federation -4.7 6.4 10.1 5.1 4.7 7.3 7.1 6.0
Ukraine -9.5 -0.2 5.9 9.2 3.6 8.5 12.1 6.5
South-East Europe -1.6 -4.4 3.8 4.6 4.4 4.1 6.4 4.8
of which:
Bulgaria -1.9 2.3 5.4 4.1 4.8 4.8 5.6 5.0
Croatia 0.6 -0.9 2.9 3.8 5.2 4.7 3.8 3.5
Romania -0.6 -1.2 2.1 5.7 4.9 4.8 8.3 5.5
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2004; UN/DESA, Development Policy
and Planning Office, Project Link estimates; ECLAC, Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean 2004￿2005;
ESCAP, Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific 2005; ESCWA, Survey of Economic and Social Develop-
ments in the ESCWA Region 2005; national sources; IMF, World Economic Outlook, April 2005; JP Morgan, Global
Data Watch, various issues; EIU, Country Forecast, various issues; and OECD, Economic Outlook No. 77.
a Calculations are based on GDP in constant market prices based on 1995 dollars.
b Region and country groups correspond to those defined in the UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2004.
c Average.
d Preliminary estimates.
e Forecast.
Table 1.2 (concluded)
GDP GROWTH IN SELECTED DEVELOPING ECONOMIES,
SOUTH-EAST EUROPE AND CIS, 1990￿2005a
(Percentage change over previous year)
 1990￿
Region/economyb 2000c 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004d 2005eTrade and Development Report, 2005 8
and good investment performance contributed to a
balanced increase of domestic and foreign demand.
In 2005, economic expansion in East and
South Asia is expected to slow to a growth rate of
slightly above 6 per cent. In particular, the contri-
bution of external trade to growth is diminishing
in several countries in the region, although it re-
mains significant. Global demand for electronics,
especially personal computers and semiconduc-
tors, is growing much slower since the end of
2004, affecting exports from several Asian econo-
mies, such as Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan
Province of China and Thailand.
On the other hand, domestic demand has gen-
erally maintained its contribution to growth in the
first months of 2005. Private consumption began
to recover in the Republic of Korea in the last
quarter of 2004, after contracting for almost two
successive years. However, this does not fully
compensate for slowing export growth. As a result,
GDP growth is forecast to decline to 3.5 per cent
(KDI, 2005). Investment has been increasing in
Indonesia and Thailand in 2005, owing to recon-
struction work after the December 2004 tsunami
and the subsequent influx of public investment and
incentives for infrastructure development. In In-
donesia, the tsunami did not cause a significant
impact on economic growth in the first quarter of
2005. On the other hand, economic activity was
more severely affected in Thailand, where the re-
duction of tourism receipts and shrimp production
after the tsunami added to other adverse factors,
Table 1.3
EXPORT AND IMPORT VOLUMES OF GOODS, BY REGION
AND ECONOMIC GROUPING, 1996￿2004
(Percentage change over previous year)
Export volume Import volume
 1996￿  1996￿
2000a 2001 2002 2003 2004 2000a 2001 2002 2003 2004
World 7 -1 5 6 13 7 -1 4 7 13
Developed economies 7 -1 2 3 11 8 -1 3 5 11
of which:
 J a p a n 6 - 889 1 3 41166
 United States 7 -6 -4 3 9 11 -3 4 5 11
 Europe 7243 1 2 8125 1 1
Developing economies 8 -2 9 12 16 7 -3 7 10 19
of which:
 Africa 2 1 2 11 7 1547 2 6
 Latin America 10 1 2 3 10 9 -3 -4 0 13
 West Asia 5081 3 1 0 - 47 - 5 3 5
 East and South Asia 10 -3 12 17 22 6 -3 11 15 18
of which:
China 12 9 25 35 33 11 12 23 36 26
India 8 7 17 10 18 5 4 13 9 17
South-East Europe and CIS 1759 1 3 - 0 1 7 1 0 2 1 1 7
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on UN COMTRADE; United Nations Statistics Division, United Nations Common
Database (UNCDB); United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, Import/Export Price Indexes database; Japan Customs
Trade Statistics database; UNCTAD, Commodity Price Bulletin, various issues; and other national sources.
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such as high oil prices, drought and outbreaks of
bird flu (NESDB, 2005). As a result, Thailand￿s
growth will decelerate in 2005 to a rate of 4 per
cent. In Malaysia, private consumption is expected
to continue growing in 2005, and investment
should increase within a context of low interest
rates and easy credit availability. As Malaysian
exports are highly concentrated in electronics and
electrical machinery, export growth is likely to
slow down. The overall result would be a moder-
ate deceleration of growth to a still strong 5.5 per
cent. Taiwan Province of China, is also experi-
encing slower export growth, while its overall
domestic demand should be sustained by the in-
crease in private consumption, owing to rising real
disposable income and falling unemployment.
These trends show a further rebalancing of growth
in Asia as economies slowly shift their reliance
on export-led growth to internally-generated de-
mand growth (NIESR, 2005: 19). Such a
rebalancing is particularly relevant in light of the
huge global trade imbalances (see section B).
GDP growth in China remained very high in
2004 and the first quarter of 2005 (9.5 per cent).
The tightening measures introduced in the course
of the year have started to have some impact on
investment expansion, even though it is still grow-
ing at a rapid pace.4 Policy measures included the
abandonment of the strict pegging regime with the
dollar, higher bank reserve requirements, moder-
ate increases in interest rates and direct measures
aimed at limiting the financing of construction
projects and industries, such as steel and cement,
that may have been building excessive production
capacities. These measures are likely to influence
not only the amount that is invested, but also its
direction. A reorientation of investment financing
is under way towards areas where bottlenecks have
appeared recently, in particular, energy and infra-
structure. Inflationary pressures have abated
during the first half of 2005, indicating that more
severe monetary tightening is unlikely. Exports
of goods continue to grow at a rapid pace, driven
by the end of textile quotas in developed coun-
tries and the production of past investments in
manufacturing coming on stream. As a result of
these trends, even though it remains a major driv-
ing factor, investment may not be making such a
large contribution to growth as in the past, while
private consumption and net exports are playing
an increasingly important role.
In South Asia, India and Pakistan are experi-
encing high and stable growth rates. India has
undergone significant growth in manufacturing
and exports of IT-related services and business-
process outsourcing. This has helped to off-balance
the adverse impact of a poor monsoon on agricul-
ture. Inflation has been kept in check despite
higher oil and other primary commodity prices.
The fiscal measures taken by the Indian Govern-
ment have so far not led to a substantial reduction
of the fiscal deficit, which remains stable at 4.5 per
cent of GDP. As a consequence, macroeconomic
policy is likely to maintain a rather supportive
stance. In Pakistan, strong GDP growth resulted
from good performances in all sectors; however,
it particularly benefited from an unusual expan-
sion of agricultural output. A rich cotton crop has
also contributed to stronger than expected growth
in the textile sector. Real GDP growth may accel-
erate in 2005, driven by the continued expansion
of manufacturing output and exports, supported
by the phasing out of textile import quotas in Janu-
ary 2005. Domestic demand will sustain present
growth rates, in particular private consumption,
due to continued higher growth of personal dis-
posable income.
Latin American economies showed a remark-
able improvement in 2004, expanding at 5.7 per
cent, following five years of stagnation and cri-
sis. The engines driving this economic recovery
were export expansion and the terms-of-trade im-
provement in most countries in the region (see
chapter III). Gains from terms of trade were very
significant for oil and mining exporters, and lower
but still relevant for agriculture exporters. On the
other hand, some Central American and Caribbean
countries that export labour-intensive manufac-
tures and import oil, suffered terms-of-trade losses.
These countries managed to shoulder the external
burden by increasing the volume of their exports
(owing to expanding imports from the United
States) and receiving substantial remittances from
overseas workers. The external environment led
to an overall surplus in the region￿s current ac-
count for the second consecutive year, despite a
significant growth in imports. On the fiscal side,
the last few years showed a moderate reduction
in fiscal deficits and, in several cases, a consider-
able surplus in the primary balance (excluding in-
terest payments). This has been partly the result
of increasing public revenues originated in pri-Trade and Development Report, 2005 10
mary commodity exports, either directly ￿ through
State-owned exporting firms ￿ or indirectly,
through rising taxes and royalties. Fiscal expendi-
ture has been allowed to increase in some cases,
although in most countries fiscal policy was more
oriented towards ￿debt sustainability￿ rather than
towards the encouragement of economic activity
and investment. For this economic reactivation to
persist, it should rely less on temporary factors,
such as the favourable external environment and
more on a sustained recovery of domestic demand,
including investment. Even though the latter has
improved after reaching record lows in 2003, fixed
investment was only 18.5 per cent of the region￿s
GDP in 2004 (ECLAC, 2005).
Preliminary evidence for 2005 points to a
continuation of economic growth, but at a slower
pace. One reason for this slowdown is monetary
tightening in the two biggest Latin American econo-
mies: Brazil and Mexico. In these two countries,
high priority is being placed on inflation targets,
leading to a significant increase in policy interest
rates, especially since the second half of 2004. In
June 2005, the policy rate in Brazil reached a level
close to 20 per cent with the inflation rate remain-
ing at 6 to 7 per cent. As a result, fixed investment
and private consumption slowed down in the last
quarter of 2004 and the first quarter on 2005 (com-
pared with the same period of the previous year),
affecting manufacturing, construction, commerce
and communications. Official forecasts for Brazil
anticipate a recovery in domestic demand in the
second part of the current year in expectation of
lower interest rates and rising minimum wages.
GDP is expected to grow at a rate close to 3 per
cent in 2005, down from 4.9 per cent in 2004
(IPEA, 2005). In Mexico, persistent monetary
tightening has pushed the interbank rate up from
5.3 per cent in January 2004 to 10.1 per cent in
May 2005. Economic activity decelerated in the
first months of 2005, particularly in manufactur-
ing, agriculture and construction, pointing to an
annual growth rate of about 3.3 per cent (com-
pared to 4.4 per cent in 2004).5
Economic activity in Latin America is also
set to slow in 2005 because Argentina, Uruguay
and Venezuela will grow at a less brisk pace. Ac-
cording to some observers the recent rapid growth
just reflects a return to the pre-crisis GDP levels.
However, the driving sectors and the characteris-
tics of this economic growth are radically different
from those prevailing before the crisis. Argentina
and Uruguay are drawing the benefits of restored
competitiveness after shifting relative prices in fa-
vour of tradable goods and services. Moreover,
they have managed to restructure their foreign
debt, particularly Argentina, with a sizeable reduc-
tion in capital and interest rates. Domestic demand
is providing new stimulus through higher domestic
consumption and fixed investment. These countries
have also benefited from improving terms of trade,
with a sizeable impact on domestic income and
fiscal receipts, especially in Venezuela, where am-
bitious social and development programmes have
been launched.
The Andean countries that have gained strong-
ly from oil and mining exports, both in volume
and value terms, such as Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador
and Peru, will continue to grow in 2005. How-
ever, there will not be the same amount of invest-
ment in natural resources and of new production
capacities coming on stream in 2005 as in 2004.
High prices for their exports will continue to pro-
vide a considerable level of revenues for both the
private and the public sector, maintaining a healthy
domestic demand. Central American countries will
keep a moderate growth pace in 2005, with some
export price increases, higher public investment
linked to debt-relief programmes and private con-
sumption sustained by workers￿ remittances. Fi-
nally, Caribbean countries, some of which were
hit by natural disasters in the second half of 2004,
should benefit from the recovery of tourism in
2005.
3. Recent developments in world trade
and finance
The strong performance of the global economy
in 2004 brought about an acceleration in world
trade. Total merchandise exports grew by 22.5 per
cent in current dollars. As in 2003, this expansion
was the result of both increasing volume (13 per
cent) and rising dollar prices (9.5 per cent).6 The
latter was partly caused by the depreciation of the
dollar, which increased the value of international
trade in dollar terms within the euro area.Current Issues in the World Economy 11
The expansion in export volume was associ-
ated with some changes in its geographical com-
position (table 1.3). In comparison with the situation
which prevailed in 2003, the major change was
the strong recovery of export volumes from de-
veloped countries, which grew by 11 per cent in
2004, compared to 3 per cent in the previous year.
There was a widespread acceleration of export
volume growth in Europe, largely due to the speed-
ing up of intraregional trade with the new EU ac-
ceding member countries, and to expanding sales
to East Asia and to oil-exporters in West Asia and
the CIS. Exports from the United States also re-
covered, as a result of a more competitive cur-
rency level, while Japan continued to benefit from
dynamic Asian intraregional trade.
Exports from developing countries continued
their expansion at a very rapid pace in 2004, and
registered a growth rate of 16 per cent in volume
terms. As in previous years, East and South Asia
led this expansion, but Latin America and Africa
also experienced significant increases in export
volumes. As has been usually the case since 1990,
exports increased at higher rates in developing
countries than in the developed world. However,
the revival of exports of developed countries reduced
the relative contribution of developing countries
to global export growth from two thirds in 2003
to an estimated 40￿45 per cent in 2004.
Increasing export volume, together with
higher commodity prices provided a boost to the
value of merchandise exports from developing
countries, which grew by 26 per cent in current
dollars. In particular, regions with a large share
of primary commodities in their total exports ￿
Africa, CIS, South America and West Asia ￿ re-
corded above-average export growth in 2004.
Terms-of-trade gains from in these regions explain
the very rapid growth in import volume, clearly
exceeding that of exports (table 1.3). Among the
manufacturing exporters, East and South Asia also
performed above average, mainly due to strong
export growth from China and India. As a whole,
the share of developing countries in world exports
rose to 33.4 per cent in 2004, compared to 27.7 per
cent ten years earlier. Among developed countries,
the United States have been constantly reducing
their share in world exports from 12 per cent in
the mid-1990s to 9 per cent in 2004, while at the
same time slightly rising their share in world im-
ports, as the economy has increasingly relied on
outsourcing in foreign markets.
World trade in services (transport, travel and
other commercial services) grew by 16 per cent
in dollar terms in 2004 (WTO, 2005a). The expan-
sion of transport services was naturally stimulated
by the strong recovery in trade volume. In par-
ticular, world seaborne trade volume grew by
4.3 per cent in 2004 (after a 5.8 per cent expansion
in 2003), mainly as a result of increased shipments
of primary commodities directed to China and
other countries in East Asia (UNCTAD, 2005a).
Strong demand for transport services has main-
tained freight rates at very high levels, after
soaring in 2003 (see box 4.1 in chapter IV). By
the end of 2004 the level of freight rates in the
main containerized routes ￿ trans-Pacific, trans-
Atlantic and Asia-Europe ￿ were mostly above the
levels that prevailed at the end of 2003.
Travel services recovered markedly from the
2001 downturn. 2004 was an excellent year for
tourism, with international tourist arrivals increas-
ing by 10.7 per cent. Growth in tourism services
rebounded by 28 per cent in Asia and the Pacific,
following the lows of the first half of 2003, which
had been due to SARS. It was also very fast in the
Middle East (21 per cent), while Europe performed
below the world average (with 5 per cent growth
in 2004) as a result of the continued strength of
the euro. International tourism kept growing in the
first four months of 2005, albeit at a slower pace
(7.7 per cent compared to the same period of
2004). Growth rates showed wide disparities, with
very positive results in South America (with a 19 per
cent expansion), Middle East (17 per cent) and
sub-Saharan Africa (15 per cent), and slow growth
rates in Western and Southern Europe (below 3 per
cent). South-East Asia and South Asia experienced
a sudden deceleration in tourist arrivals due to the
tsunami in December 2004 (World Tourism Or-
ganization, 2005: 6￿7).7
Given these developments in goods and serv-
ices trade and the growing inflow of workers￿
remittances in several countries, all developing
regions posted current-account surpluses in 2004.
Naturally, these regional totals concealed some defi-
cits at the country level, especially in sub-Saharan
Africa, South-East Europe, Central America and
the Caribbean. But, in general, the need for fi-Trade and Development Report, 2005 12
nancing the current account was less stringent in
the developing world than in previous years. The
single most important source of external financ-
ing for developing countries was FDI, which
recovered to its 2001 level.8 A large part of the
current-account deficit in several sub-Saharan and
Central American countries is explained by the
expansion of FDI in recent years, which was ac-
companied by an increase in imports of capital
goods and an outflow profit remittances. In other
cases, current-account deficits were financed
through grants or official borrowing. On the other
hand, in several middle-income countries in Asia
(including West Asia) and Latin America current
accounts were in balance or in surplus.
This overall situation had two consequences
for the international financial markets. First, as
the more comfortable balance-of-payments situa-
tion of the ￿emerging markets￿ coincided with
high liquidity in developed countries, the spreads
on emerging markets bonds have declined signifi-
cantly. Yet external debt problems have persisted
in some middle-income countries; many of them
have issued new bonds in order to repay those
coming to maturity, and have remained in a vul-
nerable situation. But market conditions were
favourable for a restructuring of external debt at
lower interest rates. They also facilitated the end
of the Argentine debt default through a debt re-
structuring, which included debt stock reduction,
extended maturity and/or lower interest rates. Sec-
ond, there has been a continued accumulation of
international reserves in a number of developing
countries, mainly in East and West Asia. In 2004,
foreign exchange reserves of developing countries
increased by an unprecedented $450 billion (IMF,
2005a). As increasing reserves mainly consist of fi-
nancial assets issued by developed countries (and
particularly those of the United States), they repre-
sent a significant export of capital from developing
to developed countries, and a key element in the cur-
rent phenomenon of global economic imbalances.
This issue is further examined in the next section.
C.  The global imbalances and the United States
current-account deficit
The United States current account recorded
a deficit of $666 billion in 2004, which makes it
the counterpart of almost 70 per cent of the aggre-
gated surpluses in the world economy (table 1.4).
This unprecedented size of a deficit and the dim
perspectives of its correction in the foreseeable
future have raised questions about the stability of
the global financial system and the sustainability
of global growth. Warnings abound, as to date no
other major economic power has been prepared
to shoulder part of the adjustment burden. Much
of the world economy continues to depend on the
United States economy, both as the consumer and
the debtor of last resort. Serious policy initiatives
to tackle the problem are missing, and the debate
is now focused on whether dramatic exchange rate
changes are the only way out or whether policies
to stimulate growth in surplus regions, combined
with measures to limit growth in the United States,
could be an alternative.Current Issues in the World Economy 13
Table 1.4
CURRENT-ACCOUNT BALANCE, SELECTED ECONOMIES, 2000￿2004
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
(As a percentage of total
($ billion) surplus or deficit)
Surplus economies
Japan 119.6 87.8 112.6 136.2 171.8 23.8 21.6 21.9 20.4 19.3
Germany -25.7 1.6 43.1 51.8 96.4 3.9 0.4 8.4 7.8 10.9
China 20.5 17.4 35.4 45.9 70.0 4.1 4.3 6.9 6.9 7.9
Russian Federation 44.6 33.4 30.9 35.4 59.6 8.9 8.2 6.0 5.3 6.7
Saudi Arabia 14.3 9.4 11.9 29.7 49.3 2.9 2.3 2.3 4.4 5.5
Switzerland 30.7 20.0 23.3 42.4 42.9 6.1 4.9 4.5 6.4 4.8
Norway 26.1 26.2 24.4 28.3 34.4 5.2 6.4 4.8 4.2 3.9
Sweden 9.9 9.7 12.1 23.0 28.0 2.0 2.4 2.4 3.4 3.2
Singapore 11.9 14.4 15.7 27.0 27.9 2.4 3.5 3.1 4.0 3.1
Republic of Korea 12.3 8.0 5.4 12.1 26.8 2.4 2.0 1.0 1.8 3.0
Canada 19.7 16.1 14.4 17.0 26.0 3.9 4.0 2.8 2.6 2.9
Netherlands 7.2 9.8 12.8 15.1 19.4 1.4 2.4 2.5 2.3 2.2
Taiwan Province of China 8.9 18.2 25.6 29.3 19.0 1.8 4.5 5.0 4.4 2.1
United Arab Emirates 12.2 6.5 3.5 6.9 16.1 2.4 1.6 0.7 1.0 1.8
Hong Kong (China) 7.1 9.9 12.6 16.2 15.9 1.4 2.4 2.5 2.4 1.8
Malaysia 8.5 7.3 8.0 13.4 15.7 1.7 1.8 1.6 2.0 1.8
Kuwait 14.7 8.3 4.3 7.3 15.1 2.9 2.0 0.8 1.1 1.7
Belgium 9.0 8.9 14.1 13.3 14.9 1.8 2.2 2.8 2.0 1.7
Venezuela 11.9 2.0 7.6 11.4 14.5 2.4 0.5 1.5 1.7 1.6
Qatar 3.2 3.5 3.3 6.8 12.0 0.6 0.9 0.6 1.0 1.3
Total surplus 501.7 406.6 513.7 667.6 888.0
Deficit economies
United States -413.5 -385.7 -473.9 -530.7 -665.9 62.2 67.7 72.5 71.1 69.0
Spain -19.4 -16.4 -15.9 -23.6 -49.2 2.9 2.9 2.4 3.2 5.1
United Kingdom -36.5 -32.2 -26.4 -30.6 -47.0 5.5 5.7 4.0 4.1 4.9
Australia -15.3 -8.2 -16.6 -30.2 -39.4 2.3 1.4 2.5 4.1 4.1
Italy -5.8 -0.7 -6.7 -21.9 -24.8 0.9 0.1 1.0 2.9 2.6
Turkey -9.8 3.4 -1.5 -8.0 -15.6 1.5 0.8 0.2 1.1 1.6
Portugal -11.1 -10.4 -8.9 -8.0 -13.3 1.7 1.8 1.4 1.1 1.4
Hungary -4.0 -3.2 -4.7 -7.5 -8.9 0.6 0.6 0.7 1.0 0.9
Mexico -18.2 -18.2 -13.7 -8.6 -8.7 2.7 3.2 2.1 1.1 0.9
Greece -7.8 -7.7 -9.7 -10.8 -8.4 1.2 1.4 1.5 1.4 0.9
New Zealand -2.5 -1.2 -2.2 -3.3 -6.0 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6
Czech Republic -2.7 -3.3 -4.2 -5.6 -5.6 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.6
France 18.0 21.5 14.5 5.0 -5.4 3.6 5.3 2.8 0.7 0.6
Romania -1.7 -2.6 -2.0 -3.9 -5.4 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.6
South Africa -0.2 -0.0 0.7 -1.5 -5.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.6
Poland -10.0 -5.4 -5.0 -4.1 -3.6 1.5 0.9 0.8 0.5 0.4
Serbia and Montenegro -0.3 -0.5 -1.4 -1.6 -3.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3
Lebanon -3.1 -3.8 -2.6 -2.5 -3.1 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.3
Ireland -0.1 -0.6 -1.5 -2.1 -2.7 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3
Azerbaijan -0.2 -0.1 -0.8 -2.0 -2.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.2
Total deficit -664.9 -569.4 -653.7 -746.0 -965.2
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, April 2005.
Note: Calculations are based on a total of 180 countries; the sum of total surpluses and deficits is different from zero because
of errors and omissions. Countries are listed according to the levels of their surplus/deficit in 2004.Trade and Development Report, 2005 14
1. Twenty-five years of deficits in the
United States
The deficit in the United States current ac-
count is not a new phenomenon. In 1982 the
United States current account fell into a deficit,
which continued to grow until 1987 (fig. 1.1).
Following the Plaza Agreement in 1985 and the
Louvre Accord in 1987, it returned to balance in
1991. However, the current account went into defi-
cit again, and it has since continued to widen in
the context of the long-lasting and strong recov-
ery in the United States. Since 1998, the share of
the deficit in GDP increased from around 2 per
cent to almost 6 per cent in 2004.
These developments are explained by two
major factors. First, the real exchange rate, which
mainly determines the international competitive-
ness of United States producers, rose markedly
during the first half of the 1980s. An overvalued
dollar played a central role in the widening cur-
rent-account deficit. The subsequent reduction of
the deficit was accompanied by a depreciation of
the dollar in the second half of the 1980s. The
second factor is the gap between real GDP growth
in the United States and in the rest of the world.
Relatively fast growth in the United States tends
to exacerbate the current-account deficit via strong
import demand, whereas outright recessions (such
as the one which occurred in 1991) lead to the
opposite result. More recently, however, these fac-
tors seemed to have a weaker influence on the
current account; since 1998 the deficit continued
to increase as a percentage of GDP, even though
the growth gap between the United States and the
rest of the world has almost disappeared since
Figure 1.1
UNITED STATES CURRENT-ACCOUNT BALANCE,a RELATIVE GDP GROWTH
AND REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATE, 1980￿2004
(Per cent and index numbers, 2000 = 100)
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on United States Bureau of Economic Analysis, International Economic Accounts
database; World Bank, World Development Indicators database; and JP Morgan, Effective Exchange Rate Indices
database.
a As a percentage of GDP.Current Issues in the World Economy 15
2000, and the dollar substantially depreciated in
2003 and 2004. While exports increased in 2004
and in the first few months of 2005, the expan-
sion of imports has continued to outpace them.
Some of the explanations given for the lack
of a rapid response of imports to exchange rate
changes point to temporary factors; for instance,
the unit value of imports rises immediately after a
devaluation, increasing the import value, while im-
port volume takes more time to adjust downward
(the so-called J-curve effect). It has also been sug-
gested that firms exporting to the United States
would be willing to squeeze their profit margin
for some time in order to keep their market shares.
Other interpretations indicate more durable factors,
such as a loss of competitiveness and market shares
of some United States industries and redeployment
of industrial production to Asia (Aglietta, 2004: 31).
It has also been argued that income elasticity for
United States imports is structurally larger than
foreign income elasticity for United States exports,
leading to a tendency towards a trade deficit, even
in the absence of a growth gap.9
These arguments suggest that only a huge
depreciation of the dollar ￿ with all its potential
repercussions on the global financial system ￿
could reduce the United States trade imbalances
and bring them down to a sustainable level. On
the other hand, an adjustment brought about by a
much lower growth in the United States involves
obvious risks for the world economy. As the value
of the United States imports currently represents
roughly 180 per cent of its exports, the latter will
have to grow much faster than imports for a con-
siderable time for the trade deficit to follow a
downward trend. Box 1.1 presents UNCTAD sec-
retariat￿s calculations of the order of magnitude
of the currency depreciation or the growth adjust-
ment required for reducing the current-account
deficit.
These considerations raise a string of questions
about the currencies the dollar should depreciate
against and which countries should either enhance
or dampen economic growth. The increase in the
Unites States deficit in recent years is most pro-
nounced with the EU and Asia (fig. 1.2); however,
the intraregional structure of current-account sur-
pluses and deficits has also to be taken into
account. While China accounts for most of the rise
in the United States current-account deficit in re-
cent years, it has considerable deficits with many
Asian countries as a result of its rapid growth and
its presence at the end of many production chains.
On the other hand, the moderate increase in the
current-account surplus of the EU as a whole hides
the much bigger increases in the surpluses of some
individual countries in the euro area, in particular
Germany.
In addition to such trade balance considera-
tions, a number of authors and organizations have
recently examined how a devaluation of the dol-
lar may modify the terms of the global imbalance
problem if the effects of financial globalization
are taken into account. They have introduced the
￿valuation effect￿, that is, the role of the actual
valuation of the stock of assets and liabilities and
the changes in their valuation due to asset price
changes and exchange rate changes.
In the United States liabilities are almost ex-
clusively denominated in domestic currency. As
two thirds of United States assets are denominated
in foreign currencies, a depreciation of the dollar
increases the domestic currency value of assets,
while leaving the value of liabilities more or less
unchanged. As a result, the depreciation had a
positive effect on the ￿net international investment
position￿ (NIIP) of the United States ￿ i.e. the dif-
ference between the value of the accumulated
stock of assets (domestic claims on foreigners) and
the accumulated stock of liabilities (foreign claims
on residents). This effect did not stop the deterio-
ration of the NIIP in dollar terms (i.e. liabilities
to increase more than assets) due to the persist-
ence of the current-account deficit, but it limited
that deterioration.
Obviously, the opposite valuation effect oc-
curs in those countries, mainly in Europe, that are
facing a currency appreciation vis-￿-vis the dol-
lar. This process is interpreted as a burden sharing
among countries and as a facilitation of the glo-
bal adjustment process.
However, the sharp appreciation of the dol-
lar from 1996 to 2002 led to similar valuation
losses for the United States and gains for Europe.
Accordingly, the appreciation of the dollar at that
time had accelerated the deterioration of the in-
vestment position of the United States that isTrade and Development Report, 2005 16
decelerated by the depreciation now. Thus, the cur-
rent change in favour of the United States simply
compensates the adverse effect that occurred be-
fore.
Hence, the argument that the sustainable level
of that deficit would increase through the valua-
tion effect because it is easier to finance the deficit
thanks to a higher net value held in the United
States is not convincing. The appreciation of the
dollar that had accelerated the deterioration of the
NIIP of the United States since the mid-1990s did
not prevent the rapid increase of the current-ac-
count deficit. Did the deterioration in the NIIP due
to the negative valuation effect make the access
to external financing more difficult for the United
States at that time? If not, it is difficult to argue
that the positive valuation now makes access of
the United States to financial markets much easier.
If market participants in the financial markets
Box 1.1
PRIMARY TRADE BALANCE EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN THE UNITED STATES
GDP GROWTH AND IN EXCHANGE RATES
UNCTAD secretariat calculated long-term trade elasticities for the estimation of: (i) the impact of
changes in domestic GDP on the United States merchandise trade balance; and (ii) the effect of a
dollar depreciation on the same trade balance. However, it must be kept in mind that, given the
trade deficit at the ￿initial situation￿, exports must grow at least 1.8 times faster than imports to
reduce the merchandise trade deficit.
The table in this box presents the main results. The first exercise supposes that the rest of the word
(ROW) grows at 3.2 per cent, and considers three situations characterized by different GDP growth
in the United States, with the exchange rate remaining unchanged. In scenario 1, the United States
growth rate is the same than in the ROW. In this case, imports continue to grow faster than exports,
and the United States trade deficit would grow by 0.3 per cent of GDP, on top of the existing
5.7 per cent of GDP in 2004. In scenario 2 it is assumed that the trade deficit remains at its 2004
level. In order to achieve that (and assuming that ROW grows at 3.2 per cent), the United States
economy would need to reduce its GDP growth to 1.5 per cent. In this case, import growth would
be lower than in scenario 1, at 3.1 per cent. In scenario 3 the trade deficit is reduced to 5 per cent
of GDP. At constant exchange rate and ROW growth, this would require a negative GDP growth of
1.8 per cent in the United States, which would lead to a contraction in imports of 3.6 per cent.
The table also shows that a 10 per cent appreciation of the currency of one of the main trading
partners of the United States would not improve the imbalance visibly. The highest impact would
come from an appreciation of the Canadian dollar, followed by the euro and the Mexican peso.
Appreciations of the Chinese renminbi and the Japanese yen would have lower impacts, because of
the lower shares of these economies in the United States merchandise exports. According to the
simulation, a 10 per cent general depreciation of the dollar would reduce the trade deficit to 4.5 per
cent of GDP.
Additionally, the table shows the rates to which the main trading partners should appreciate their
currencies to reduce the United States trade deficit to 5 per cent of GDP. In the case of China, given
its low weight in the composition of United States exports, the renminbi would need to appreciate
by 67 per cent, whereas, for the Canadian dollar an appreciation of 26.5 per cent would be suffi-
cient.Current Issues in the World Economy 17
expect appreciations and depreciations to be
equally distributed over the long term, the short-
term valuation does not change their perception
of a long-lasting current-account deficit.
For most of the developing countries the
valuation effect is felt on both sides of the bal-
ance sheet. The liabilities of developing countries
are normally denominated in foreign currencies.
For these countries, exchange rate movements af-
fect both the domestic value of assets and the do-
mestic value of liabilities. Appreciation of the
national currency of a developing country reduces
the burden of liabilities (denominated in foreign
currencies) and also reduces the value of assets
(denominated in foreign currencies). On the other
side, depreciation increases the burden of liabili-
ties and increases the value of assets. In the past,
in many developing countries with huge stocks of
net foreign debt, depreciation shocks after finan-
EFFECT OF CHANGES IN GDP GROWTH AND IN EXCHANGE RATES
ON THE UNITED STATES TRADE BALANCE
Hypothetical change Outcome
United States Exchange Merchandise
GDP rate Exports Imports trade balance
(Per cent) (Per cent) (Per cent of GDP)
GDP growth changes in the United Statesa
Scenario 1 3.2 - 4.4 6.6 -6.0
Scenario 2 1.5 - 4.4 3.1 -5.7b
Scenario 3 -1.8 - 4.4 -3.6 -5.0
Exchange rate changes
Euro - 10.0 1.5 -0.6 -5.5
Canadian dollar - 10.0 2.3 -0.7 -5.4
Chinese renminbi - 10.0 0.4 -0.6 -5.6
Japanese yen - 10.0 0.6 -0.4 -5.6
Mexican peso - 10.0 1.4 -0.4 -5.5
United States dollar - -10.0 9.9 -4.2 -4.5
Exchange rate changes required for a reduction
of the United States trade deficit to 5 per cent of GDP
Euro - 37.2 5.7 -2.2 -5.0
Canadian dollar - 26.5 6.2 -2.0 -5.0
Chinese renminbi - 67.4 2.9 -3.8 -5.0
Japanese yen - 74.1 4.8 -2.7 -5.0
Mexican peso - 44.9 6.1 -2.0 -5.0
United States dollar - -5.6 5.5 -2.3 -5.0
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on United States Bureau of Economic Analysis, International Economic
Accounts database.
a GDP growth in the rest of the world is assumed at 3.2 per cent in all scenarios.
b The deficit of the United States merchandise trade balance as a percentage of GDP in the base year (2004) is
5.67 per cent.
Box 1.1 (concluded)Trade and Development Report, 2005 18
cial crises have led to big negative valuation effects
on their liabilities that could not be compensated
by the positive effects on their assets. Argentina
was the most prominent case recently.
Although there is no strict and general ceil-
ing for sustainable external deficits, recent studies
analysing current-account dynamics in industrial
economies conclude that reversals usually take
place as deficits reach about 5 per cent of GDP.10
However, the mechanisms towards such an adjust-
ment may be different for the United States. So
far, the biggest economy in the world has been
able to finance its current-account deficit at rela-
tively low interest rates. An examination of the
economic situation in the surplus regions is nec-
essary to understand this continued easy financing
of the deficit and to assess the chances for a
smooth resolution of global imbalances.
2. The surplus regions
The fact that the current account essentially
corresponds to net foreign investment in finan-
cial assets, reflecting the simple logic that whoever
extends demand beyond means has to raise debt,
has been taken as proof for the willingness of the
rest of the world to provide the United States con-
sumers with ￿savings￿ that could not be used
elsewhere. This static logic overlooks the fact that
without the stimulus provided by United States
growth, income and savings in the rest of the world
(and in particular, in surplus countries) would have
been lower. Thus, part of the savings that were
used to finance the current-account deficit of the
United States were generated by the process of
rising demand from the United States. If the sur-
plus regions were to reduce their financing to the
United States, they would not be re-allocating their
￿savings￿ elsewhere, but the process of generat-
ing these savings would itself be at stake. In other
words, the attempt to repatriate funds may have
negative consequences not only in the deficit but
also in the surplus economies. This poses a di-
lemma to surplus regions, in Asia and in particular
in some parts of Europe.
In the aftermath of the currency crises at the
end of the 1990s, Asian economies implicitly or
explicitly pegged their currencies to the dollar at
rather low values. The currency peg has encour-
aged rising exports and has had a positive effect
on growth, profits and jobs in these countries.
Moreover, in Asia imports have been rising rap-
idly, spilling the effects of the Asian boom over
many developing countries. From the point of
view of these countries and their beneficiaries, a
sharp currency appreciation that would markedly
reduce the current-account surplus might jeopard-
ize these positive outcomes on a broad scale.
The members of the euro area as well as those
economies whose currencies are tied to the euro
constitute the third major block in the current im-
balances constellation. As in the case of Asia, this
block has registered external surpluses that rely
Figure 1.2
MERCHANDISE TRADE BALANCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, BY COUNTRY/REGION,
1980￿2004
(Billions of dollars)
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on UN
COMTRADE; and United States Bureau of Economic
Analysis, International Economic Accounts database.
Note: Asia includes: China, Hong Kong (China), Japan, the
Republic of Korea, Singapore and Taiwan Province
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on the United States market, even if their contri-
bution to the United States trade deficit has not
risen as dramatically in recent years. Yet, like Asia,
European authorities have been focusing on ex-
port-led growth strategies, although the European
Central Bank has not pursued an explicit exchange
rate policy. A major reason for the good trade per-
formance has been wage restraint, which has
resulted in stronger international competitiveness,
but also in anaemic growth of private consump-
tion. Thus, in some large member countries,
domestic demand remains weak due to overly
moderate wage increases. The dependency on
foreign demand explains the uneasiness at the
beginning of 2005, when the euro rose to 1.35
against the dollar. In a way, Europe will have the
most to lose if it does not move quickly. If Asian
central banks stick to managing dollar rates while
at the same time diversifying their portfolio by
moving towards the euro, Europe is doomed to
bear the brunt of dollar depreciation.
Overall, none of the three regions analysed
above has an interest in prolonging the current
situation as long-term risks exceed short-term
advantages. As the issuer of the world￿s predomi-
nant reserve currency, the United States bears a
special responsibility for financial market stabil-
ity. A further lowering of the dollar exchange rate,
if eventually needed, should take place in an or-
derly adjustment process, in which both, the deficit
and the surplus regions, would act transparently
and effectively.
3. Tailoring policy measures
There can be little doubt that a smooth cor-
rection of global imbalances will have to be
achieved through adjustments in both relative
prices and absorption levels. Obviously, the main
difficulty is the identification of policy measures
tailored to the specific economic circumstances
of certain countries and regions. The examination
of the internal and external performance of the
euro area and the United States leads to relatively
clear policy conclusions.
The United States starts from relatively low
unemployment and high growth. It could use the
currency depreciation already in place, combined
with careful measures to dampen domestic demand.
Monetary policy has already shifted to a more re-
strictive path and some fiscal adjustment is under-
way. However, in light of the dominance of the
United States economy on a global scale, authori-
ties should refrain from excessively curtailing ab-
sorption in order to avoid recessionary tendencies
that could feed back into a worldwide slowdown.
In contrast, the euro area has no reason to
worry about its external balance, but growth is
stalling and in many countries unemployment is
very high or even rising. Consequently, the whole
region would greatly benefit from higher demand
and rising absorption. Thus, the optimal combi-
nation of macroeconomic policies to correct global
imbalances would certainly include a massive
expansion of domestic demand in the euro area. A
coordinated effort of macroeconomic policies is
needed to foster economic growth and to approach
internal and external equilibrium at the same time.
In an environment of negligible inflation rates,
monetary and fiscal policy can actively contrib-
ute to economic recovery by lowering interest
rates and stimulating domestic demand. Finally,
the excessively moderate stance of wage policy
in some member countries should be abandoned
to avoid deflationary spillovers.
Identifying an appropriate approach for sur-
plus countries in Asia is much more complicated
as most countries in the region are already report-
ing rapid and sometimes ￿neck breaking￿ growth
rates. Despite the fact that the often-mentioned
danger of overheating ￿ most pronounced in the
non-tradable sectors ￿ does not represent a major
threat to price stability yet, the argument whereby
more growth is needed to increase absorption in
this region is unconvincing. The recommendation
given by many observers to use currency appre-
ciation for creating leeway for monetary authorities
to fight overheating by raising interest rates, would
reduce absorption and imports, and trade surpluses
might thus persist despite currency appreciation.
Consequently, global imbalances would continue
but at a slower rate of GDP growth for the world,
and they would be accompanied by lower demand
for other developing countries primary commodity
exports. Additionally, countries such as China need
to integrate a vast pool of rural workers ￿ unac-
counted for by official unemployment statistics ￿Trade and Development Report, 2005 20
if political and economic stability is to be main-
tained.
As shown before, any bilateral exchange rate
realignment with the dollar will fall short of a sig-
nificant re-equilibrating effect; this could even
have a disruptive effect on the revaluing country
and on the region it is mainly trading with. If ex-
change rate reforms are undertaken in surplus
regions, they will have to involve all regional pro-
tagonists within a multilateral agreement. China￿s
move to abandon the peg with the dollar in July
2005 without allowing for a major revaluation could
be a step in the right direction if it forms part of a
concerted action among the global players.
History offers examples of correcting global
imbalances, some of which ended in regional cri-
ses and in an upsurge in protectionism harming
trade, growth and welfare, as was the case for the
Asian episode of 1997￿1998. But there are other
examples where crises have been avoided by early
and controlled adjustments of exchange rates, for
example the regional arrangements in Europe that
preceded the European Monetary Union. But even
on a global scale, the current-account reversal that
followed joint political efforts by the major pow-
ers in the late 1980s suggests that an orchestrated
attempt might have a greater chance of succeed-
ing than isolated measures. This may well be the
right time for a global exchange rate agreement.
D.  Oil price hikes in perspective
After the relatively low prices seen in the first
half of the 1990s, when the price of crude petro-
leum rarely exceeded $20 per barrel,11 the price
of oil began to rise in 1999 and culminated at
$60 per barrel in mid-2005. This surge in oil prices
worries governments in many oil-importing coun-
tries, who fear the detrimental effects of a sub-
stantial and long-lasting rise in energy prices on
output growth. This is a special concern for many
developing countries which have become increas-
ingly dependent on oil imports as industrializa-
tion has progressed.
Oil price shocks have repeatedly had a nega-
tive aggregate impact on global economic activity.
The reason for this has to be mainly sought in the
response of economic policy in countries affected
by an oil price shock. Inappropriate reactions,
particularly from those responsible for wage and
monetary policies, can aggravate the situation and
lead to losses in economic activity that could oth-
erwise have been avoided.
1. The impact of an oil price shock on
prices and economic activity
The consequences of a rise in oil prices are
usually separated into first- and second-round ef-
fects. Under any normal circumstances, consumer
prices rise (or stop falling) immediately after pe-
troleum products, such as gasoline and heating oil,
become more expensive because the elasticity of
demand is rather low at most stages of the pro-
duction chain. On the other hand, second-round
effects occur if workers try to compensate their
real income loss by bargaining for higher nomi-
nal wages. The occurrence of second-round effects
becomes more likely the larger the impact of first-
round effects of a rise in oil prices ￿ or energy
prices more generally ￿ on the overall price level.
A higher rate of inflation implies a loss of real
income unless nominal wages rise alongside con-
sumer prices. If, however, workers successfully
bargain for higher wages in order to compensateCurrent Issues in the World Economy 21
for real income losses, the result is an additional
upward pressure on the price level as firms will
seek to pass rising labour costs on to consumer
prices. Workers may thus find that their recently
negotiated wages do not keep up with the rising
price level, and consequently enter the next round
of wage bargaining with yet augmented aspirations.
In the worst case, such a scenario may lead to a
wage-price spiral resulting in accelerating inflation.
At best, it will still cause inflationary expectations
to become embedded in the economy￿s wage bar-
gaining processes, involving a permanently higher
inflation rate compared to the initial situation.
Apart from the consequences on inflation, the
effects of an oil price shock on the overall eco-
nomic activity in importing countries are more
difficult to disentangle. The most obvious impact
stems from the deterioration in the terms of trade.
An oil price increase shifts the terms of trade be-
tween net-importing and net-exporting economies
in favour of the latter. Essentially, this implies a
real income transfer from consuming to produc-
ing countries. Shrinking real incomes in countries
facing larger oil bills, in turn, mean less income
to spend on other products, which translates into
lower domestic demand unless matched by re-
duced domestic savings and/or higher export
demand. To date, the evidence suggests that the
propensities of oil-producing countries to consume
from current income are low relative to consuming
economies. Oil price increases have historically
been accompanied by swelling current-account
surpluses in oil-exporting countries, implying that
the windfall revenue accruing to producers is typi-
cally not immediately spent to its full extent ￿ a
pattern that can also be observed in the current
situation (fig. 1.3).
In this case, cutbacks in output and employ-
ment are the consequence of falling demand
in consuming countries. While macroeconomic
Figure 1.3
CURRENT-ACCOUNT BALANCES OF 10 OPEC COUNTRIESa
(Per cent of GDP)
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2004;  IMF, Balance-of-Payment Statistics
database and International Financial Statistics database; Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Reports; and national
sources.
a Algeria, Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Kuwait, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Nigeria, Saudi
Arabia and Venezuela.Trade and Development Report, 2005 22
studies usually confirm the general effect on the
aggregate level, empirical studies using disaggre-
gated data suggest that demand disturbances of oil
price shocks vary substantially between sectors,
with producers of consumer durables being hit es-
pecially hard during oil-price related recessions
(Bresnahan and Ramey, 1992). To the degree that
firms are able to pass higher costs to market prices
without a subsequent reaction of nominal wages,
the burden of adjustment shifts from producers to
consumers, while the net negative impact remains
identical.
A further effect operates through nominal
interest rates, which may be higher if second-
round effects on inflation are triggered by an oil
price increase. While central banks will find it
difficult to prevent an initial rise in the general
price level due to the change in relative prices
induced by higher energy prices, they will be
alerted by second-round effects and curb persist-
ent inflation through restrictive monetary policy.
With such a move they would add to the restrictive
first-round effects on the real economy to prevent
inflationary expectations from becoming embed-
ded in the system.
2. The 1973￿1974 and 1979￿1980 oil
price shocks: putting current events
in perspective
By the early 1970s, the price of crude oil had
been declining persistently for about two decades
to reach a level of $2￿3 per barrel. This situation
changed dramatically after 1973. Between Novem-
ber 1973 and the first quarter of 1974, the price
increased from $3.3 to $13. Prices remained rela-
tively unchanged for the next four years. In late
1978, OPEC cutbacks triggered the second oil
price shock and oil prices peaked at $39 in No-
vember 1980.
Compared with the two oil price shocks in
the 1970s, the substantial oil price rise between
1998 and mid-2005 presents several features ren-
dering it less dramatic than it seems to be at first
glance. Firstly, the starting point for oil prices
($11 in the beginning of 1999) was an abnormally
low one, following the plummeting of oil prices
that resulted from the Asian financial crisis in
1997￿1998. Among informed market participants,
the expectation prevailed that the oil price would
not remain depressed for much longer, but would
soon rise again to previous levels of around $20.
Secondly, recent price increases have been stretched
over five years, and have thus taken the form of a
gradual evolution instead of an explosion. Thus,
the surprise effect of the oil price increase was
milder this time. Thirdly, in real terms, the recent
oil price increase was significantly smaller than
that of the 1970s (fig. 1.4). Measured in today￿s
prices, the oil price increases of the 1970s were
considerably more substantial than implied by the
nominal figures.
One obvious reason for current developments
on the oil market being steadier compared to 30 years
Figure 1.4
CRUDE PETROLEUM PRICES,a NOMINAL
AND REAL,b 1970￿2005
c
(Dollars per barrel)
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on UNCTAD,
Commodity Price Bulletin, various issues; and IMF,
International Financial Statistics database.
a Average of Dubai/Brent/Texas equally weighted.
b Deflated by United States Consumer Price Index (CPI)
(2000 = 100).
c 2005 data are estimates.Current Issues in the World Economy 23
ago is that they were primarily demand-driven,
rather than motivated by supply decisions in oil-
exporting countries. Despite the fact that there
have been several OPEC interventions on oil sup-
ply in recent years, there is little doubt that the
growing demand for oil imports, primarily com-
ing from the United States and the rapidly growing
developing countries in East and South Asia, in
particular China and India, is at the origin of the
oil price hike. On the supply side, OPEC spare
supply capacity almost disappeared in 2004.
OPEC countries had dramatically reduced their
supply in the first half of the 1980s, but their pro-
duction was replaced by new entrants with higher
production costs (such as North Sea producers). In
recent years, however, non-OPEC supply grew at
lower rates, and OPEC countries recovered their
1979 production level. At present, OPEC coun-
tries are not in a position to respond rapidly to a
surge in demand or a disruption in supply in a
major producer. Oil supply is expected to increase
in the coming years, but at a pace that will prob-
ably not exceed that of demand (Kaufmann, 2004).
In the same way as the size of the oil price
increase, its impact has also been much smaller in
this recent episode than in earlier ones. Between
1973 and 1974, oil imports as a percentage of GDP
in eight major industrialized countries increased
from 1.3 to 3.2 per cent, and remained between
2 and 3 per cent for the rest of the decade, before
rising again in 1980￿1981 to reach 3.7 per cent of
GDP. The 1999￿2000 oil price increase resulted
in a rise of the oil import bill from 0.8 per cent of
GDP in 1999 to 1.4 per cent in 2000, and it went
down again over the subsequent two years. In
2005, assuming that the renewed hike will main-
tain oil prices at an annual average of $50 per
barrel, it may reach 1.9 per cent but even then it
would fall short of the levels attained in 1974 and
the following years (fig. 1.5).
On average, consumer prices in the major
industrialized countries increased by about 10 per
cent in the course of the first and second years of
both oil price crises in the 1970s, and by only
marginally less in the following years. By con-
Figure 1.5
OIL IMPORT BILL, OECD MAJOR OIL-CONSUMING COUNTRIES,a
 1973￿1978,1979￿1983, 1999￿2005
b
(Per cent of GDP)
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on UN COMTRADE; UN National Accounts Main Aggregates database; EIU,
Country Forecast, various issues; and OECD, International Trade by Commodity Statistics database.
a Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States.
b 2005 data are estimates.Trade and Development Report, 2005 24
trast, the impact of recent price increases on the
consumer price index is rather negligible (fig.
1.6A). The evolution of unit labour costs in the
industrialized countries during the 1970s and early
1980s demonstrates the role and weight of sec-
ond-round effects. The rise in unit labour costs is
especially marked in the wake of the first shock.
Trade unions were firmly determined to compen-
sate for real income losses, as unit labour costs
grew by 15 per cent in the first year and 12 per
cent in the second year, and subsequently remained
in the neighbourhood of 7 per cent. Increases were
less pronounced during the second crisis, although
they were still quite considerable (fig. 1.6B).
The development of unit labour costs in the
major oil-consuming countries since 2000 indicates
that second-round effects have been practically ab-
sent. Unit labour costs rose by just over 2 per cent
in 2000 and have been growing more slowly ever
since, a fact that is also reflected in the consumer
prices shown in figure 1.6A. Except for the im-
mediate impact of higher energy prices, there is
no sign of inflationary tendencies taking hold as
trade unions have refrained from seeking compen-
sation for real income losses due to energy prices
during wage negotiations.
Nevertheless, central banks in the industri-
alized countries have continued to vehemently
warn against the occurrence of second-round ef-
fects, to which they would react by raising interest
rates in a bid to defend price stability. However,
given the absence of inflationary second-round
effects, central banks have refrained from respond-
ing immediately to slightly higher inflation rates,
focusing instead on ￿core inflation￿ indices that
exclude energy prices. Volatility in energy costs
and the concomitant variation of real incomes
have, arguably, come to be seen in the developed
world as something that is outside the control of
consumers, manufacturers and monetary authori-
ties and thus can only be accepted.
The policy responses during the major oil
crisis followed a quite different pattern. That the
two oil price shocks had markedly different reper-
cussions in individual countries is quite instructive
with a view to lessons to be learned by those coun-
tries in the developing world faced by a similar
oil price increase. By the time of the second oil
price shock, all major central banks adopted a re-
Figure 1.6
CHANGES IN CONSUMER PRICES AND UNIT
LABOUR COSTS, OECD MAJOR OIL-CONSUMING
COUNTRIES,
a SEVERAL PERIODS
(Per cent)
Source: OECD, Main Economic Indicators database and
Economic Outlook No. 77.
a GDP weighted average of Canada, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, Spain, the United Kingdom and the
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strictive stance, led by the Federal Reserve. The
federal funds rate reached 19 per cent in 1981 and
remained above the 10 per cent mark through late
1982. Even in those countries whose central banks
had pursued a largely accommodative monetary
policy stance throughout the 1970s, such as
France, short-term rates scaled new heights in the
early 1980s. Interest rates increased sharply de-
spite the fact that oil-exporting countries recycled
their windfall oil revenues through the interna-
tional capital markets, rather than to spend them
directly on higher imports. The potentially de-
creasing impact on interest rates of these capital
flows reaching the international capital markets
was overlaid by the concerted action to curb
inflation carried out by central banks of the in-
dustrialized countries after 1979.
Many developing countries, in particular in
Latin America, were caught in this high interest
rate trap with disastrous results for their overall
economic development and their foreign indebt-
edness. Servicing the existing debt became more
difficult in an environment of climbing interna-
tional interest rates and, eventually, plunged many
developing economies into severe economic cri-
ses during the 1980s.
The repercussions from current price devel-
opments in the oil market will much less likely
produce the kind of dramatic impact seen during
the 1970s, particularly in the absence of compa-
rable interest rate reactions in developed countries.
Moreover, the impact on consumer prices is
much weaker as increased efficiency in energy use
over the past few decades has contributed to a
decline in the share of energy products in the con-
sumer price index. The effect is further mitigated
by the presence of higher indirect taxes on energy
consumption, particularly on gasoline. In the euro
area, about two thirds of the price for transport
fuels and lubricants are made up by taxes, mean-
ing that a price increase only works on one-third
of the overall price. The respective tax burden is
smaller in the United States and slightly larger in
Japan. Moreover, the use of other energy sources
has also contributed to the reduction in the share
of oil in total energy consumption.12
Furthermore, in addition to greater efficiency
in the use of energy for final consumption, there
has also been a decline in energy intensity of pro-
duction.13 The overall economic structure of
developed economies has changed over the past
30 years. It has become more service-oriented and
less reliant on industrial production, which fur-
ther reduces the likely role of an oil price rise as
an impending disturbance. The combination of
these various factors explains why the average oil
bill of the major economies (as depicted in fig-
ure 1.5) has declined to about 0.8 per cent of GDP
in 1999, and why present inflation did not pick up
in the same way it did during the 1970s.
3. The impact on oil-importing
developing economies
Exposure of oil-importing developing coun-
tries to oil price hikes frequently differs from that
of the developed world. First-round effects on
prices and balance of payments tend to be more
severe, as the energy and oil intensities are gener-
ally higher in these countries. Taking the OECD
countries level as 100, oil intensity (e.g. primary
oil consumption per unit of GDP) in 2002 was
142 in Brazil, 232 in China, 237 in Thailand and
288 in India (IEA, 2004b: 11). Moreover, the share
of taxes in the final price of fuels is usually much
lower in developing than in most developed coun-
tries, and in a number of them, these prices are
subsidized. As a consequence, the cost of crude
has a more direct impact in developing countries,
either on the final consumer price or on fiscal ac-
counts. If these impacts are seen as a threat to the
control of inflation or to fiscal consolidation, they
would call for policy adjustments with all the at-
tendant effects these have on growth. Finally,
developing countries could also feel another indi-
rect effect, stemming from policy reactions in the
developed countries, in the form of lower exports
and tighter conditions in international financial
markets.
In contrast to the substantial reduction of oil
dependency in developed countries, reliance on
oil imports has increased in the developing word,
as a result of industrialization and urbanization.
In 1972, the oil import bill in developing coun-
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of current GDP, and it climbed to 2.3 per cent in
1975￿1976 and 3.4 per cent in 1980. In 1998￿1999
this share was 1.7 per cent of GDP, and it rose to
2.7 per cent in 2000￿2003. In 2004￿2005 it has
probably exceeded 3.5 per cent, roughly twice the
oil import bill paid in the main OECD countries.14
As a result, the increased cost in oil imports in
developing countries clearly exceeds those faced
by developed regions and more closely resembles
the experience of the oil shocks of the 1970s.
Latin America (excluding the oil-exporting
countries of Ecuador and Venezuela) shows the
lowest exposure among developing regions, with
the share of oil imports rising from 0.8 per cent of
GDP in 1998 to 1.3 per cent in 2003. This has
been, in particular, the result of active Brazilian
policies aimed at substituting oil with national
energy sources (hydroelectricity and alcohol) and
at increasing the domestic production of hydro-
carbons. However, oil imports account for a
significant proportion of GDP in Chile (4.7 per
cent in 2003), Central America (4.9 per cent on
average for Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama) and the Carib-
bean, with particularly high shares in Guyana,
Jamaica, Belize and Barbados.
Asia (excluding OPEC) accounts for roughly
80 per cent of oil imports from developing coun-
tries, and is also the region where the ratio of oil
imports to GDP remains the highest. The main rea-
son for this is the deepening of industrialization
in East and South Asian countries. In 2003, the
share of oil imports in GDP was 5 per cent or more
in Singapore, the Republic of Korea, Thailand,
Taiwan Province of China and the Philippines, and
more than 4 per cent in Pakistan and Sri Lanka; in
India, which is relatively less advanced in indus-
trialization than other countries in the region, this
share amounted to 3.8 per cent.
In Africa, the situation is very heterogene-
ous as the region comprises several major oil
exporters, but also a number of countries that are
heavily dependent on oil imports, particularly
among sub-Saharan countries. This subregion as
a whole (excluding Nigeria and South Africa)
presents levels of oil dependency close to those
found in East and South Asian countries (3.5 per
cent of GDP in 2000￿2003), despite the much
lower level of industrialization.
Summing up, oil prices have had, and con-
tinue to have, an impact on the import expenditure
of a significant number of developing countries
which is comparable to the one subsequent to the
1970s oil shocks. However, in many cases their
negative impact on the trade balance has been
compensated, either by a parallel increase in the
price of other exported primary commodities or
by expanding volumes of manufactured exports;
the first case was especially relevant in several
South-American and sub-Saharan countries, while
the second explains the solid trade performance
in East and South Asia, despite high oil prices.
Other oil-importing countries, however, face se-
vere financial strain.
In some developing countries, high commod-
ity prices (including oil) have caused concern about
inflationary pressures, and prompted a tightening
of monetary policies in order to prevent second-
round effects on prices. This is in stark contrast
to the reaction in developed economies. There the
lesson has been learned that monetary policy
instruments, which almost exclusively operate
through the impact on aggregate demand and the
absolute price level, should not be used to abate
price increases originating in changes of relative
prices.
Indeed developing countries have taken dif-
ferent approaches. For example, monetary policy
was tightened in Brazil and Mexico in 2004 in
order to prevent second-round effects, even though
it was recognized that higher-than-expected infla-
tion was mainly related to supply-side factors,
including energy prices (IPEA, 2005: 7￿9; Banco
de MØxico, 2005: 2). The policy response in other
Latin American and most East Asian countries was
more flexible. In order to avoid negative effects
on growth, monetary policy was not used to curb
inflation forced by higher oil prices (fig. 1.7). For
instance, economic policy in Argentina tried to
avoid high real interest rates and currency ap-
preciation as ways to fight against accelerating
inflation in early 2005. The latter was considered
to be largely due to temporary factors, and the
current levels of real exchange and interest rates
are central policy instruments for maintaining eco-
nomic growth and competitiveness. Similarly, in
most East and South-East Asian countries, supply-
side driven inflation pressures have not led to
sharp interest rates increases, which could haveCurrent Issues in the World Economy 27
Figure 1.7
REAL INTEREST RATES AND REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATES,
SELECTED ASIAN AND LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES, 2003￿2005
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on Thomson Financial Datastream; national sources; and JP Morgan, Effective
Exchange Rate Indices database.
a Interbank rates deflated by CPI changes.Trade and Development Report, 2005 28
undermined economic growth and the recovery of
their financial systems from the 1997￿1998 crisis.
For the Malaysian monetary authorities, for in-
stance, price pressures have been contained by
improvements in labour productivity and capacity
expansion, enabling monetary policy to remain sup-
portive to growth (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2005).
Several countries have also tried to isolate
domestic from international oil prices. In Latin
America, this has been the traditional approach in
Venezuela (see also annex to chapter III), but also
in a number of Asian countries, including oil-pro-
ducing countries, such as Viet Nam and Malaysia,
and countries dependent on oil imports. In India,
for example, the government resorts to subsidies
in the order of 0.5 per cent of GDP for specific
petroleum products largely used by the rural poor.
In Thailand, such subsidies reached 1.3 per cent
of GDP in 2004, and in Indonesia they amounted
to 2.5 per cent of GDP in the same year. In the
latter countries, these policies have recently been
revised, leading to an increase in oil prices (Chan-
nel News Asia, 2005).
In conclusion, the chances of an oil price hike
plunging the global economy into a recession com-
parable to the ones of the 1970s and 1980s appear
to be small. In the major developed countries, oil
prices have considerably lost significance for the
evolution of GDP. First- and second-round effects
have not led to inflationary pressures that would
have prompted a restrictive stance in monetary
policy. Naturally, the higher cost for energy had
an impact on price indices, but the monetary au-
thorities have learned from the previous oil price
hikes that monetary tightening is not a proper re-
sponse to this challenge. However, oil dependency
remains high in many developing countries and
the prospect of permanently higher oil prices is
especially disturbing for those countries that are
not benefiting from higher prices for their exports.
Asia has been a remarkably dynamic region
over the past four decades, with different econo-
mies in the region experiencing rapid growth and
catching up. Following Japan￿s economic catch-
ing up episode between the 1950s and the 1980s,
the fast pace of economic growth, industrializa-
tion and growth of manufactured exports in the
Republic of Korea, as well as in other Asian newly
industrializing economies (NIEs) ￿ Hong Kong
(China), Singapore and Taiwan Province of China
￿ awarded these countries, and by extension the
region, with the distinction of forming the ￿East
Asian miracle￿. China and India have entered this
process most recently.
E.  Rapid growth in China and India and
the profit-investment nexus
In spite of their rapid growth over a number
of years, both China and India still have relatively
low levels of per capita income (table 1.5). How-
ever, due to the two countries￿ size and the fact
that, together, they account for about two fifths
of the world population and one fifth of global
income (measured in terms of purchasing power
parity, PPP), their economic performance has al-
ready a sizeable impact on international trade
patterns, global output growth, and the economic
prospects of other developing countries, includ-
ing their progress towards achieving the MDGs.
In 2003, China ranked second and India fourth in
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their respective ranks being sixth and twelfth  in
terms of real GDP. Moreover, as the third largest
importer and exporter in the world in 2004, China￿s
growth dynamics significantly influence commod-
ity prices and the prices of some traded manufactures
such as textiles, as discussed in subsequent chap-
ters of this Report.
This section addresses selected issues that are
of crucial importance for the sustainability of rapid
economic growth in China and India in the me-
dium and long term. In particular, investment plays
a key role in the expansion of productive capacity
and productivity growth (TDR 2003). UNCTAD￿s
analysis has shown that the catching up process
in the NIEs was based on the so-called profit-
investment nexus (TDR 1996, chap. II, TDR 2003,
chap. IV), in which savings created by profits in a
process of rapid capital accumulation, technologi-
cal progress and structural change constitute the
basis for sustained productivity growth, rising liv-
ing standards and successful integration into the
international economy. Investment plays the cru-
cial role due to its ability to simultaneously create
income, develop productive capacities, and trans-
mit technological progress; moreover, investment
supports the upgrading of skills as well as institu-
tional deepening.
A macroeconomic environment which both
supports and encourages investors is required for
domestic and foreign investment to become a
source of growth and development. The profit-
investment nexus emphasizes that profits, the sav-
ings accrued at companies, are the dominant
source of financing. Rising profits can create a
virtuous circle whereby the profits stemming from
investment increase the incentives for companies
to invest, thereby raising the capacity for financing
new and additional investment.15 For this to happen
on an economy-wide scale, access to reliable, ad-
equate and cheap sources of financing is an impor-
tant precondition. The stance of domestic monetary
policy is of crucial importance to initiate a process
that will become self-supporting once profits have
started to create the savings necessary to finance
additional investments. Overly restrictive monetary
policy may lead investors to prefer investing in fi-
nancial assets over extending productive capacity.
Together with the interest rate, the exchange
rate level is the other crucial macroeconomic price.
Table 1.5
REAL GDP PER CAPITA AND GDP GROWTH IN CHINA, INDIA, JAPAN AND
THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA DURING THEIR RAPID GROWTH PERIODS
Real GDP per capita (dollars) Average growth rate (per cent)
Market pricesa PPPb
Year Year Year Year Year Year 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 1st 20
1 10 20 2003 1 10 20 2000 decade  decade decade decade years
China (1979) 163 347 752 1 067 1 023 1 752 3 276 3 747 8.6 8.1 . . 8.3
India (1980) 222 304 440 511 1 159 1 634 2 414 2 479 3.7 3.8 . . 3.7
Japan (1957) 5 481 11 575 20 763 38 222 3 605 7 515 13 544 24 675 8.4 6.1 2.9 2.9 7.2
Rep. of Korea (1965) 1 297 2 397 4 149 12 232 1 803 3 501 6 237 15 876 6.7 5.7 7.5 4.2c 6.2
United States . . . 35 566 . . . 33 293 .....
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on UNCDB; Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Historical
Statistics of Japan database; World Bank, World Development Indicators database; and Penn World Table 6.1, 2002.
a In constant 2000 dollars.
b In constant 1996 dollars.
c The Republic of Korea￿s average growth rate in the 4th decade covers only 9 years due to data constraints.Trade and Development Report, 2005 30
Without a competitive and rather stable exchange
rate it is even more difficult for developing coun-
tries to successfully integrate into the world market.
Hence, the monetary conditions of an open mar-
ket economy (i.e. the interest rate and the real
exchange rate) are of utmost importance for domes-
tic and foreign investors and for the sustainability
of the growth process.
Finally, the experience of the successful
Asian economies shows that growing profits and
positive profit expectations do not exclude the full
participation of labour in the functional distribu-
tion of income. By contrast, only if overall demand
grows in line with the production potential of an
economy, can investors expect a stable and last-
ing source of profit income. But domestic demand
can only follow such a growth path if real wages
increase in line with productivity. This, more than
the perceived ability and willingness to ￿save￿,
has been one of the characteristic features of the
Asian economies during their catching up epi-
sodes. High ex-post savings are the result of the
investment process, rather than its source.
Thus, three conditions for sustainable growth
emerge from Asia￿s growth experiences. First,
economies need productivity drivers. These driv-
ers may be individual companies, or a critical mass
of companies located in specific sectors or
branches, that push productivity growth beyond
formerly reached limits and create the kind of
incentive needed for maintaining the overall
profit-based dynamics of the economy. In the past,
manufacturing has been the most important driver,
as the potential to expand productivity growth has
been closely related to the opportunities of inten-
sifying the process of capital deepening.
Second, growth dynamics need to be sup-
ported by both domestic demand and exports. An
appropriate balance between domestic and foreign
demand is required mainly to cushion the shocks
that frequently emerge from the vagaries of world
financial markets and their impact on exports.
In particular, steady and rapid growth of private
consumption, which is quantitatively the most im-
portant component of overall demand, is needed
to sustain growth processes. Finally, pro-growth
macroeconomic conditions are required to set and
keep the economy on a sustainable and steep
growth path.
1. The sectors driving economic growth
A breakpoint analysis on labour productiv-
ity trends16 for the post-Second World War
catching up process in selected Asian countries
indicates rapid growth episodes for Japan between
1957 and 1973, the Republic of Korea since 1965,
China since 1979, and India since 1980. At the
beginning of their economic take-off, the level of
Japan￿s per capita income (in constant 2000 dol-
lars) was $5,481 and that of the Republic of Korea
$1,297. Compared to these levels, economic take-
off in China and India started from a much lower
base ￿ $163 for China and $222 for India. Table
1.5 shows the four countries￿ per capita GDP in
market prices, as well as in constant PPP terms,
which gives less divergent results among coun-
tries, as poor countries generally have lower price
levels and higher purchasing power per dollar.
Assuming labour to be immobile internation-
ally and wages to be set at the level of the national
economy, the sectors where profits rise or prices
fall will be those that are best positioned to ex-
ploit the potential for productivity growth through
the increasing use of sophisticated equipment and
technologies. Whereas, in principle, any sector can
take the lead and become a driver, the manufac-
turing sector has most often assumed this role,
because it is apparently the best placed to exploit
all the specific advantages of machinery and tech-
nology for large-scale production. The pattern of
manufacturing productivity growth dominating
overall productivity growth can be found in most
of the successful catching up episodes.
In the Republic of Korea, manufacturing pro-
ductivity was expanding at about 2.5 per cent
above the productivity of the overall economy
between 1963 and 1983.17 Where this is the case,
and where wages in manufacturing rise broadly
in line with productivity of the overall economy,
manufacturing producers have a huge advantage
above all other sectors. They can either increase
the volume of production by lowering prices or
realize consistently higher profits than other parts
of the economy.
The same pattern of development can be ob-
served in China￿s rapid growth phase starting in
the early 1980s. Between 1981 and 2000, its manu-Current Issues in the World Economy 31
facturing productivity growth averaged 9.4 per
cent, an extremely high rate by historical stand-
ards, exceeding all the other sectors of the economy
by 2.5 per cent per year on average. In China,
manufacturing productivity growth accelerated in
the mid-1990s and expanded at an unprecedented
rate of 14.7 per cent annually between 1997 and
2000 (fig. 1.8). This productivity surge in the Chi-
nese manufacturing is closely related to rapidly
increasing inflows of FDI and their concentration
in industry. Inflows of FDI in industry increased
from $11 billion in 1992 to $45 billion in 1997
and to $53 billion in 2003. Indeed, since the mid-
1990s, 60 per cent of China￿s total FDI inflows
have been oriented to the manufacturing sector
(UNCTAD, 2004a: 55).
Producers in high-cost industrialized coun-
tries have found in China an attractive outsourcing
platform not only because of its cheap and rela-
tively well-educated workforce, but also because
of the incentives offered by its Government. For
more than two decades, foreign funded enterprises
(FFEs)18 have benefited from tax breaks which
gave them a competitive advantage over local
State-owned and private companies. For corpo-
rate income tax, local companies are charged a
tax rate of 33 per cent as soon as they start mak-
ing profits, while foreign firms pay 7.5 per cent
two years after they start earning profits, followed
by 15 per cent starting from the sixth year they
continue to earn profits.
India is still far from such a regime of manu-
facturing-driven growth. Comparing China￿s and
India￿s manufacturing productivity growth and
their total economy productivity growth,19 reveals
the dominating role of China￿s manufacturing sec-
tor (fig. 1.8). Although India also experienced
vigorous growth of manufacturing productivity in
Figure 1.8
PRODUCTIVITY IN THE MANUFACTURING AND SERVICES SECTORS COMPARED TO
OVERALL PRODUCTIVITY IN CHINA (1984￿1993, 1993￿2002) AND INDIA (1991￿2000)
(Index numbers, initial year = 100)
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on UNCDB; China State Information Center (SIC) Database; Ghoshal, 2003;
and World Bank, World Development Indicators database.
Note: Numbers over 100 mean that manufacturing and services sectors productivities exceed overall productivity.Trade and Development Report, 2005 32
the first half of the 1990s, the dominance of manu-
facturing was much less pronounced in India than
it was in China throughout the 1980s and 1990s.
This is reflected in the fact that China almost tri-
pled its manufacturing productivity between 1993
and 2002 (fig. 1.9).
In India, the services sector seems to be as-
suming the role as an engine of income growth
and driver of change, albeit in a less pronounced
fashion, that manufacturing has played in other
countries. Moreover, productivity growth in In-
dia￿s services sector is only slightly higher and
more stable than in manufacturing. Average an-
nual growth rates of 5.6 per cent in the services
sector in the 1990s were outstanding, especially con-
sidering that this very heterogeneous sector includes
a large part of informal activities and activities with
a very low productivity potential. In China the
growth rate of services between 1993 and 2002
averaged only 3.7 per cent, and it has lagged con-
siderably behind overall productivity increases.
In absolute terms, productivity in India￿s
services sector is still much lower than in China￿s
manufacturing sector (fig. 1.9). For instance, pro-
ductivity in Chinese manufacturing increased from
$900 in 1984 to $5,400 in 2002. Productivity in
India￿s services sector reached $530 in 1991 but
rose to only $870 in 2000. Moreover, productiv-
ity in Indian manufacturing stood at about $960
in 1991, a level roughly comparable to China￿s
$900 in 1984. But over a period of 10 years India￿s
manufacturing productivity increased to only
$1,500 while China had already reached $1,950
in 1993. Thus, while the initial productivity level
of Indian manufacturing was higher, the growth
dynamics were insufficient to keep the position.
Figure 1.9
PRODUCTIVITY IN THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR IN CHINA (1984￿1993, 1993￿2002)
AND IN THE MANUFACTURING AND SERVICES SECTORS IN INDIA (1991￿2000)
(Constant 2000 dollars)
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on UNCDB; China State Information Center (SIC) Database; Ghoshal, 2003;
and World Bank, World Development Indicators database.Current Issues in the World Economy 33
With extraordinary productivity growth in the
last decade, Chinese manufacturers, domestic and
foreign alike, had a wide margin to improve their
market position. While labour productivity in
manufacturing increased at an average annual rate
of 12.2 per cent from 1991 to 2002, real wages
grew by only 6.8 per cent in that sector. The huge
gap between productivity growth and wage growth
could be strategically used to reduce prices of their
products and to gain market shares against for-
eign competitors and domestic producers in less
favoured sectors. Depending on the degree of com-
petition in their specific markets, manufacturing
producers could also use the gap to increase their
profit margins and to strengthen their ability to
invest.
2. Stable and balanced demand growth
as a condition for sustained rapid
growth
An analysis of the contribution of the differ-
ent components of GDP growth in Asia suggests
that an effective policy should not only focus on
exports and imports but try to balance foreign and
domestic stimuli (table 1.6). In fact, the contribu-
tion of exports to GDP growth has increased over
time in all the countries considered but domestic
demand, comprising investment and private con-
sumption, plays a much more important role in
quantitative terms. While India lags behind in its
investment dynamics, China and the other Asian
drivers have used an approach where both, exter-
nal and domestic demand had a significant impact
on the sustainability of GDP growth. Obviously,
large and populous countries such as China and
India cannot rely on exports as the only engine of
growth; domestic demand, investment and con-
sumption, is at least as important.
Real household demand, the main contribu-
tion to GDP growth, grew at an average annual
rate of 8.9 per cent in China, 7.7 per cent in Japan,
7 per cent in the Republic of Korea and 4.7 per
cent in India (fig. 1.10). Private consumption reg-
istered a remarkably steady and strong growth rate
in China. Given the sustainability of the past per-
formance in Asia, it seems that the steadiness of
households demand growth can act as an endog-
enous stabilizer to economic development. Even
more, if it is true that revenues from a flourishing
domestic demand flow back to the business sector
in form of steadily rising profits, the participation
of workers in the proceeds of an economy-wide
expansion may be indispensable for a sustainable
growth process.
If the increase in labour productivity of the
total economy is fully reflected in real wage and
salary increases, disposable income and real con-
sumption grow consistently at a rate close to the
growth rate of GDP. Indeed, in a world where the
distribution of income between labour and capi-
tal and the household savings rate are constant,
the growth rates of GDP and private consumption
are identical.
In China, as well as in the other successful
Asian countries, the full participation of labour in
the proceeds of total economy productivity in-
creases was never in question. Apart from the
growing inequality of the personal distribution of
income between different types of labour, the func-
tional distribution between labour and capital has
been reflecting equality of powers rather than the
dominance of one side. For instance, for the pe-
riod between 1990 to 2000, available statistics
indicate that, on average, real wage in the total
economy grew by around 8 per cent annually,
while overall economy productivity grew at a rate
of some 9 per cent (Flassbeck et al., 2005).20
Recently, real wage growth seems to have
been even more rapid than overall productivity
growth. This is in line with reports warning about
labour shortages in the manufacturing sector,
which would be leading to an upward pressure on
wages. For example, the province of Guangdong
in the Pearl River delta is short of two million
migrant workers; a shortage evident throughout
the manufacturing sector along China￿s eastern
shoreline, from the Pearl River Delta up to Shang-
hai (The Economist, 9 October 2004). Other
observers also warn of an impending labour short-
age (Yang, 2005).
These developments have led to a significant
reduction in poverty, but as rapid wage increases
are unevenly distributed among sectors and re-
gions, they have also led to a more unequal income
distribution (box 1.2).Trade and Development Report, 2005 34
All in all, consumption may not have been
the main engine of growth, but the stable growth
rate of consumption must have been a huge stimu-
lus for investors. The profit-investment nexus has
not materialized through a redistribution of income
from labour to capital, but by equally rapidly ris-
ing profits and wages in the overall economy as-
sociated with surging manufacturing productivity.
In other words, investment that pushed the economy
towards new frontiers has created sources of new
investment through consumption (Eatwell et al.,
2002).
Compared to private consumption, invest-
ment growth rates are much more volatile in all
the countries under consideration. The magnitude
of investment in the Republic of Korea and Japan
in the first 20 years of the economic take-off
dwarfs the much-quoted spectacular growth of
Chinese investment. Overall, the Republic of Ko-
rea recorded an average annual growth rate of
gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) of 17.2 per
cent over a 20-year time span, whereas investment
in Japan expanded by 12.5 per cent and in China
by 11 per cent annually. India￿s average perform-
ance lags far behind, at 6.8 per cent, but India￿s
and China￿s investment growth has accelerated
markedly in the past five years at 7.6 per cent and
14.1 per cent respectively.
Investment shares of GDP were high in the
Asian countries, at levels hovering around 30 per
cent in the first and second decades of their rapid
growth periods. While Japan￿s investment share
levelled off to just below 30 per cent in the third
and fourth decades following the initial take-off,
the Republic of Korea￿s share has remained at over
30 per cent up to the present. In India, investment
shares in the first and second decades have again
lagged around 10 per cent behind the respective
Chinese and Japanese investment shares, and the
investment gap between China and India widened
further between 2000 and 2004. On average, Chi-
na￿s investment share reached 41.1 per cent per
Table 1.6
CONTRIBUTION OF CONSUMPTION, INVESTMENT AND TRADE TO GDP GROWTH
IN CHINA, INDIA, JAPAN AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
(Per cent)
Consumption Gross Trade Average
fixed annual
Private Public capital GDP
consumption expenditure  formation Exports Imports  growtha
1st decadeb
China 4.88 1.39 3.05 0.61 -1.06 10.10
India 3.25 0.75 1.33 0.32 -0.57 5.89
Japan 4.89 0.58 4.40 1.34 -1.27 9.41
Republic of Korea 6.08 0.65 4.27 3.80 -5.25 9.01
2nd decade
China 3.88 1.10 3.62 2.03 -1.96 9.41
India 3.11 0.70 1.51 1.16 -1.38 5.70
Japan 3.45 0.64 3.10 1.38 -0.97 7.41
Republic of Korea 3.96 0.43 3.43 4.33 -3.67 7.35
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on UNCDB; Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Historical
Statistics of Japan database; and World Bank, World Development Indicators database.
a Differences between the sum of the contributions and GDP growth are due to variations in stocks and/or statistical
discrepancies.
b Starting years as in table 1.5.Current Issues in the World Economy 35
annum in this period, compared with India￿s
22.5 per cent. In 2004, India￿s GDP share of GFCF
stood at 23.4 per cent, half of China￿s 46.6 per cent.
3. Policy conditions underlying the
Asian catching up processes
Asia￿s catching up episode has also been a
period of consistent monetary stability. Despite
extremely fast real income growth, rising employ-
ment opportunities and falling unemployment
rates, long periods of very high investment have
coincided with very low inflation rates. None of
the countries under consideration experienced in-
flation rates above 30 per cent during their
respective growth periods. The inflation rate, on
average, was 7.4 per cent for Japan between 1960
and 1979, and 12.7 per cent for the Republic of
Korea in the 20 years from 1967 to 1986. In China
and India it was 5.6 per cent and 8 per cent, re-
spectively, between 1990 and 2003. Moreover,
China￿s growth and investment have recently ex-
perienced an extraordinary acceleration but there
are still no hints of an impending inflationary ac-
celeration that could force the government and the
central bank to sacrifice real growth in order to
stabilize prices in an overheating economy. De-
spite the rise in commodity prices, and oil in
particular, monthly headline inflation did not ex-
ceed 5.3 per cent at annual rate in 2004.
It is important to note that the achievement
of price stability is not rooted in a restrictive mon-
etary policy. For example, the policy interest rate
(in real terms) set by the Peoples￿ Bank of China
throughout the boom years, i.e. from the mid-
1990s to the present, has remained at an average
level of 3 per cent. In Japan￿s 20-year period from
1957 to 1976, the average real interest rate (again
Figure 1.10
EVOLUTION OF PRIVATE CONSUMPTION IN CHINA, INDIA, JAPAN AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
(Index numbers on a logarithmic scale, initial year = 100)
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on UNCDB; Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Historical
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based on the policy rate) was negative at -0.1 per
cent and slightly positive in the Republic of Ko-
rea, at 0.6 per cent from 1967 to 1986.21 The
averages for the Chinese and Indian real short-
term rates between 1990 and 2004 were 1.1 per
cent and 1.3 per cent, respectively. Lending rates
were also extremely low in China, and they have
remained well below the growth rate of GDP,
which may be considered as a proxy for the rate
of return on investment in fixed capital; as a re-
sult, they have consistently stimulated the creation
of new capital. In India, real lending rates were on
average close to real growth of GDP (fig. 1.11).22
The pro-growth stance is as true for domes-
tic monetary conditions as for the main external
condition: the real exchange rate. The four coun-
tries￿ development paths were supported by low
and fairly stable real exchange rates, which con-
tributed to a high level of competitiveness on the
world market.23 The real effective exchange rates
of China, India and the Republic of Korea depre-
ciated throughout most of their catching up periods
with major devaluations taking place at the be-
ginning of the 1990s in India and in the mid-1990s
in China. Thus monetary stability and competitive
valuation functioned as strongly supportive and sta-
bilizing elements of the high-growth periods in all
of the four countries without fuelling inflation.24
China and India were able to create a favour-
able monetary environment throughout the 1980s
and early 1990s and, even more importantly, to
defend these positions throughout the past dec-
ade. Since 2000, China has had to justify its
pro-growth monetary policy against external po-
litical pressure and, despite continued currency
appreciation in real terms during and after the
Asian financial crisis it has managed to preserve
competitiveness and the expansionary stance of
its monetary policy. The Indian real effective ex-
change rate has remained stable over the past
Box 1.2
INCOME DISPARITIES IN CHINA AND INDIA
In China, the number of people living in absolute poverty has been reduced considerably over the
past 25 years. However, both relative poverty and the gap between the rich and the poor are grow-
ing. China￿s Gini-coefficient increased from 0.18 to 0.33 in urban areas and from 0.25 to 0.36 in
the rural areas between 1981 and 2002 (United Nations, 2004a). In 2001, the Gini-coefficient for
the country as a whole was 0.44. In India, it was significantly lower than in China at 0.32 in 2000,
down from 0.37 for the period 1993￿1998. In comparison, in 2000, the Gini-coefficients in Swe-
den, Germany and the United States were 0.25, 0.28 and 0.41, respectively.
The high value of the Gini-index in China in general, compared to the lower values for rural and
urban areas, reflects the rising disparities between regions within the country. As the rural popula-
tion is an important factor for the expansion of domestic demand, in China, the policy to raise
welfare of the rural population will be a crucial factor for economic growth in the future. In this
regard, the Chinese Government recently reduced agricultural taxes in order to increase the in-
comes of China￿s 800 million rural residents.
For India, widening disparity is less of an issue. However, with more than 350 million poor people
(UN Statistical Division, Millennium Indicator Database) not fully participating in overall eco-
nomic growth, social stability could be threatened. Only if India can significantly increase income
levels nation-wide, can overall pro-growth balanced demand be created to help move the economy
forward.Current Issues in the World Economy 37
decade. Financial crises in India (in 1991) and in
China (in 1994) had the effect of radically changing
their monetary regimes; both countries conse-
quently adopted an anchor approach for their
exchange rates at a rather low level in order to
being able to defend their respective positions
unilaterally (TDR 2004). Only recently and under
enormous political pressure has China modified
its external monetary regime slightly by introduc-
ing a more flexible band for the exchange rate and
by envisaging a basket approach instead of unilat-
eral fixing against the dollar.
Price stability and pro-growth monetary con-
ditions of the Asian countries are in stark contrast
to those of other developing regions. Latin America,
for example, has over the past three decades ex-
perienced high and highly volatile inflation rates
and very restrictive monetary policies as well as
overvalued exchange rates. Different policy in-
struments used in Asia for coping with inflationary
pressures have been more effective, both in terms
of price stability and economic growth. In par-
ticular, by stabilizing the price level through
non-monetary instruments, such as an income
policy or direct price controls,25 monetary policy
was freed from the task of permanently fighting
inflationary dangers. Empirical evidence provided
in TDR 2003 has shown that the freedom to set
pro-growth macroeconomic conditions (interest
rates and exchange rates) has been a key feature
of Asia￿s success in comparison with Latin America.
In this respect, the macroeconomic regime,
in a broad sense, is an important component for
an explanation of Asia￿s comparatively good per-
formance. The successful Asian countries were
able to permanently stimulate investment because
a special assignment of policies created the space
for pro-growth monetary policy and a competitive
exchange rate. Sound institutional and structural
conditions were not seen as substitutes for support-
ive macroeconomic policies but the precondition
for applying them. The Chinese example, in par-
ticular, shows that even in a very open economy
with large FDI inflows, the labour market and, to
a very large extent, the money and capital mar-
kets may remain within the realm of national
Figure 1.11
REAL INTEREST RATESa IN CHINA AND INDIA, 1980￿2004
(Per cent)
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on IMF, International Financial Statistics database.
a Nominal lending rates deflated by consumer prices.Trade and Development Report, 2005 38
governments and central banks. The Asian expe-
rience demonstrates that globalization has not
reduced the need for economic policy to act at the
national level; in fact that need may even have in-
creased. The smoothing of the adjustment process
to more open markets, the stimulation of investments
and the maintenance of overall competitiveness
of an economy is, more than ever, the responsi-
bility and the opportunity of national governments.
4. Challenges for sustained growth in
China and India
Rapid growth in China and India over the past
two and a half decades have made the East and
South Asian region a new growth pole in the world
economy. The challenge for the two countries now
is to ensure the sustainability of their growth mo-
mentum. There is a need to strengthen the factors
underlying their current growth, as well as to ad-
dress existing challenges.
One of these challenges is how to foster the
pace of structural change. History shows that in
the development process, the importance of manu-
facturing and services increases both in output and
employment, whereas that of agriculture declines.
In China and India, by contrast, the role of agri-
culture in economic development will continue to
be of great importance for many years to come,
given that the majority of their populations still
live in rural areas, and the sector still employs
50 to 60 per cent of the workforce in both countries.
For China, expanding GDP and employment
in manufacturing and exporting sectors has been
imperative, but services will, in the future, pro-
vide more employment opportunities. In Japan and
the Republic of Korea the services sector com-
pensated for the declining contribution of the
industrial sector to GDP in the 1980s and 1990s,
respectively. In India, in contrast to China and the
NIEs in the high growth period of the 1990s the
share of industry in GDP has remained constant
while that of services has risen rapidly. This might
pose a challenge for sustained growth, as produc-
tivity increases in the services sector are normally
less strong than in the manufacturing sector.
Nevertheless, outsourcing in IT and business
processing has expanded rapidly, offering many
new opportunities for a country with weak infra-
structure and low investment in fixed capital, but
equipped with a fairly large educated workforce.
Although considerable productivity gains are
to be expected from structural change and in-
creased use of economies of scale, technological
upgrading can accelerate the catching up process.
Since China and India launched their economic
reforms, the pace of integration has been increas-
ing due to major structural changes in the world
economy. Production sharing in global manufac-
turing and services has enabled China, and subse-
quently India, to integrate into the world economy
by using their absolute advantage of a low-cost,
educated workforce. In comparison with the home
grown industries of Japan and the Republic of
Korea, it took much less time for the specialized
activities in China and India to become part of
the international supply chain. However, indus-
trialized countries are increasingly reluctant to
transfer technologies and know-how as part of
their engagement, particularly in China.
China has tried to circumvent this trend by
attracting FDI, which, ideally, incorporates the
transfer of required technology to the host coun-
try. However, despite granting ever-increasing
preferential treatment to foreign ventures that in-
clude the transfer of advanced technologies, there
are indications of difficulties in acquiring the
needed technological know-how through this
channel. It is well known that such spillover is
limited due to the prevalence of ￿technology mer-
cantilism￿ of foreign ventures whereby TNCs seek
to retain control over their technologies. In re-
sponse, China has shifted its policy to include the
purchase of key hardware, products and know-
how. However, so far China lacks the ability to
indigenize most imported technologies. Signifi-
cant manufacturing capabilities have been devel-
oped, but most of them are aimed at producing by
means of original equipment manufacturing to
supply TNCs and large brand name retailers.
India￿s industry has succeeded in develop-
ing certain knowledge-based industries in sectors
such as pharmaceuticals, basic organic chemicals
and IT. As with China￿s manufacturing sector,
however, there is the danger that the Indian IT
industry will remain trapped at the low end of theCurrent Issues in the World Economy 39
market, exporting services such as debugging, test-
ing, conversion and installation of software, and
importing expensive branded software and hard-
ware products.
As more developing countries develop ca-
pacities to produce labour-intensive manufactured
goods, competition in manufactured exports will
also intensify. Thus there is an additional strong
imperative for technology upgrading, to support
more diversified and higher value-added produc-
tion, which would enable both countries to maintain
their economic growth.
In both countries it will be crucial to ensure
that the majority of their population reaps the ben-
efits of economic growth, even if a price in terms
of greater interpersonal inequality has been paid
in the first round. The present analysis has shown
that the growth of real wages in line with rising
productivity is important for gaining general ac-
ceptance of the rapid processes of structural change.
It is also of the utmost importance for maintain-
ing the stability of the growth process and, hence,
for the success of catching up at large. Investment
depends on favourable demand expectations. Ex-
port demand is subject to the vagaries of the world
market and national competitiveness, and no coun-
try can expect permanent increases in its global
market shares. Therefore domestic consumption
is the most important factor for stabilizing and
sustaining private investment.
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Sustained rapid growth and rising living
standards in a number of Asian countries have
been accompanied by a dramatic increase of the
region￿s shares in world exports and raw material
consumption. The recent emergence of develop-
ing Asia as a driver of world economic growth
has been widely welcomed, not least because the
associated poverty reduction in China and India
signifies important progress towards achieving the
Millennium Development Goal of halving global
poverty by 2015. Moreover, combined with their
rapid growth, the greater integration of these coun-
tries into the world trading system has created new
export opportunities for many developed and other
developing countries.
But policy-makers in some developed and
developing countries have also expressed concern
about potential adverse effects on their economies
stemming from the rising import demand and ex-
port supplies of these rapidly growing Asian
countries. For example, Asia￿s sustained superior
export performance relative to other developing
regions has sparked fears that this region might
become a price setter for labour-intensive export
activities in the world market, and that competi-
tive pressure from Asian economies might, over
time, wipe out export opportunities for other de-
veloping-country exporters. Combined with the
recent, much slower pace of economic growth in
most developed countries, it has also fuelled the
debate in developed countries about the employ-
ment and growth consequences of rising imports
of labour-intensive manufactures from, and in-
creased relocation and outsourcing of economic
activities to, Asian developing countries. Further,
particularly over the past three years, policy-mak-
ers in some developed and developing countries
have been concerned about the potential adverse
impact on their economies￿ growth prospects of
the rise in commodity prices, especially those of
metals and fuels. This price rise is partly attrib-
uted to the strong increase in demand from the
rapidly growing Asian developing countries.
The global impact of China￿s buoyant eco-
nomic performance has been the focus of many
of these concerns in recent years. For example,
there have been widespread fears that China￿s ac-
cession to the World Trade Organization (WTO)
in 2001 and, in particular, termination of the WTO
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) at the
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beginning of 2005, might be followed by a massive
increase in China￿s exports of labour-intensive
apparel. Some fear that this might be accompa-
nied by a significant decline in the price of inter-
nationally traded clothing, which would erode the
export opportunities of other developing-country
exporters, as well as displacing producers in im-
porting developed countries. Moreover, media
reports on observed or expected changes in the
fortunes of the Chinese economy can have an enor-
mous influence on short-term price movements of
internationally traded raw materials such as pe-
troleum, copper and nickel.
India￿s economic development has sparked
less fear, even though the country has also regis-
tered buoyant economic growth over the past few
years. Moreover, India￿s growth
potential is sometimes consid-
ered to be even greater than that
of China (Panagariya, 2004).
However, India￿s exports of la-
bour-intensive manufactures
have not featured as promi-
nently as China￿s in world trade
flows, nor has its raw material
consumption grown at any-
where near the same pace as
China￿s. Rather, developed
countries￿ fears of India￿s eco-
nomic growth focus mainly on offshoring in the
services sector, particularly from the United States.
Some developing-country policy-makers are oc-
casionally concerned about the impact on their
countries of a potential surge in labour-intensive
apparel exports from India following termination
of the ATC and full implementation of WTO rules
for this sector; this could reinforce the perceived
adverse effects from the growing Chinese exports
of these commodities.
In some sense, China￿s recent rapid income
growth and shifts in its pattern of trade resemble
those experienced by Japan and the Republic of
Korea some decades ago. For example, between
1965 and 1985 manufactured exports from the
Republic of Korea grew at an average annual rate
of almost 35 per cent, which was more than dou-
ble the pace of growth in world manufactured
exports. Similarly, between 1987 and 2003 manu-
factured exports from China grew at an average
annual rate of almost 18 per cent, which was also
more than double the pace of growth in world
manufactured exports.
However, there are also important differences
between the recent growth of China and India, on
the one hand, and the earlier episodes of rapid
growth, industrialization and greater trade inte-
gration by Japan and the Republic of Korea, on
the other. Two of these have to do with the coun-
tries themselves. First, both China and India are
very large economies, each with a population
about 10 times larger than that of Japan and about
25 times larger than that of the Republic of Ko-
rea. The share of China in total world population
has averaged about 21 per cent since the begin-
ning of the country￿s economic catch-up and grow-
ing trade integration in the late 1970s, and the
share of India has been around
17 per cent since the intensi-
fication of its trade integration
in the late 1980s. By contrast,
the respective shares for Japan
and the Republic of Korea
were about 3 per cent and 1 per
cent, respectively, during their
corresponding phases of rapid
economic catch-up and export
expansion. Moreover, China
accounts for about 13 per cent
￿ and India for another 6 per
cent ￿ of global income, measured in terms of
purchasing power parity (PPP).
Second, rapid income growth and greater
trade integration by China and India started from
lower levels of per capita income. For example,
in the late 1980s (i.e. when the two countries
strongly accelerated their trade integration), their
respective per capita incomes were at about the
same level as that of the Republic of Korea at the
beginning of its export surge in the early 1960s,
but only at about half that of Japan￿s in the mid-
1950s, when this country began its post-War
export take-off. This means that the patterns of
demand in China and India may change at least as
much as that in the Republic of Korea and much
more than that in Japan during their respective
catch-up and rapid integration periods after the
Second World War.
Given the large size of the Chinese and In-
dian economies, and their specific patterns of
China and India will have a
much larger impact on the
composition of world trade
than Japan and the
Republic of Korea had
during their economic
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demand, changes in the two countries￿ level and
structure of supply and demand will tend to have
a much larger impact on the composition of world
trade than those of Japan and the Republic of
Korea during their economic ascent. China￿s
growth has already demonstrated some of this
impact on global trade flows. The structure of
India￿s merchandise trade is likely to follow a
sequence of changes similar to that of China, but
with a lag of one or two decades, if the role of
industrialization in India￿s further economic as-
cent is similar to that in the other fast growing
Asian economies.
Three additional differences concern the inter-
national environment in which economic catch-up
and greater integration by China and India are
taking place. One is the much slower pace of eco-
nomic growth and industrialization in developed
countries. This has reduced income-related export
opportunities for developing-country exporters of,
for example, labour-intensive manufactures, and
contributed to rather pessimistic forecasts of glo-
bal primary commodity consumption. As a con-
sequence, investment in commodity production
and processing facilities has fallen, particularly
in mining and energy production. Another differ-
ence is that greater trade integration by China and
India is occurring concurrently with similar ef-
forts by other developing countries; a number of
countries have been simultaneously increasing
their export-oriented activities in the same prod-
ucts. This risks creating growing competition
among the developing countries for export mar-
kets. A third difference in the international envi-
ronment is reduced space for proactive trade and
industrial policies to manage greater trade inte-
gration. This has made it more difficult to use the
kind of targeted support to nascent industries that
policy-makers in the Republic of Korea provided
during its economic catch-up so as to create broad-
based domestic forward and backward linkages
in which greater trade integration could be em-
bedded. Partly as a result of this, policy-makers
in developing countries have actively supported
participation in international production networks,
increasingly through the use of tax instruments.
Bearing these similarities and differences in
mind, this chapter examines changes in the trade
patterns that have been associated with success-
ful economic development in China and India.
This is done from a historical perspective and in a
comparative framework, referring to the economic
catch-up and industrialization periods of Japan
after the Second World War and of the Republic
of Korea. The impact of domestic resource and
balance-of-payments constraints on rapid economic
growth and industrialization is emphasized. The
chapter also assesses the impact of the changing
trade patterns in China and India on international
trading relationships. More specifically, the chap-
ter focuses on two key aspects:
￿ Shifts during rapid income growth and indus-
trialization in the pattern of food consumption
and the intensity of metal and energy use,
which, when combined with shifts on the sup-
ply side, affect the level and composition of
a country￿s external trade;
￿ The impact of these shifts on the pattern of
international trade flows when they occur in
very large economies with relatively low lev-
els of per capita income.
The chapter shows that import demand by
China and India for a number of primary com-
modities (particularly metals and energy products,
as well as some soft commodities such as natural
rubber and soybeans) can be expected, in the near
future, to keep international prices for a limited
number of products at levels above those experi-
enced over the past decade or so. However, it is
uncertain whether this can lead to a reversal of the
long-standing price decline in primary commodi-
ties more generally. Rising prices will stimulate
the production of some of the affected commodi-
ties, including domestic production in the importing
countries, and reduce the consumption of some
others. The chapter also shows that the ability of
the fast-growing Asian economies to further in-
crease their export earnings in line with their rising
import bills, in the medium term, will depend on
their progress with regard to structural change and
domestic capital formation, as well as their ca-
pacity to upgrade production to more skill-intensive
manufactures in the case of China, and to expand
manufacturing in the case of India.Trade and Development Report, 2005 44
It is well known that the process of economic
development is accompanied by changes in the
sectoral composition of production, employment,
private consumption, and external trade. On the
demand side, the changes are derived from the
pattern of income elasticity of private consumer
demand and the intensity of metal and energy use
associated with urbanization and industrialization.
On the supply side, they result from factor accu-
mulation and productivity growth. Shifts in the
patterns of production, employment and consump-
tion are more uniform across countries than shifts
in the level and composition of external trade. This
is because a host of country-specific factors (such
as size, geographic location, resource endow-
ments, history of industrial growth, and trade and
exchange rate policies) influence shifts in a coun-
try￿s level and composition of external trade.
There is clear evidence of a close relation-
ship between (i) increasing population and per
capita income, on the one hand, and the level and
composition of food consumption, on the other;
and (ii) per capita income and the level of indus-
trial production, on the one hand, and the intensity
of metal and energy use, on the other (Syrquin,
1988; Syrquin and Chenery, 1989). The trade im-
pact of shifts in the level and composition of food
consumption is often relatively small, depending
on the supply response in agriculture to shifting
relative prices. By contrast, given that metals and
most energy products are non-renewable resources,
rising demand for these raw materials can often
lead to a substantial rise in imports. This section
examines these relationships in the rapidly growing
Asian economies, emphasizing the experiences of
China and India over the past decade.
1. Changing patterns of food
consumption
A rise in per capita income from low levels
is associated with an increase in per capita food
consumption and a shift in the composition of
household expenditure away from primary prod-
ucts, particularly food, towards manufactures,
such as textiles and clothing, wood and paper
products, machinery (e.g. electrical household
equipment), and chemicals (e.g. pharmaceuticals).
Household demand for services also increases,
particularly for transport (especially personal
transportation), electricity and housing (including
furniture and consumer appliances).1 The share of
food in total household expenditure, while increas-
ing in absolute terms, declines relative to that of
other products, because the income elasticity of
demand for food is below unity. Moreover, as per
capita income continues to grow, the increase in
per capita calorie intake peters out, and households
change the composition of food consumption: the
share of staple cereals falls, while in most coun-
tries the shares of meat, fish, dairy products, and
fruits and vegetables tends to rise.
Income changes are not the only cause of
shifts in food consumption patterns. Lifestyle and
preference changes, particularly those associated
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with urbanization and the increasing number of
two-income nuclear families, also play a role.
They tend to lead to a greater emphasis on con-
venience, including a growing
share of food consumed away
from home, a larger intake of
readymade meals, and efforts
to reduce the preparation time
for traditional dishes (Popkin,
1993). Urbanization has a par-
ticularly strong impact on the
level and composition of a
country￿s food consumption
if the incomes of urban con-
sumers are significantly higher
than those of rural consumers.
Where this is the case, rural
consumers may continue to strive for a higher per
capita calorie intake on the basis of traditional
diets, whereas urban consumers will have already
reached nutrition levels similar to those in devel-
oped countries and will start shifting away from
traditional diets.
The evolution of the level and composition
of food demand has differed between China and
India. By the end of the 1990s, China￿s average
level of daily per capita calorie intake fell only
10 per cent short of the level of developed coun-
tries. Due to India￿s relatively lower level and
growth rate of per capita income, growth in per
capita demand for cereals in that country has been
much slower than in China over the past two dec-
ades, and per capita rice and
wheat consumption in India is
still well below Chinese lev-
els. Indeed, India￿s average
level of daily per capita calo-
rie intake has remained about
20 per cent below the Chinese
level. The expectation, there-
fore, is that the increase in
China￿s level of per capita food
consumption in the future will be slower than in
the past, while in India there is considerable scope
for a further strong increase in per capita food
consumption (FAO, 2002: 11￿12).
Table 2.1 shows a sharp decline in the share
of cereals in China￿s dietary pattern and an almost
equally sharp increase in the share of vegetables
(which have replaced cereals as the most de-
manded food group), as well as some increase in
the shares of oil crops and vegetable oils, meat,
dairy products, fish and seafood, and fruits. This
shift has been most pronounced
in the urban areas, where con-
sumers have higher incomes
and access to a wider range of
food products. Aggregate meat
consumption has grown by
more than 50 per cent over the
past decade. Per capita meat
consumption has also grown
considerably, mainly due to a
higher demand for pork and
poultry, the consumption of
which has risen by about one
third over the past decade. The
growing demand for meat is likely to continue:
projections indicate that China alone will account
for over 40 per cent of the additional demand
for meat worldwide between 1997 and 2020 (Rose-
grant et al., 2001: 65). The overall rise in meat
consumption has also contributed to higher over-
all demand for soybeans, due to its increasing use
as animal feed. Per capita consumption of veg-
etable oils, notably soybean oil and palm oil, has
grown rapidly as the rise in urban incomes has
stimulated their use in place of lower grade veg-
etable oils.
Changes in India￿s dietary pattern over the
past decade have been markedly different from
those in China (table 2.1). India￿s cultural tradi-
tions favouring vegetarianism
have held back the country￿s
demand for meat and animal
feeds, and thus the dietary
shift away from cereals to meat
consumption (Rosegrant et al.,
2001: 5￿30). But the share of
cereals in India￿s total food
consumption has fallen only
slightly, and the shares of veg-
etables, dairy products and fruit have not increased
as much as in China. This indicates that India￿s
dietary pattern has not yet shifted to the same ex-
tent as China￿s over the past decade and as Japan￿s
and the Republic of Korea￿s in the 1970s and
1980s.2
Rapid population growth and rising per capita
incomes have, nonetheless, resulted in a sharp rise
The change in the
composition of China￿s food
consumption is likely to
induce a further rise in the
demand for livestock
products, oil crops,
vegetable oils, and fruit and
vegetables.
There is also potential for a
strong rise in India￿s
consumption of livestock
products and feed.Trade and Development Report, 2005 46
in India￿s absolute level of food consumption. For
example, over the past decade, the aggregate con-
sumption of cereals grew by about 15 per cent and
vegetables by about 50 per cent, while that of
soybeans about doubled and poultry almost tri-
pled over the same period.3 This indicates that
India is still experiencing the first stage of the
nutrition transition (i.e. the expansion of per capita
calorie intake); once the level of per capita calo-
rie intake in India comes close to the current level
in China,4 India might also experience a shift in
its dietary pattern similar to that of other Asian
countries. It has been estimated that by 2020 the
consumption of dairy products, in particular, will
increase dramatically to compensate for the rela-
tively low meat consumption, but meat consump-
tion will also increase. This, in turn, could drive a
dramatic increase in the demand for cereals for
livestock feed, unless soybeans take a larger share
in such feed, as happened in China during the
1990s. By 2020, India could thus reach a level of
livestock product consumption (measured in terms
of meat equivalents) similar to that of China in
the early 1990s (Bhalla, Hazell and Kerr, 1999).
India￿s shift in dietary pattern would also imply a
strong increase in the consumption of fruit, veg-
etables, fish and seafood, similar to that of other
Asian countries.
To sum up, China￿s pattern of average food
consumption has gone through most of the first
stage of the nutrition transition, as the aggregate
level of per capita calorie intake has come close
to that of developed countries. Hence, a future rise
in the level of food consumption is likely to be
much slower than in the past. By contrast, the
change in the composition of food consumption
(i.e. the second stage of the nutrition transition)
is likely to continue for some time, leading to a
further rise in the demand for livestock products,
oil crops, vegetable oils, and fruit and vegetables.
The pace at which rural incomes catch up with
urban incomes will have a marked influence on
how fast China￿s aggregate per capita calorie
intake fully converges with developed-country
levels and how fast its composition of food con-
sumption continues to change. India, by contrast,
appears still to be in the first stage of the nutrition
transition, with substantial potential for a rapid
rise in per capita calorie intake, particularly in the
consumption of livestock products and livestock
feed.
2. Intensity of metal and energy use
Over the past few decades, metal use in
China, and to a lesser extent in India, has strongly
increased. This trend has become particularly vis-
ible in China since the mid-1990s. Between 1994
and 2003, China￿s average annual growth of GDP
of 8.2 per cent was accompanied by an even higher
average annual rate of growth in the use of alu-
minium (13.6 per cent), copper (14.9 per cent),
nickel (13.0 per cent) and steel (9.2 per cent). By
contrast, India￿s average annual growth of GDP
of 5.8 per cent over the same period was exceeded
only by the growth of copper use (12.4 per cent),
while there was slower growth in the use of alu-
Table 2.1
DIETARY COMPOSITION IN CHINA AND
INDIA, 1994 AND 2002
(Per cent)
China India
Product 1994 2002 1994 2002
Alcoholic beverages 3.6 3.8 0.3 0.4
Cereals 36.0 23.0 38.9 36.0
Eggs 2.1 2.4 0.3 0.4
Fish and seafood 3.3 3.5 1.1 1.1
Fruits 5.0 6.5 8.5 8.6
Meat 6.7 7.3 1.2 1.2
Milk 1.3 1.8 14.0 14.4
Oil crops 1.4 0.9 2.0 1.5
Pulses 0.3 0.2 3.1 2.8
Starchy roots 10.7 11.1 5.3 5.5
Sugar and sweeteners 1.2 1.0 5.9 5.6
Sugar crops 0.0 0.0 2.8 2.9
Vegetable oils 1.3 1.3 1.7 2.1
Vegetables 25.5 35.1 13.5 15.9
Other 1.5 1.9 1.3 1.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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minium (3.2 per cent), nickel (3.7 per cent), and
steel (4.4 per cent).5 Whereas the absolute level
of metal use has risen rapidly in both China and
India, measured in per capita terms it has remained
relatively low, in particular when compared with
the Republic of Korea or developed countries such
as Japan and the United States (table 2.2).
Both these features of metal use by China and
India reflect earlier findings in the literature based
on the ￿intensity-of-use￿ hypothesis (e.g. Malem-
baum, 1973). In this context, ￿intensity of use￿ is
defined as the ratio of metal use to national in-
come; that is, the change in metal use depends on
the change in the intensity of use and on the change
in income. According to the ￿intensity-of-use￿
hypothesis, the intensity of metal use is low in poor
countries, which rely largely on unmechanized
subsistence agriculture. As economic development
takes place, manufacturing, construction of hous-
ing and physical infrastructure, and household
demand for consumer durables grow, while the
share of agriculture in GDP declines. This causes
the intensity of use to rise. At some point, how-
ever, the growth of manufacturing and construction
activities, as well as household demand for con-
sumer durables, starts to slow down. Thus, the
￿intensity-of-use￿ hypothesis anticipates an in-
verted U-shaped relationship, with the intensity
of use first rising and then falling with growing
per capita income. The hypothesis also anticipates
change in the intensity of metal use due to forces
other than those related to per capita income. Most
importantly, new production technologies or long-
term price increases may lead to the introduction
of synthetic substitutes and to a reduction in the
use of materials per unit of output, and, thus, tend
to result in a downward shift in the intensity-of-
use curve. Moreover, the mode of industrialization
strongly influences the evolution of the intensity
of metal use. This is because, for example, indus-
trialization that relies on heavy industry requires
greater metal use than industrialization that relies
on light industry; moreover, a more outward-
oriented industrialization strategy requires the
extended metal-intensive construction of port fa-
cilities.
A comparative analysis of the intensity of use
of aluminium, copper and nickel can give some
indication of a country￿s current location on its
intensity-of-use curve. As shown in figure 2.1,
China currently is in the stage of rapid industri-
alization on its intensity-of-use curve (i.e. the
income elasticity of metal use exceeds unity).
However, the rise in its intensity of metal use has
not been continuous. Its intensity of aluminium
and copper use rose until the late 1970s, after
which it began a temporary decline. This decline
is probably closely related to the transition away
from central planning, with its emphasis on metal-
intensive heavy industry. However, more recently,
China￿s intensity of aluminium, copper and nickel
use has picked up again, and has tended to grow
steeply over the past two or three years, undoubt-
edly due largely to rapid industrialization. Part of
this recent increase coincides with very high rates
of investment, particularly investment in infra-
structure. According to Morgan Stanley (2004: 29),
for example, the share in GDP of China￿s invest-
ment in infrastructure rose from an already high
level of about 15 per cent in 1997 to over 20 per
cent in 2002. This indicates that similar rates of
economic growth can be associated with different
levels of intensity of metal use, depending on the
rate and composition of investment. Thus the re-
cent rapid rise in China￿s intensity of metal use
may well slow down once investment in infrastruc-
ture declines from its current high levels.
Table 2.2
PER CAPITA METAL CONSUMPTION,
SELECTED COUNTRIES, 2003
(Kilograms per capita)
Aluminium Copper Nickel Steel
China 4.0 2.4 0.1 197.9
India 0.7 0.3 0.0 33.4
Japan 15.8 9.4 1.4 603.2
Rep. of Korea 20.6 18.9 2.4 984.6
United States 19.3 7.8 0.4 349.3
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on World
Bank, Global Economic Prospects - Commodity
Market Briefs, 2004; International Iron and Steel
Institute, Steel Statistical Yearbook 2004; Inter-
national Copper Study Group, Copper Bulletin, 11(4),
2004; and United Nations Department of Economic
and Social Affairs (UN/DESA), Population Division,
World Population Prospects, Rev. 2002.Trade and Development Report, 2005 48
Figure 2.1
INTENSITY OF METAL USE, SELECTED METALS AND COUNTRIES, 1960￿2003
(Tons per GDP in $ million, PPP-adjusted)
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on World Bureau of Metal Statistics Yearbook, various issues; International
Copper Study Group, Copper Bulletin, 11(4), 2004; Tilton, 1990; World Bank, Global Economic Prospects - Commodity
Market Briefs, 2004, and World Development Indicators online; and Penn World Tables.
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Contrary to developments in China, India￿s
intensity of aluminium, copper and nickel use has
remained relatively stable over the past four dec-
ades. This difference is likely to reflect the two
countries￿ different pace of industrialization and
the relatively small share of investment in infrastruc-
ture in India￿s GDP. Assuming current growth and
industrialization trends will be
maintained, Morgan Stanley
(2004: 15) estimates that In-
dia is 5 to 20 years behind
China in per capita use of
commodities such as alumin-
ium, copper and steel.6
Figure 2.2 is a schematic
representation of the relation-
ship between the intensity of
metal use on the one hand, and
per capita income and time on the other. The con-
tinuous line in figure 2.2 reflects a locus of points
on the different intensity-of-use curves for China,
India, Japan, the Republic of Korea and the United
States. The position of these countries on the con-
tinuous line should be taken as illustrative only,
and not as a precise reflection of their actual lo-
cations. Moreover, given the tendency of long-
term intensity-of-use curves to shift downwards,
it is probable that the curves of late industrializers,
such as China, will peak at a level below those of
early industrializers, such as the United States.
Much of the reasoning
behind the intensity of metal
use also applies to the energy
sector. Hannesson (2002), for
example, shows that the inten-
sity of use of energy first rises
and then falls after countries
reach a certain level of afflu-
ence. This means that energy
use tends to grow more slowly
than income in mature, indus-
trialized economies, while the opposite holds for
countries where the share of industry in output
continues to grow.
In line with this general pattern, figure 2.3
indicates relatively little change in India￿s inten-
sity of energy use over the past four decades. This
is probably largely due to the country￿s relatively
slow pace of industrialization, as well as its low
level of investment in infrastructure, which has
held back growth in demand for transportation
fuels.
By contrast, the evolution of China￿s inten-
sity of energy use does not correspond to the
general pattern: it was highly volatile, but re-
mained at a high level until the
late 1970s when it started to
decline, a trend that was re-
versed only in 2000 (fig. 2.3).
The income elasticity of en-
ergy use in China between
1980 and 2003 was 0.5 ￿ only
slightly higher than in the
United States (at 0.46) and
much lower than in India and
the Republic of Korea (at 0.97
and 1.22 respectively). The
decline in China￿s intensity of energy use regis-
tered between the late 1970s and 2000 was mainly
due to two factors: technical change within indi-
vidual sectors (i.e. the change in the energy re-
quired to produce a particular product) and
structural change between sectors (i.e. shifts in
the share of total output between sectors which
may be more or less energy-intensive). In China,
gains in energy efficiency were brought about by
the move from central planning towards market-
mediated prices, enterprise ownership reform, and
the introduction of energy-saving technologies;
these are generally credited for
most of the decline in China￿s
intensity of energy use (Zhang,
2003; Fisher-Vanden et al.,
2004).7
While China￿s energy use
has risen at a slower pace than
its GDP, its absolute level of
energy use has steadily in-
creased since the 1960s, ex-
cept for the period between
1997 and 2000, when it decreased in spite of rapid
output growth. This was mainly due to a decline
in the direct use of coal caused by a variety of fac-
tors, including the closure of many State-owned
factories that were large and inefficient energy
users, the elimination of small and inefficient
power generators, and the switch to high quality
coal (Sinton and Fridley, 2000). Energy use be-
tween 2000 and 2003 grew at an average annual
The recent rise in China￿s
intensity of metal use may
slow down once
infrastructure investment
declines from its current
high levels.
India is 5 to 20 years
behind China in per capita
use of commodities such as
aluminium, copper and
steel.Trade and Development Report, 2005 50
rate of 16.2 per cent, significantly more than be-
tween 1990 and 1997, when it was 5.2 per cent.
As a result, for the first time since the late 1970s,
China￿s income elasticity of energy use started to
exceed unity in 2001. This strong growth appears
to have been spurred largely by the substantial
number of steel mills and aluminium smelters that
came into operation in the late 1990s, as well as
by the growth in demand for energy-intensive
consumer goods, such as automobiles and home
appliances (Crompton and Wu, 2005).
One notable feature in both China and India
is the relatively high proportion of coal in total
energy use: 69.0 per cent and 54.5 per cent, re-
spectively, in 2004. Oil ranked second, accounting
for 22.3 per cent of energy use in China and 31.7 in
India. Although in China absolute levels of coal
use have been increasing (except in the period
1998￿2000), in total energy use the share of coal
has been declining (BP, 2005). While coal will
probably continue to be a major source of energy
for China, other sources of energy, such as oil (for
transportation and industry), natural gas and hy-
droelectric power (growing in conjunction with
increasing use of household appliances) are also
likely to be increasingly used.
The future development of China￿s energy
use will depend on a balance of opposing trends.
On the one hand, continued rapid industrialization,
higher living standards, and improved transport
infrastructure will tend to increase China￿s inten-
sity of energy use. On the other hand, despite the
country￿s low average income elasticity of energy
use over the past three decades or so, the level of
energy use per unit of output remains relatively
Figure 2.2
STYLIZED REPRESENTATION OF THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTENSITY
OF METAL USE AND PER
CAPITA INCOME
Source: UNCTAD secretariat.
Figure 2.3
INTENSITY OF ENERGY USE,
SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1965￿2003
(Tons of oil equivalent per GDP in $ million, PPP-adjusted)
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on British
Petroleum, 2004; Penn World Tables; and World
Bank, World Development Indicators online.
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high for a country at its current level of economic
development (fig. 2.3). This indicates considerable
further potential for the adop-
tion of energy-saving technolo-
gies (e.g. more energy-efficient
vehicles). The imposition of a
vehicle fuel tax and further liber-
alization of energy prices could
also help cut the increase in en-
ergy demand. However, such
measures would need to be
weighed against their adverse
impact on the real incomes of
energy users, such as farmers who rely on diesel oil
for transportation and machinery, and for whom
the energy-intensive production of fertilizer in-
put is an important cost factor. Taking account of
these opposing factors, it is
widely expected that the in-
come elasticity of China￿s en-
ergy use will be substantially
below unity in the next few
years. For example, Crompton
and Wu (2005) estimate an
annual growth rate of 3.8 per
cent between 2004 and 2010,
while the International Energy
Agency (2004) estimates an
average annual growth rate of 2.6 per cent annu-
ally from 2002 to 2030.
The extent of China￿s future
energy use will depend on
a balance of opposing
trends ... but it is likely to
grow less than its income.
C.  Domestic resource constraints and the
balance-of-payments constraint
Changes in the supply and demand patterns
of rapidly growing and industrializing countries
are typically characterized by the accumulation
of capital (both physical and human), sectoral
differences in productivity growth, a shift in
household demand from food to manufactured
products and services, an initial rise and then de-
cline in per capita use of energy and industrial
raw materials as per capita income rises, and a
growth in demand for machinery and intermedi-
ate production inputs (Chenery, Robinson and
Syrquin, 1986). But the way in which changes in
these patterns interact with shifts in the level and
composition of a rapidly growing country￿s ex-
ternal trade depends on the country￿s size, changes
in its domestic resource constraints and demand
patterns relative to those of other countries, the
balance-of-payments constraint, and trade and
exchange rate policies.
Rapid economic growth and industrialization
face two main constraints. A country￿s domestic
natural-resource endowment determines the
degree to which its self-sufficiency in food con-
sumption and raw-material use is compatible with
rapid industrial development and economic growth.
To the extent that the growing demand for food,
energy, industrial raw materials, intermediate
products and capital goods cannot be met from
domestic production, the pace of income growth
and industrialization will slow down unless im-
ports grow. But the balance-of-payments con-
straint limits import growth. Imports of food and
inputs for industrial production (including raw
materials, intermediate goods and capital goods)
cannot exceed what is earned from exports and
net inflows of financial capital. Hence a key de-
terminant of the dynamics of economic growth and
industrialization in an open economy is the ca-Trade and Development Report, 2005 52
pacity to secure the increased export revenues re-
quired to overcome domestic resource constraints
and the balance-of-payments constraint, translate
these increased export earnings into investment
in new lines of production, and implement a co-
herent strategy of industrial upgrading. Where this
occurs, rapid growth and industrialization increases
a country￿s export capacity, and the higher export
earnings can be used to finance the greater volume
of imports required for still further growth.
1. Relative resource constraints and
country size
The evolution of domestic resource constraints
during economic development is strongly influ-
enced by the size of a country, measured by popu-
lation, geographic area, or aggregate income.
Other things being equal, a larger population
makes the domestic resource constraint more sig-
nificant because of the associated higher demand
for food. On the other hand, a large population
means greater availability of labour, and thus
improves a country￿s supply
capacity, including for food
production. The size of a coun-
try￿s geographic area has an
impact on domestic resources
because arable land, energy
sources and industrial raw ma-
terials are more likely to be
present in larger quantities and
in greater variety in a large ter-
ritory than in a small one.8 But
a large geographic area also
imposes greater demands on
domestic resources, because it
requires greater quantities of
raw material to develop the
country￿s physical infrastructure. Hence, countries
with very large territories, such as China and In-
dia, need substantial investment to physically link
the domestic rural and urban markets.
A country￿s relative resource endowment in-
fluences the impact of the interplay between
country size and domestic resource constraints on
the country￿s trade composition as its per capita
income rises.9 A simplified approach to examin-
ing relative factor endowments is to concentrate
on labour, land and skills of the labour force, and
to omit capital (physical and financial), which,
though of vital importance as an input to pro-
duction, has become highly mobile between
countries.10
Figure 2.4 shows the evolution of the land￿
labour and skill￿labour resource ratios for several
groups of economies over the past four decades:
the vertical axis measures the skill￿labour ratio
(h), proxied by average adult years of schooling;
and the horizontal axis measures the land￿labour
ratio (n), proxied by square kilometres of land per
100 adults. The groups include two main devel-
oping regions (sub-Saharan Africa and Latin
America (including the Caribbean)) and two
groups of developed countries, divided on the
basis of their land￿labour ratios ￿ land-scarce
developed countries include those of Western
Europe, while land-abundant developed econo-
mies include Australia, Canada, New Zealand,
Scandinavia and the United States. The figure also
includes China, India and Japan, as well as the
Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China
taken as a group to represent the first-tier newly in-
dustrializing economies (NIEs).
Three of the country groups
are land-abundant (sub-Saharan
Africa, Latin America, and the
land-abundant developed coun-
tries), while the other groups
and individual economies are
land-scarce. In terms of skill￿
labour ratios, the groups di-
vide into three categories: (i) at
low levels of education (sub-
Saharan Africa and India),
(ii) at intermediate levels of
education (China and Latin
America), and (iii) comprising
the two highly educated de-
veloped-economy groups, as well as Japan and
the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of
China.11
One striking feature of figure 2.4 is how
much the composition of resources varies among
the regions. The other striking feature is how lit-
tle the pattern of variation changed between 1960
and 2000. There are some differences in the de-
gree of movement upwards and leftwards, but for
Natural-resource
endowments determine the
degree to which self-
sufficiency in food and raw
materials is compatible with
rapid industrial
development and growth ...
but the balance-of-payments
constraint limits import
growth.Income Growth and Shifting Trade Patterns in Asia 53
the most part the positions of economies and
groups relative to one another were the same in
2000 as they had been in 1960. Moreover, it seems
likely that this pattern of the past few decades will
persist over the next few decades; even large in-
creases in school enrolment rates will feed through
only slowly to raise the average educational level
of the labour force, and population growth rates
will not differ by enough to alter the ranking of
regions by land￿labour ratios. The figure also
shows that, depending on the relative growth rates
of their population and skills, China and India are
likely to move towards relative endowment posi-
tions similar to those of Japan and the group
comprising the Republic of Korea and Taiwan
Province of China.
The figure further illustrates how relative
endowment positions may influence shifts in the
composition of imports and exports as income
rises. In resource-rich regions (such as sub-Saharan
Africa, Latin America, and the land-abundant de-
veloped countries in the diagram), the shift of re-
sources away from primary production is likely
to lag behind that in the other regions at low in-
come levels. Moreover, these regions will tend to
maintain a relatively large share of primary com-
modities in their exports even at relatively high
income levels. For those economies that have a
comparative advantage in manufactures (such as
the Asian economies in the diagram), the compo-
sition of their manufactured exports in labour- and
skill-intensive products will be influenced by their
Figure 2.4
RESOURCE COMBINATIONS OF COUNTRIES/REGIONS, 1960￿2000 (AT 5-YEAR INTERVALS)
(Unweighted averages)
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on Barro and Lee, 2001; and World Bank, World Development Indicators.
Note: The figure includes all countries and economies with a population larger than one million for which comprehensive data
are available, except countries in the Middle East and North Africa, countries in South Asia other than India, and
economies in East Asia other than China, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China which are omitted so as
not to clutter the chart.
a Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Scandinavia and the United States.
b Western Europe.
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relative skill￿labour ratios. This implies that In-
dia￿s merchandise exports will consist largely of
labour-intensive manufactures,
while those of Japan and the
Republic of Korea will com-
prise largely skill-intensive
manufactures, with China being
in an intermediate position.
Moreover, for all these Asian
economies the share of primary
commodities in their imports
will tend to increase as per
capita income rises.
In addition to relative
skill￿labour ratios, the abso-
lute number of skilled workers
may influence the range of
manufactures that a country exports. China and
India are in a unique position in this respect: be-
cause of their very large populations, they combine
a large relative supply of low-skilled labour with
an ample absolute supply of high-skilled labour.
For example, in 2000￿2001, 12.1 million students
in China and 10.6 million in India were enrolled
in tertiary education, compared to about 4 million
in Japan and 3 million each in Indonesia and
the Republic of Korea. The number of university
graduates in China was 1.95 million, compared
with about 1.01 million in Japan and about 0.5 mil-
lion each in Indonesia, the Republic of Korea and
Thailand. Moreover, in 2001, China had the sec-
ond largest number of researchers in the world,
its R&D personnel totalling almost one million,
slightly more than in Japan and about six times
more than in the Republic of Korea.12 This means
that China and India may attain significant export
diversification at an earlier stage of development
than did the NIEs, and they may simultaneously
export a wider range of both labour- and skill-in-
tensive manufactures.
2. Shifts in trade composition:
experiences of Asian industrialization
The above examination of shifts in compara-
tive advantage in the course of economic devel-
opment suggests that rapid income growth in
relatively natural-resource-poor countries, such as
China and India (as well as Japan and the Repub-
lic of Korea), occurs along with a change in their
export composition from ag-
ricultural goods to manufac-
tures. It also suggests that,
depending on the country￿s
relative endowment of skilled
labour, the composition of
manufactured exports changes
from an initial predominance
of labour-intensive goods to an
increasing share of more skill-
intensive products. This sec-
tion examines the differences
and similarities of the shifts
in the trade composition of
China, India, Japan and the
Republic of Korea over the
past four decades. The two preceding sections fo-
cused on structural changes in the economies of
China and India, associated with factor and pro-
ductivity growth on the supply side and income
growth on the demand side; this section looks at
the impact of these structural changes, as well as
trade and exchange rate policies, on their trade
composition.
China￿s trade reforms, embedded in its over-
all reform strategy, have been gradual. Results
from each reform have influenced the design of
the next stage of reform ￿ an approach that in
China has sometimes been described as ￿crossing
the river by feeling the stones￿. Major features of
China￿s trade reform included the decentralization
of foreign trading rights by progressively increas-
ing both the number of companies authorized to
carry out trade transactions and the range of goods
these companies are allowed to trade, greater
transmission of international prices of traded goods
to the domestic market, and the gradual removal
of exchange rate distortions. As a result, China￿s
foreign trade regime has increasingly come to rely
on traditional trade policies in the form of tariffs
and non-tariff measures. This shift in the kinds of
trade policy instruments used has been accompanied
by progressive trade liberalization: the exchange
rate was unified in 1994, the number of products
subject to quotas and licences was considerably
reduced during the 1990s (Lardy, 2002), and tar-
iffs were significantly lowered throughout the
reform process, with average tariffs falling from
over 50 per cent in the early 1980s to about 16 per
China and India combine a
large relative supply of low-
skilled labour with an ample
absolute supply of high-
skilled labour, and may
therefore succeed in
diversifying their
manufactured exports at an
earlier stage of develop-
ment than did the NIEs.Income Growth and Shifting Trade Patterns in Asia 55
cent on the eve of China￿s accession to the WTO
(IMF, 2004b).
Its WTO accession in December 2001 con-
stitutes part of China￿s ongoing reform process
(TDR 2002, chap. V), facilitating its emergence
as a major trading nation. It has also contributed
to reducing trade tensions that have often accom-
panied the emergence of major new traders over
the past few decades. Nevertheless, there were
concerns by China￿s policy-makers, particularly
regarding the initial post-accession period, about
the competitiveness of the agricultural sector,
which had enjoyed a relatively high degree of
border protection, and about the heavy-industry
sector (dominated by State-owned enterprises for
which the transformation and restructuring proc-
ess being undertaken was far from complete). As
discussed in more detail below, China￿s WTO-ac-
cession commitments in agriculture included the
phasing-in of tariff rate quotas for a number of
bulk commodities and a reduc-
tion of tariffs for other com-
modities. Both these measures
reached their committed lev-
els in 2004. Other commit-
ments included limiting the
share of import quotas allo-
cated to State-trading enter-
prises, eliminating export sub-
sidies, and the use of science-based sanitary and
phytosanitary (SPS) standards for imports. China
also made far-reaching liberalization commitments
in the services sector (Mattoo, 2004). It is clear
that the impact of trade liberalization on the ca-
pacity of domestic firms to withstand pressure
from foreign competitors very much depends on
how the exchange rate is managed. China￿s tight
exchange rate management, mainly designed to
avoid a nominal appreciation of its currency vis-
￿-vis the dollar, has facilitated adjustment during
the initial post-accession period.
The selective use of duty exemptions and
rebates on value added tax payments, which have
supported its processing trade ￿ primarily assem-
bly operations ￿ and foreign direct investment
(FDI), has perhaps been the single most impor-
tant trade policy instrument in China￿s export
promotion policy. Tariff exemptions have been
concentrated in imports of intermediate products
used for assembly or transformation in the pro-
duction of goods for export. Typically, neither the
imported intermediate products nor the finished
goods have been entering China￿s domestic mar-
ket. Concessional duties have also been granted
to equipment imported by foreign firms as part of
their contribution to initial investment in affili-
ates in China. These measures have contributed
to a sizeable expansion of its processing trade, the
bulk of which involves foreign-funded enterprises
(FFE) based in China, owned mainly by investors
from East Asia (TDR 2002; Lemoine and ￿nal-
Kesenci, 2004).
India began trade reforms about a decade af-
ter China. Regardless of when exactly the reforms
began,13 there is little doubt that they were under-
taken in what was by and large a market economy.
Thus, unlike in China, there was no complex transi-
tion from a centrally planned to a market economy.
The reforms required for greater trade integration
were, nonetheless, substantial. As in China, they
involved redressing the over-
valuation of the exchange rate
(a process started in 1986 and
completed with the switch to
managed floating in 1993),
phasing out pervasive import
licensing, and reducing tariff
protection. While import li-
censing for capital and inter-
mediate goods was abolished in 1993, quantita-
tive restrictions on imports of manufactured con-
sumer goods and agricultural products were finally
abolished only in 2001. Average tariff levels were
reduced significantly, but at a level of about 22 per
cent in 2004 (IMF, 2004c: 16) they remain higher
than in most other developing countries. While
the reform process has gone far, important aspects
of the reforms, particularly the removal in 2001￿
2002 of items with high export potential (such as
garments, shoes, toys, and auto components) from
the list of items reserved for small-scale produc-
tion, have only recently been implemented, and it
may take some years before their outcomes are
reflected in economic performance (Ahluwalia,
2002: 72).
In the wake of their adoption of reform pro-
grammes, China and India have moved into
leading positions in world trade. In 2004, China
was the world￿s third largest exporter of mer-
chandise goods and the ninth largest exporter of
China and India have
moved into leading
positions in world trade.Trade and Development Report, 2005 56
commercial services, with a share of 9.0 per cent
and 2.8 per cent, respectively, of total world ex-
ports. In the same year, India ranked 20th in world
merchandise exports with a share of 1.1 per cent,
and was the world￿s 22nd largest exporter of com-
mercial services with a share of 1.5 per cent.
However, in most years since 1995, India￿s serv-
ices exports have grown much more rapidly than
its merchandise exports.14 The reforms in China
and India have not only supported trade growth,
they have also contributed to a change in the com-
position of their trade. This is the focus of the
remainder of this section.
(a) Self-sufficiency in agriculture and energy
The fact that their comparative advantage in
agricultural products is poised to decline in China
and India has sometimes raised concerns about
their capacity to maintain food self-sufficiency.
For example, in the 1960s and 1970s there were
frequent warnings of impending famines in India
and in South Asia as a whole. This has contrib-
uted to fears that strongly growing food imports
by China and India could seriously upset world
food markets. However, as
a result mainly of the Green
Revolution, which started in
the mid-1960s, the aggregate
supply of cereals (especially
maize, rice and wheat) more
than doubled in South Asia
from the 1960s to the 1990s.
More recently, there have
been concerns that the comple-
tion of India￿s phasing out of
quantitative restrictions by
April 2001 and China￿s acces-
sion to the WTO might also have significant ad-
verse effects on the two countries￿ agricultural
sectors and on their food self-sufficiency. This is
because the effects from trade policy reform in
agriculture come in addition to the adjustment
pressure resulting from the nutrition transition and
the related shifts in private consumer demand for
food, discussed above. But regarding China, many
observers have noted that the country￿s WTO-
accession commitments implied a reduction of over-
all agricultural import tariffs (in terms of simple
averages) from about 21 per cent in 2001 to 17 per
cent in 2004, after having already declined from
42.2 per cent in 1992 to 23.6 per cent in 1998. Thus,
they argue, the implications of agricultural trade
liberalization stemming from China￿s accession to
the WTO may, on average, be best considered con-
tinuations of past trends, and therefore unlikely
to cause drastic changes in the country￿s net agri-
culture and food trade balances (see, for exam-
ple, Huang and Rozelle, 2003).15
Examining the actual evolution of food self-
sufficiency in China and India, table 2.3 traces
the ratio of domestic production to domestic con-
sumption, for selected food products in China and
India from 1994 to 2002 (the last year for which
comprehensive data are available). It shows that
both China and India have been fairly successful
in maintaining a high degree of food self-sufficiency.
The main exception to this pattern is the marked
decline of self-sufficiency in soybeans for both
countries, and in soybean oil for India. Regarding
India, the decline in soybean self-sufficiency re-
flects the finding of a number of studies (e.g.
Gulati and Mullen, 2003) that oilseeds and edible
oils are the only major commodities likely to be
adversely affected by trade policy reform in ag-
riculture. But given the rela-
tively wide gap between bound
and actually applied tariffs, the
Indian Government was able
to flexibly adjust import duties
on edible oils; it was thus able
to reduce the difference be-
tween domestic and interna-
tional prices that had grown
partly in response to the sharp
decline in international prices
of vegetable oilseeds and oils
between 1998 and 2002. It is
likely that most of the decline
in China￿s self-sufficiency in soybeans also results
from a combination of the fall in international
prices and domestic policy reform (i.e. the reduc-
tion of the out-of-quota tariff from 114 per cent
to 3 per cent and the phasing-out of import quo-
tas that the Chinese Government undertook in
2000 in anticipation of its WTO-accession com-
mitments).
Although China has remained overwhelm-
ingly self-sufficient in all major food items, even
China has remained
overwhelmingly self-
sufficient in all major food
items, but even small
changes in self-sufficiency
ratios can have a consider-
able impact on the country￿s
agricultural trade balance.Income Growth and Shifting Trade Patterns in Asia 57
small changes in self-sufficiency ratios can have
a considerable impact on the country￿s agricul-
tural trade balance, given the size of its economy.
Table 2.4 shows the evolution of China￿s imports
and exports for selected agricultural product cat-
egories between 1980 and 2003 (the last year for
which comprehensive data are available). It re-
veals that China￿s food trade balance has been in
surplus over the past few years and that, with an
average annual growth rate of 5.4 per cent, its food
exports performed relatively well between 1990
and 2003. Even though China￿s food imports have
risen faster than its food exports over the past few
years, so far there has not been a sustained, dra-
matic growth in food imports, as some analysts in
the early 1990s had been expecting (e.g. Brown,
1995).
The table also shows that China￿s food im-
ports increased significantly between 2002 and
2003, and that the rise in imports of seeds for soft
fixed oils (which include soybeans) accounted for
most of this increase. According to China￿s Cus-
toms Statistics reported by Gale (2005), China￿s
soybean imports further increased in 2004 to reach
about $7 billion, up from about $5 billion in 2003
and $2.2 billion in 2002. This corresponds to about
30 per cent of the rise in China￿s import bill for
agricultural products between 2002 and 2004. As
discussed in more detail below, this sharp increase
in the value of China￿s soybean imports is partly
due to the rise in world market prices for this item
and in shipping costs. However, the rise in inter-
national primary commodity prices is partly the
result of China￿s own growing demand for pri-
Table 2.3
FOOD SELF-SUFFICIENCY RATIOS IN CHINA AND INDIA, SELECTED PRODUCTS, 1994￿2002
(Per cent)
China India
Product 1994￿1996 1999￿2001 2002 1994￿1996 1999￿2001 2002
Wheat 90.0 96.1 99.1 97.0 107.7 104.3
Rice 98.5 101.1 99.5 103.1 110.7 81.2
Maize 100.2 97.9 105.9 100.5 99.6 100.8
Bovine meat 99.5 98.2 98.2 105.6 108.9 111.5
Mutton and goat meat 98.7 98.5 98.0 101.4 101.4 100.7
Poultry meat 97.1 95.2 97.5 100.0 100.0 100.1
Pig meat 101.3 99.5 99.7 100.2 100.1 100.2
Soybeans 82.7 59.8 50.1 102.2 103.7 62.5
Palm oil 14.9 11.0 7.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Soybean oil 61.7 84.3 103.1 84.4 54.4 48.9
Milk 87.0 88.9 90.3 100.1 100.3 100.4
Pelagic fish 30.2 38.7 38.9 97.9 95.7 92.9
Demersal fish 89.4 85.6 83.8 100.2 100.8 100.6
Marine fish, other 107.6 143.8 162.4 151.0 172.6 170.8
Crustaceans 101.4 103.4 104.9 134.2 142.1 144.5
Bananas 92.6 91.3 94.1 100.0 100.0 100.1
Apples 100.9 102.3 106.1 100.9 100.1 100.0
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on FAOSTAT.
Note: Self-sufficiency ratio = production divided by total availability.
Total availability = production + net imports + net stock changes.Trade and Development Report, 2005 58
Table 2.4
CHINA￿S AGRICULTURAL TRADE BY MAJOR PRODUCT CATEGORY, 1980￿2003
(Millions of dollars)
Grains, oilseeds
and fixed vegetable oils Agricultural raw materials
Total of which: Total of which:
Other food
Seeds Horti- products, Rubber Total
for soft cultural Livestock beverages Total and hides agri-
Wheat fixed oils products products and tobacco food Cotton and skins culture
Exports
1980  691  0  170  842  638 1 197 3 368  789  47  206 4 157
1987 1 332  1  640 1 290 1 659 1 471 5 752 1 685  777  140 7 437
1990 1 387  1  580 1 760 2 646 2 058 7 851 1 383  318  173 9 234
1995 1 242  2  494 3 399 4 758 2 854 12 254 1 343  49  95 13 597
2000 2 324  0  394 3 359 5 363 2 482 13 528 1 589  307  65 15 117
2001 1 788  47  412 3 777 5 887 2 744 14 196 1 256  82  78 15 452
2002 2 414  70  425 4 318 6 291 3 105 16 127 1 458  172  95 17 585
2003 3 528  265  532 5 249 7 071 3 352 19 201 1 604  135  103 20 805
Imports
1980  613  226  41  11  56  333 1 013 1 798  313  458 2 812
1987 2 063 1 362  62  55  138  879 3 135 2 576  13  460 5 711
1990 3 321 2 157  18  83  251  927 4 583 3 022  718  386 7 604
1995 6 176 2 026  104  185  784 1 917 9 062 6 385 1 487 1 168 15 446
2000 4 360  147 2 942  516 2 100 1 829 8 805 9 853  137 1 958 18 658
2001 4 530  121 3 194  675 2 180 1 802 9 186 10 133  117 2 246 19 320
2002 4 684  103 2 637  689 2 521 1 770 9 664 11 313  200 2 432 20 977
2003 8 854  77 5 514  871 3 098 1 866 14 689 14 866 1 218 3 339 29 555
Net exports
1980  78 - 226  129  832  582  864 2 355 -1 010 - 266 - 252 1 345
1987 - 731 -1 362  578 1 235 1 521  592 2 617 - 891  764 - 320 1 726
1990 -1 934 -2 156  562 1 676 2 395 1 131 3 268 -1 639 - 400 - 213 1 629
1995 -4 934 -2 025  390 3 215 3 975  937 3 192 -5 041 -1 438 -1 073 -1 849
2000 -2 036 - 147 -2 548 2 843 3 264  653 4 723 -8 264  170 -1 893 -3 541
2001 -2 742 - 75 -2 782 3 102 3 707  942 5 009 -8 878 - 35 -2 168 -3 868
2002 -2 271 - 33 -2 212 3 629 3 770 1 335 6 463 -9 855 - 27 -2 337 -3 391
2003 -5 326  188 -4 982 4 378 3 973 1 487 4 512 -13 262 -1 084 -3 236 -8 750
Memo item: Average annual growth, 1990￿2003 (per cent)
Agricultural exports 4.9
Food exports 5.4
Agricultural imports 10.7
Food imports 9.4
Food imports, excluding
seeds for soft fixed oils 5.1
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics database (UN COMTRADE);
and estimates by the United Nations Statistical Office.
Note: Data reported for 1980 rely to a large extent on estimates. Cereals, oilseeds and vegetable oils include Standard
International Trade Classification (SITC) 04, 22 and 42. Horticultural products include SITC 05. Livestock products
include SITC 01, 02 and 03.Income Growth and Shifting Trade Patterns in Asia 59
mary commodity imports. This implies that the
country￿s strong import demand has had a multi-
plicative effect on the dollar value of commodities
imported, and thus might
prove self-limiting.
It is also worth highlight-
ing that between 2000 and
2003 wheat imports were
much lower than in the early
1990s (table 2.4). According
to more recent data (Gale,
2005), this development was
sharply reversed in 2004 when wheat imports
bounced back to reach about $1.6 billion. Accord-
ing to Gale (2005), government policies have been
highly responsible for these swings: from 1997 to
2003 China disposed of its ageing grain in gov-
ernment reserves while replenishing them in 2004,
and government entities, the main importers of
wheat, increased imports of this commodity in an
effort to curb the rising prices of domestic grain.
Regarding agricultural raw materials, ta-
ble 2.4 shows that cotton accounted for much of
the surge in import values between 2002 and 2003.
This was closely related to the increasing use of
imported cotton, not only because of China￿s rap-
idly growing clothing exports, but also partly
because of a poor domestic cotton harvest in 2003.
The net trade balance of hides and skins (used as
inputs for other natural-resource-intensive and
labour-intensive manufactures, such as footwear
and leather goods) and of rubber (used for the rap-
idly expanding production of
vehicle tyres) has also consid-
erably deteriorated over the
past few years.
To sum up, even though
China remains largely self-
sufficient in all major food
items, the direction of change
in the country￿s agricultural
trade is towards greater import
dependence. Rosegrant et al.
(2001: 74), for example, estimate that China will
become the world￿s largest importer of agricul-
tural commodities in value terms by 2020, its im-
ports increasing from $5 billion in 1997 to $22 bil-
lion in 2020. While this would imply that China￿s
net agricultural imports as a percentage of total
agricultural production would increase only from
2 per cent to 6 per cent, such an outcome depends
largely on rapid productivity growth in agricul-
ture, which is an underlying
assumption of the estimation
results. Indeed, while China￿s
agricultural output has grown
rapidly for several decades,
particularly since the rural re-
forms that began in 1979 (Fan
and Zhang, 2002), its further
growth would probably be
necessary in order to meet fu-
ture increases in demand without strongly impair-
ing food self-sufficiency. This is likely to require
greater investment in agricultural research (Huang,
Li and Rozelle, 2004).
Thus China￿s agricultural trade balance in the
future will largely depend on government policy.
In a sense, the new approach to agricultural policy
that was adopted in 2004 represents a reappraisal
of the role of agriculture in economic develop-
ment. This reappraisal is reflected in China￿s in-
troduction of its first national direct subsidies to
farmers, the initiation of an eventual phasing out
of a long-standing tax on farmers, subsidizing seed
and machinery purchases, and increasing funding
for agricultural infrastructure and research (Gale,
Lomar and Tuan, 2005). Moreover, if China up-
grades its export composition away from relatively
natural-resource-intensive and labour-intensive
sectors such as clothing, footwear and leather
goods, the recent increase in agricultural imports,
due to imported raw materials
for such exports, will be dra-
matically reversed.
Turning to an assessment
of China￿s self-sufficiency in
energy, it is useful to recall
that in 2004 the country was
the sixth largest producer of
oil and the leading producer of
coal worldwide (BP, 2005). In-
deed, following oil discoveries
in the 1960s, China￿s domestic oil production has
steadily increased over the past four decades, and
the share of fuels in total imports remained small
until about 1990. Since then, however, the expan-
sion of domestic production has no longer kept
pace with the rise in demand. As a result, China
China￿s agricultural trade
balance in the future will
largely depend on
government policy.
China￿s energy demand is
likely to continue to outpace
the future growth of
domestic supply, so that
fuels will add substantially
to China￿s total import bill.Trade and Development Report, 2005 60
became a net oil importer in 1993, and the gap
between the country￿s domestic consumption and
production has risen substantially over the past
decade (fig. 2.5). By contrast, the production of
coal, which, as already mentioned, continues to
account for a large share of China￿s total energy
use, has closely kept up with changes in the use
of coal. However, given that China￿s energy de-
mand is likely to continue outpacing the future
growth of supply, fuels are likely to add substan-
tially to China￿s total import bill.
India￿s energy use has depended heavily on
imports, given the limited domestic energy re-
sources. Thus fuels have comprised one quarter
to one third of the country￿s total merchandise
imports.
(b) Import composition
Sustained rapid growth and industrialization
are generally accompanied by a rise in imports
(both in absolute value and as a share of total im-
ports) of primary commodities and, generally at
the early stages in industrialization, of capital
equipment and intermediate inputs. Shifts in im-
port composition for Japan, the Republic of Korea,
China and India over the past few decades are re-
flected in table 2.5. The table uses six broad
categories of products, based on a distinction be-
tween primary commodities and manufactures; the
latter are further categorized according to whether
they are labour- or resource-intensive, and whether
their production involves low-, medium- or high-
skill and technology intensity; a separate category
is the electronics sector.16
The table shows that, contrary to the experi-
ence of the Republic of Korea during its process
of rapid economic catch-up, the share of machin-
ery in the total imports of China and India has
declined over the past few years. While this may
reflect substantial pent-up demand for state-of-the-
art technology, which, particularly in the case of
China, could result in rapidly rising high-technol-
ogy imports once the appropriate conditions are
in place both domestically and internationally,
country-specific factors have also played a sig-
nificant role.
In the case of India, the decline in the pro-
portion of machinery in total imports is closely
associated with the relatively limited share of in-
dustry in the country￿s economic structure. In the
case of China, it coincides with a sharp growth in
the share of electronics parts and components. This
reflects the greater role that participation in inter-
national production networks has played in its
recent industrialization and development strate-
gies, as it has in many other developing countries.
In principle, becoming part of an international
production network can give substantial impetus
to a developing country￿s development and indus-
trialization strategy, mainly because such partici-
pation broadens the range of sectors on which
developing countries can base their quest for in-
dustrialization. Given that product-specific char-
acteristics allow a partitioning of the production
process of a number of industrial sectors into vari-
ous slices, industrializing countries can focus on
Figure 2.5
CHINA: CONSUMPTION AND PRODUCTION
OF OIL AND COAL, 1965￿2004
(Million tons of oil equivalent)
Source: British Petroleum, Statistical Review of World Energy
2005.
Note: Coal production data are available only from 1981
onwards.
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Table 2.5
PRODUCT STRUCTURE OF IMPORTS OF SELECTED ASIAN COUNTRIES, 1965￿2003
(Percentage of total merchandise imports)
Japan Republic of Korea Chinaa Indiaa
Product group 1965 1975 1985 1995 2003 1965 1975 1985 1995 2003 1987 1995 2003 1975 1985 1995 2003
Primary commodities 80.5 83.0 74.7 45.8 42.1 48.4 49.4 42.8 31.9 35.8 18.0 20.4 20.1 44.3 45.4 42.3 45.4
All food products 22.7 18.0 14.1 16.4 12.5 15.1 14.2 5.8 5.5 5.6 7.4 7.0 3.6 31.9 8.4 4.6 5.8
Meat and meat preparations 0.6 1.2 1.5 2.9 2.3 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.6 0.9 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Fish and seafood 0.9 2.0 3.7 5.3 3.4 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.6 1.1 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Cereals and cereal preparations 9.4 5.7 3.1 1.6 1.4 12.1 9.5 2.9 1.5 1.1 1.9 2.8 0.1 29.1 0.6 0.1 0.0
Fruits and vegetables 1.8 1.1 1.5 1.9 1.6 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.2 1.4 1.3 1.6 1.5
Vegetable oilseeds and oils 4.7 2.7 1.8 1.0 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.2 0.7 0.5 1.0 2.1 2.1 0.6 3.9 2.3 3.8
Agricultural raw materials 20.4 9.5 7.2 6.3 3.0 22.2 11.4 7.9 5.5 2.5 6.3 5.0 3.7 2.5 3.4 4.3 3.3
Cotton 5.4 1.5 0.8 0.2 0.1 9.1 3.4 1.7 0.6 0.2 0.0 1.1 0.3 0.8 0.1 0.5 0.5
Rubber 1.6 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 1.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.3 0.9 0.6 0.6 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.4
Cork and wood 6.1 5.3 3.4 3.7 1.7 4.6 3.7 1.8 1.3 0.5 1.4 0.4 0.9 0.0 0.2 0.7 1.0
Minerals, ores and metals 17.4 11.0 9.0 6.7 5.0 4.2 4.7 5.3 6.4 5.6 3.0 4.5 5.6 5.4 7.0 7.5 4.3
Metalliferous ores and metal scrap 12.5 7.8 5.0 2.9 2.4 1.1 2.4 2.9 2.5 2.6 1.2 2.3 2.9 0.4 1.9 2.5 1.8
Non-ferrous metals 3.0 2.2 3.1 3.2 2.2 2.0 0.9 1.5 3.5 2.8 1.7 2.0 2.5 2.7 2.8 3.7 1.9
Fuels 20.0 44.5 44.4 16.4 21.6 7.0 19.1 23.8 14.5 22.1 1.3 3.9 7.2 4.4 26.6 25.9 32.0
Labour- and resource-intensive manufactures 1.8 4.0 5.7 14.0 12.2 6.8 5.3 5.0 7.7 6.8 12.9 14.4 6.9 4.0 8.2 9.7 13.5
Textiles 0.7 1.4 1.6 1.9 1.4 6.0 3.5 2.2 3.1 1.9 8.6 8.5 3.5 0.3 0.8 1.1 1.6
Clothing 0.1 0.9 1.6 5.7 5.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.8 1.5 0.0 0.8 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
Cork, wood and paper products 0.2 0.5 0.9 2.7 2.7 0.4 0.4 0.6 1.6 1.3 3.1 2.5 1.4 1.7 1.2 1.5 1.0
Non-metallic mineral manufactures 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.8 1.2 0.3 0.4 1.0 1.2 1.3 0.8 0.8 0.9 2.0 6.1 6.8 10.5
Low-skill and technology-intensive manufactures 2.5 0.8 1.9 3.2 2.5 8.9 9.7 16.2 7.7 5.7 13.8 7.5 6.7 9.8 8.9 5.6 5.2
Iron and steel 1.7 0.3 1.2 1.8 0.9 5.4 4.7 3.8 5.0 4.2 11.1 5.0 5.3 8.4 7.1 4.2 2.0
Ships and boats 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0 1.6 3.4 11.1 1.2 0.3 0.5 0.8 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.3 1.9
Medium-skill and technology-intensive manufactures 5.2 3.8 4.4 10.2 11.5 10.3 14.3 13.5 20.7 15.4 27.7 26.2 20.1 15.8 17.0 16.6 10.4
Non-electrical machinery 4.2 2.7 2.7 4.0 5.0 7.9 11.1 10.8 16.7 9.2 19.2 20.8 12.6 11.6 14.0 12.9 7.4
Electrical machinery, excluding electronics 0.5 0.5 0.8 1.9 2.7 1.7 1.7 1.6 2.1 4.0 1.8 2.8 3.9 2.9 1.1 1.6 1.6
High-skill and technology-intensive manufactures 6.9 5.3 9.1 11.1 12.7 24.1 14.6 13.0 16.5 14.2 17.1 17.2 18.8 23.0 17.0 20.4 14.2
Electronics 1.9 1.9 2.8 12.3 16.0 1.0 6.1 8.7 13.9 20.1 8.3 12.7 26.2 1.9 3.2 4.3 9.4
Communications equipment (less parts thereof)
 and household equipment 0.1 0.2 0.1 1.4 1.9 0.3 0.8 0.7 0.5 1.0 2.1 0.8 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3
Computers and office machines (less parts thereof) 1.2 0.7 0.8 3.3 4.3 0.1 0.3 1.1 1.8 1.9 1.3 0.9 2.8 0.2 0.5 0.7 1.6
Parts and componentsb 0.6 1.0 1.9 7.6 9.8 0.7 5.1 6.9 11.6 17.2 4.9 11.0 23.0 1.5 2.6 3.5 7.4
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on UN COMTRADE.
a Data for earlier years not available.
b Includes SITC 759, 764, 772 and 776.Trade and Development Report, 2005 62
mastering just one facet of production, or on no
more than a limited subset of all the activities in-
volved in making a final product. Thus it would
seem no longer necessary for producers to master
entire production chains and organize them with-
in single firms, which was
the strategy that characterized
much of the earlier Asian in-
dustrialization episodes. On
the other hand, it seems that in
China this kind of production-
sharing activity has developed
mainly in the electronics sec-
tor. Moreover, it is likely that,
with geographically dispersed
production sites, the spillovers
from engaging in subcontract-
ing or hosting affiliates of transnational corpora-
tions (TNCs) are reduced because the package of
technology and skills required at any one site is
narrower, and because cross-border backward and
forward linkages are strengthened at the expense
of domestic ones.
Indeed, the weakness of domestic backward
linkages (i.e. the scarcity of domestic supply of
suitable intermediate production inputs) has im-
paired the development impact of assembly-based
export activities in a number of developing coun-
tries over the past few years (TDR 2002). More-
over, this weakness tends to reduce a country￿s
relative cost advantage in assembly-based export
activities to those involving low unit-labour costs.
Regarding China, it appears
that, although the wage bill of
Japanese electronics compa-
nies operating in China is
much lower than at home, the
fact that intermediate produc-
tion inputs of the required
quality are often not available
from local suppliers signifi-
cantly reduces the financial
advantage of producing in
China rather than in Japan
(Marsh, 2004). However,
China￿s recent strong invest-
ment in domestic manufactur-
ing capacity may significantly reduce its reliance
on imported parts and components in the elec-
tronics industry and strengthen the country￿s pat-
tern of domestic linkages in industry more
generally, as locally produced alternatives become
available.
The different phases of rising and falling
shares of textiles and clothing in the four coun-
tries￿ import composition reflect
the important role of labour-
intensive exports during the
industrialization process.17
While in Japan, the impor-
tance of textile imports has
remained stable over the past
four decades, the share of cloth-
ing imports has significantly
increased, in particular over
the past 10 years. Table 2.5
also shows that in the Repub-
lic of Korea there has been a continuous decline
in the share of textile imports, but a steady rise in
the share of clothing imports, as in Japan earlier.
In China, the current decline in the importance of
textile imports is similar to that experienced in
the Republic of Korea since the 1970s. While tex-
tiles have become more important in India￿s im-
port basket, this rise has occurred from a very low
level; overall, the share of textiles and clothing
items in India￿s import composition has not
changed significantly over the past few years.
The sharp fall in the share of primary com-
modities in the import composition of Japan and
the Republic of Korea between 1985 and 1995 may
seem to be contrary to expectations of the change
in the comparative advantage
of rapidly growing countries
with relatively poor natural-
resource endowments. How-
ever, for Japan in particular, it
is likely that this finding partly
reflects continuous structural
change, as the share of indus-
try in total output fell from
40 per cent to 34 per cent and
that of services rose from 59 per
cent to 68 per cent between
1985 and 1995 (UNCTAD
Handbook of Statistics, vari-
ous issues, table 7.3). More-
over, most of this decline was due to falling oil
prices during the second half of the 1980s. In the
period between 1965 and 1985, much of the de-
cline in the share of primary commodities in the
In India, the decline in the
share of machinery in total
imports is closely
associated with the limited
share of industry in its
economy ...
￿ while in China, this
decline reflects the greater
role that participation in
international production
networks has played in
its recent industrialization
and development
strategies.Income Growth and Shifting Trade Patterns in Asia 63
total imports of Japan and the Republic of Korea
occurred in the agricultural sector. This might
partly reflect the rise in domestic production as a
result of the Green Revolution. But several ob-
servers have also noted a general tendency among
countries towards agricultural protection during
the course of their industrialization (e.g. Timmer,
2002).
Table 2.5 further indicates the growing im-
portance of vegetable oilseeds and oils in the im-
port composition of both China and India, as men-
tioned earlier. But given that much of the imported
oilseeds (and soybeans) are used as animal feed,
they have contributed to limiting meat imports.
This is in contrast to Japan and the Republic of
Korea, where meat imports have risen while im-
ports of vegetable oilseeds have remained low.
Moreover, the table highlights the large share in
total imports of fuels and a number of raw materials
(such as cotton, rubber, wood,
iron ore and non-ferrous met-
als) during economic growth
and industrialization. For ex-
ample, fuels continue to ac-
count for about one fifth of the
total imports of Japan and the
Republic of Korea and their
share in China￿s imports have
increased fivefold over the past
15 years. The share of minerals, ores and metals
has fallen sharply in Japan￿s imports, while it ap-
pears to have reached a peak in the imports of the
Republic of Korea and continues to rise in China￿s
imports. This pattern is most probably determined
by the intensity-of-metal-use cycle associated with
industrialization and de-industrialization, discussed
above. Finally, the decline in the share of cotton
in the imports of Japan and the Republic of Korea
over the past four decades is related to shifts in
the importance of textiles and clothing in the two
countries￿ exports, as discussed below.
Table 2.6 illustrates the potential magnitude
of change in imports of selected products by China
and India over the next two decades. For Japan
and the Republic of Korea, it shows the magni-
tude of the rise in import volumes and values of
selected primary commodities during the first and
second decades of their post-war economic catch-
up and greater trade integration, as well as during
the subsequent 20-year period. It compares these
data with the rise in imports by China and India
over the period 1990￿2000,18 as well as with prod-
uct-specific projections for imports by China and
India up to 2010 and, in a few instances, 2020.
Regarding China, the rise in imports of the
selected primary commodities during the period
1990￿2000 is similar to that of Japan during its
first two decades of post-war economic catch-up
and greater trade integration. However, it is be-
low that of the Republic of Korea during the com-
parable periods. The two main exceptions to this
general pattern are the very rapid rise in China￿s
imports of petroleum and soybeans. But given that
China is itself an oil and coal producer, with a
high share of coal in its energy use, the recent rise
in petroleum imports started from very low lev-
els. Except for cotton, the rise in imports of the
selected primary commodities in table 2.6 has been
substantially smaller in India than in China. The
major reason for this is likely
to be India￿s slower pace of in-
dustrialization compared to
China￿s.
Looking at import trends
for Japan and the Republic of
Korea reveals that the growth of
Japan￿s imports (especially by
volume) continuously slowed
down between 1955 and 1995, while those of the
Republic of Korea increased between the first and
the second decade of economic catch-up, and
subsequently declined. This suggests that imports
of commodities and raw materials rise particularly
fast during the early catch-up phase.19
Does this mean that the magnitude of the rise
in China￿s imports over the next two decades is
likely to be smaller than it was during the period
1990￿2000? The product-specific projections in
table 2.6 indicate that the volume of China￿s pri-
mary imports is likely to grow less on average than
it did between 1990 and 2000. However, when
China started integrating into the world economy,
its per capita income was much lower than that of
Japan and the Republic of Korea when they be-
gan their rapid integration. Consequently, China
can be expected to maintain a relatively strong
growth in imports of energy and raw materials for
a number of years to come in order to maintain its
growth momentum.
In China growth in imports
of energy and raw materials
will remain strong for
several years.T
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4 Table 2.6
MAGNITUDE OF CHANGE IN SELECTED RAW MATERIAL IMPORTS BY JAPAN, THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, CHINA AND INDIA, SELECTED PERIODS
Japan China
1955￿1965 1965￿1975 1975￿1995 1990￿2000 2000￿2010 2000￿2020
Product Volume Value Volume Value Volume Value Volume Value Volume Volume
Soybeans 2.3 2.3 1.8 4.2 1.4 1.5 11 490.5 7 072.6 1.5a 2.5b
Natural rubber and similar natural gums 2.3 1.4 1.4 1.7 2.4 6.9 2.5 2.0 2.3 ..
Wood, lumber and cork .. 8.0 .. 5.3 .. 3.9 .. 5.2 .. ..
Cotton 1.5 1.2 1.0 1.9 0.5 0.9 0.6 0.2 3.4 ..
Iron ore and concentrates 7.1 6.4 3.4 4.2 0.9 1.4 4.9 4.7 5.0c ..
Ores and concentrates of non-ferrous base metals 5.3 8.6 3.2 6.1 0.8 2.7 4.0 4.3 2.1d 5.6d
Coal, coke and briquettes 6.0 4.8 3.6 12.8 2.0 1.9 .. 0.9 .. ..
Petroleum, crude and partly refined 9.9 7.0 3.1 18.8 1.0 1.5 24.0 35.1 2.5e 4.1e
Petroleum products .. 3.4 .. 4.4 .. 4.2 6.0 6.5 .. ..
Republic of Korea India
1964￿1970 1970￿1980 1980￿2000 1990￿2000 2000￿2010 2000￿2020
Volume Value Volume Value Volume Value Volume Value Volume Volume
Soybeans 3.6 3.3 18.4 48.5 2.7 2.0 .. .. 1.1 ..
Natural rubber and similar natural gums 2.7 2.8 4.6 13.6 2.8 1.3 0.2 0.2 3.0 ..
Wood, lumber and cork .. 6.8 .. 7.0 .. 1.0 .. 1.9 .. ..
Cotton 1.7 1.7 3.0 9.5 1.0 0.7 159.0f 111.5f 1.1 ..
Iron ore and concentrates 25.1 149.3 121.3 168.8 4.3 5.5 2.7 2.6 .. ..
Ores and concentrates of non-ferrous base metals 38.0 25.0 13.7 31.8 6.3 7.2 6.8 3.0 .. ..
Coal, coke and briquettes .. 1.2 .. 147.8 .. 4.9 .. 2.6 .. ..
Petroleum, crude and partly refined 12.4g 9.4 2.8 44.9 4.9 4.5 3.6 4.4 1.6e 2.3e
Petroleum products .. 0.6 33.6 69.7 8.0 9.5 .. 0.5 .. ..
Source: Trade data for Japan from Japan Statistics Bureau; data for the Republic of Korea, China and India from UN COMTRADE. Projections for rubber and cotton from FAO, 2003;
soybeans from FAO, 2003, and Rosegrant et al., 2001; iron ore from UNCTAD, 2004b; total extraction industries from van Meijl and van Tongeren, 2004; and petroleum from
IEA, 2004b.
Note: The numbers in the table indicate by how many times imports increased, e.g. ￿2￿ indicates a doubling of imports.
a Oil meal. b 1997￿2020. c Projection up to 2009. d Total extractive industries.
e Projections over base year 2002. f 1979￿1981 to 1989￿1991. g 1965￿1970.Income Growth and Shifting Trade Patterns in Asia 65
(c) Export composition
The sustained growth of exports that has been
a characteristic common to all industrialization
episodes in Asia over the past five decades would
not have been possible in the absence of shifts in
export composition. The accumulation of capital,
both physical and human, raises the productivity
of labour, and thus tends to be associated with
higher wages, even though there is no direct link
between sector-specific productivity growth and
wage increases (TDR 2004, chap. IV, annex 1).
As a result of the ensuing change in comparative
advantage, industrializing countries need to up-
grade their export structure towards products with
a comparatively higher potential for productivity
growth in order to sustain output growth.
In this context, it is important for domestic
firms to enter export markets in sectors with high
productivity and market potential, and to use
the export proceeds to finance
imports of the capital goods,
intermediate imports and pri-
mary commodities needed for
further productivity increases
and industrialization. Even
though productivity and mar-
ket potentials vary within broad
product categories, there is
widespread agreement that
manufactures, particularly of
the skill-intensive type, have
a more favourable potential
than other products. This is because primary sec-
tors face adverse terms-of-trade movements in the
long run, as well as limits to raising productivity;
and markets for labour-intensive manufactures ex-
ported by developing countries risk becoming
rapidly oversupplied.
The growth in the share of manufactures in
the export composition of rapidly industrializing
countries is a recurrent feature. For some of the
now developed countries, such as Canada, Japan,
Sweden and the United States, the proportion of
manufactured exports rose sharply over the first
six decades of the twentieth century. In Canada
and the United States it increased continuously
up to the mid-1950s, when it stabilized, while in
Japan and Sweden it continued to rise. In Japan,
it doubled over the 60-year period to reach 88 per
cent in 1959, with the vast bulk of the rise occur-
ring after the Second World War.
To examine the links between industrializa-
tion and export upgrading in Asia, table 2.7 uses
the six broad product categories listed in table 2.5.
The table shows that Japan, the Republic of Ko-
rea and China (but not India, as discussed later)
have indeed been successful in upgrading the
composition of their merchandise exports from
primary commodities to manufactures. Within
manufactures, the early stages of rapid growth
and industrialization saw a high share of labour-
intensive items, particularly clothing, while further
industrial development in Japan and the Republic
of Korea was accompanied by a strong rise in the
share of electronics, as well as other, more skill-
intensive manufactures, particularly cars.
The sequence of these changes has been
broadly similar for all three countries, although it
occurred at different periods
of time. The share of primary
commodities in Japan￿s mer-
chandise exports had already
begun falling sharply before
the Second World War and the
importance of textiles and cloth-
ing reached its peak in the
1950s. The table shows that
textiles, as well as iron and
steel, still accounted for a size-
able share of Japan￿s exports
in the mid-1960s, but by the
mid-1980s, with the rise of the automobile indus-
try, road motor vehicles became the single most
important export item. At the same time, exports of
capital goods, in particular non-electrical machin-
ery and electronics began to gain in importance.
It is noteworthy that the share of finished products
in the electronics sector peaked in the mid-1980s,
and subsequently parts and components of elec-
trical and electronic products, together with road
motor vehicles, became the most important items
in Japan￿s merchandise exports. Protectionist ten-
dencies in Japan￿s main export markets (i.e. the
United States and Western Europe), the apprecia-
tion of the yen following the Plaza Accord of 1985,
and increased competition from the NIEs played
a significant role in the evolution of Japan￿s ex-
port pattern (see, for example, Balassa and Noland,
1988).
China￿s exports continue to
include a large proportion
of imported inputs ... but
there are indications of a
rise in the share of
domestic value added in
China￿s processing trade.T
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6 Table 2.7
PRODUCT STRUCTURE OF EXPORTS FROM SELECTED ASIAN COUNTRIES, 1965￿2003
(Percentage of total merchandise exports)
Japan Republic of Korea Chinaa Indiaa
Product group 1965 1975 1985 1995 2003 1965 1975 1985 1995 2003 1987 1995 2003 1975 1985 1995 2003
Primary commodities 8.8 4.4 2.7 2.8 2.9 40.6 18.4 8.7 6.7 7.3 37.7 15.7 9.2 55.1 41.8 25.6 23.0
All food products 4.4 1.5 0.8 0.5 0.5 16.7 13.2 4.1 2.3 1.4 15.6 8.3 4.4 37.7 25.3 19.0 11.4
Agricultural raw materials 2.3 1.4 0.6 0.6 0.5 8.6 1.6 0.7 1.3 0.9 6.3 1.8 0.7 4.0 2.8 1.3 1.3
Minerals, ores and metals 1.7 0.4 0.9 1.1 1.4 14.3 1.3 0.7 1.0 1.5 3.4 2.1 1.6 12.3 7.6 3.6 4.4
Fuels 0.4 1.1 0.3 0.6 0.4 1.1 2.2 3.1 2.0 3.6 12.4 3.6 2.5 1.1 6.0 1.7 5.9
Labour- and resource-intensive manufactures 23.9 8.7 5.5 3.8 3.3 41.4 48.7 32.0 19.0 10.0 35.7 37.3 27.7 27.8 42.2 48.5 40.3
Textiles 13.7 5.3 2.8 1.7 1.4 15.1 13.0 8.4 10.1 5.6 16.2 9.5 6.2 13.8 11.6 14.0 11.0
Clothing 3.4 0.6 0.4 0.1 0.1 11.8 22.6 14.7 4.1 1.9 14.5 16.3 11.9 4.5 10.2 13.2 10.7
Footwear, leather and travel goods 1.4 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.0 2.4 5.5 6.8 3.0 0.9 2.4 6.8 4.5 5.3 6.8 4.4 2.9
Cork, wood and paper products 2.2 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.7 10.5 5.4 0.9 1.3 1.1 1.4 2.4 3.3 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.7
Non-metallic mineral manufactures 3.2 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.6 2.1 1.1 0.6 0.5 1.2 2.3 1.8 3.8 13.4 16.4 14.9
Low-skill and technology-intensive manufactures 30.6 35.7 15.3 9.5 9.0 8.7 10.3 28.8 13.0 11.8 4.0 8.8 7.2 6.1 2.5 6.2 9.2
Iron and steel 15.4 18.5 7.8 3.9 3.8 7.3 4.6 6.0 4.5 4.1 1.1 3.7 1.2 2.7 0.5 3.3 5.1
Fabricated metal products 3.6 3.3 2.0 1.7 1.6 1.3 2.5 5.0 3.0 1.6 2.2 3.0 3.3 2.1 1.4 1.9 3.3
Simple transport equipment 2.7 3.1 2.0 1.4 1.5 0.0 0.6 1.2 1.0 0.2 0.3 1.5 2.0 1.2 0.6 1.1 0.6
Ships and boats 8.9 10.9 3.4 2.5 2.2 0.0 2.7 16.7 4.5 5.8 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2
Medium-skill and technology-intensive manufactures 15.0 27.4 40.8 41.8 45.0 2.8 5.6 7.4 20.5 22.8 6.4 8.8 12.1 5.7 5.8 6.3 8.4
Rubber and plastic products 1.9 1.4 1.3 1.5 1.6 0.7 3.5 1.9 1.8 1.6 0.5 2.2 2.2 0.5 0.8 1.7 1.4
Non-electrical machinery 7.1 10.8 13.4 18.8 17.2 1.4 0.6 2.0 5.9 6.9 1.4 3.2 4.9 3.0 3.0 2.2 3.6
Electrical machinery excluding electronics 2.8 2.8 3.3 4.8 4.7 0.2 1.4 1.4 5.4 2.4 0.6 3.0 4.2 1.1 1.0 0.7 1.4
Road motor vehicles 3.2 12.4 22.7 16.6 21.5 0.5 0.1 2.1 7.4 11.8 3.9 0.4 0.6 1.1 0.9 1.8 2.0
High-skill and technology-intensive manufactures 9.8 11.0 9.4 12.6 15.2 0.5 3.1 5.2 8.9 10.4 7.8 8.8 7.1 2.8 4.2 8.6 12.4
Industrial chemicals 6.0 6.8 4.1 6.4 7.7 0.2 1.2 3.0 7.0 8.5 5.0 5.0 3.8 1.8 2.2 5.9 8.5
Pharmaceuticals 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.7 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 1.1 1.1 0.7 0.7 1.5 2.3 3.2
Aircraft 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.8 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1
Scientific instruments 3.3 3.9 5.0 5.6 6.4 0.2 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 2.6 2.6 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.6
Electronics 7.5 10.9 23.5 27.5 22.6 0.9 9.4 13.5 29.1 35.8 3.4 12.3 30.3 0.8 0.8 1.9 1.9
Communications equipment (less parts thereof)
    and household equipment 5.0 5.7 9.2 2.6 3.7 0.8 2.9 5.8 5.2 4.2 2.3 4.4 6.0 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.3
Computers and office machines (less parts thereof) 0.3 1.2 4.8 4.9 2.0 0.0 0.4 1.4 3.4 5.0 0.3 2.1 9.9 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3
Parts and componentsb 2.3 4.1 9.4 20.0 17.0 0.1 6.1 6.3 20.5 26.5 0.7 5.8 14.4 0.3 0.5 1.3 1.3
Other manufactures 4.4 1.9 2.7 1.9 1.8 5.0 4.6 4.4 2.7 1.7 5.1 8.1 6.2 1.6 2.6 2.8 4.7
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on UN COMTRADE.
a Data for earlier years not available.
b Includes SITC 759, 764, 772 and 776.Income Growth and Shifting Trade Patterns in Asia 67
In the Republic of Korea, primary commodi-
ties accounted for about 40 per cent of merchan-
dise exports even in the mid-1960s, while labour
and resource-intensive manufactures (mainly,
textiles, clothing and cork, wood and paper prod-
ucts) constituted another 40 per cent. The decline
in importance of primary commodities in the
1970s, and clothing in the 1980s and 1990s, was
accompanied by a rise in the share of transport
equipment, machinery, industrial chemicals and
electronics. In electronics, the shares of finished
products, and parts and components rose fairly
evenly during the 1980s; thereafter, the rapid in-
crease in the share of parts and components has
made electronics the single most important export
item in the country￿s export composition. The fall-
ing shares of clothing and of finished products in
the electronics category have been spurred by the
increasing importance of production networks
with assembly operations located in China.
As for China, following the international oil
price hikes of the 1970s, fuels constituted a sub-
stantial proportion of its export earnings. As a
result, primary commodities, including also a large
share of food products, continued to account for
the highest share of China￿s total merchandise
exports until the mid-1980s. Thereafter, the rapid
rise in domestic demand for energy products and
the sharp fall in international oil prices substan-
tially reduced China￿s earnings from primary
commodity exports. Labour- and resource-inten-
sive manufactures (mainly textiles, clothing and
footwear), chemicals, machinery and, increas-
ingly, electronics have since accounted for the bulk
of China￿s merchandise exports. Unlike Japan and
the Republic of Korea, China￿s electronics exports
continue to be fairly evenly spread between fin-
ished products and parts and components. This
reflects the fact that a large proportion of China￿s
assembly operations are based on inputs imported
from other countries, including Japan and the Re-
public of Korea.
Despite the similarities in the broad evolu-
tion of the export structure of the latecomers to
industrialization and the leaders, the changes are
based on rather different production structures and
are related in different ways to their import struc-
tures. Upgrading in Japan￿s export composition
emanated from a strong indigenous technological
base, developed prior to the country￿s global eco-
nomic integration in the 1950s. On the other hand,
China, and earlier, during the 1970s and 1980s,
the Republic of Korea, were able to take advantage
of participation in the labour-intensive segments
of international production networks. In this con-
text, the Republic of Korea imported mainly
technology and equipment that fed into exports
with a high domestic value-added content (TDR
2002). By contrast, China has relied relatively
more on the assembly of final products ￿ the most
labour-intensive segment of production ￿ from
imported parts and components, and its exports
continue to include a large proportion of imported
inputs.
However, there are indications that suggest
a rise in the share of domestic value added in Chi-
na￿s processing trade. According to data from
China￿s Customs Statistics, the export￿import ra-
tio of processing with imported materials has been
rising steadily, from 1.2 in 1994 to about 1.5 in
1998￿2001, and 1.7 at the end of 2004. The elec-
tronics sector is likely to have contributed most
to upgrading in processing trade, given that an
increasing share of parts and components used
in such trade comes from domestic production,
in particular those traded between different for-
eign affiliates located in China, rather than being
imported (Lemoine and ￿nal-Kesenci, 2004:
840￿841).
Most important for the dynamism of domes-
tic value added in China￿s electronics exports is
the recent massive geographic dispersion of chip
design (a process that creates the highest value in
the electronics industry) away from developed
countries towards leading Asian electronics ex-
porting countries, including China (Ernst, 2004).
The adoption of modular design methodology (an
approach pioneered in the automobile industry
some two decades ago) has facilitated the reuse
of design building blocks, and thus the disinte-
gration and geographic dispersion of design teams
to multiple locations with different, yet comple-
mentary, specialization profiles. This has improved
design productivity and enabled an improved
management of the rapidly growing cost of chip
design, which increasingly reflects complex de-
sign requirements. The attractiveness of Asian
developing countries, particularly China, as new
locations for chip design stems from a combina-
tion of factors, including their relatively low wagesTrade and Development Report, 2005 68
for skilled labour, policy incentives in the form
of tax rebates20 and, not least, proximity to the
providers of design and engineering support serv-
ices, as well as the rising number of end-users in
the rapidly growing markets of Asian developing
countries.
Unlike the strong upgrading in China￿s ex-
port composition, there has been little change in
India￿s merchandise export structure. While simi-
lar to the other countries in
that the share of primary com-
modities has declined and that
of textiles and clothing has in-
creased, these shifts have not
been as far-reaching as in the
other three countries. Four re-
source- and labour-intensive
products ￿ food products, non-
metallic mineral manufactures
(i.e. gems, jewellery and re-
lated products), textiles and
clothing ￿ jointly continue to account for about
half of India￿s merchandise exports. Such a struc-
ture is typical of a country at an early stage of
industrialization. However, as mentioned above,
since a number of important trade policy reforms
have been implemented only recently, it is prob-
able that the main changes in India￿s export
structure that would be expected to accompany
trade reform have yet to occur.
Two of India￿s policy instruments, namely
price controls and reserving market segments for
small-scale firms, have had noticeable, but widely
varying, impacts on the composition of its mer-
chandise exports. It is often argued that the
relatively small share of labour-intensive manu-
factures in India￿s merchandise exports is partly
due to the reserving of market segments for small
firms. Small-scale firms in labour-intensive manu-
facturing sectors, where production is often also
scale intensive, have been neither innovative nor
agents of industrial diversification. This has con-
tributed to sidelining India from mass markets that
require long production runs and goods of a stand-
ard quality. As a result, the share of clothing in
India￿s merchandise exports, for example, has re-
mained relatively small. Yet India￿s relatively
abundant supply of low-skilled labour gives it a
comparative advantage for the production of la-
bour-intensive manufactures (fig. 2.4).
The introduction of price ceilings on the do-
mestic market, on the other hand, seems to have
had a positive impact on India￿s exports of phar-
maceuticals (Amsden, 2001: 156).21 These ceil-
ings tended to make exports more profitable, and
thus provided an incentive for domestic pharma-
ceutical firms to engage in export activities. They
also helped boost innovation, because local firms
that manufactured new medicines on the basis of
indigenous technologies were exempted from
price controls for five years.
However, domestic innova-
tiveness in India￿s pharmaceu-
tical sector owes most to the
Indian Patents Act of 1970.
One stated objective of that
Act was the development of an
independent and self-reliant
pharmaceutical industry (Jha
et al., 2005: 12). The Act fa-
cilitated the acquisition of for-
eign technology, as it pro-
tected production processes but not products (i.e.
it permitted reverse engineering, whereby mol-
ecules can be reconstituted using production tech-
niques that are different from the inventor￿s tech-
nique). This enabled India to become the world￿s
leading exporter of generic medicines, and for
Indian companies to capture 65 per cent of the
domestic market in pharmaceutical products, com-
pared to 25 per cent in 1971 (Chauvin and Lemoine,
2003: 36).
Export prospects for India￿s pharmaceutical
industry depend to a large extent on the effects of
the new Patent (Third Amendment) Act 2005. In-
dia had to change its patent legislation to comply
with its obligations under the WTO Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS). The new Act provides for the
granting of product patents. However, it affects
only newly invented medicines, whereas specific
regulations apply to those medicines that were
invented between 1995 and 2005. India was al-
lowed to delay the patenting of pharmaceutical
products until 2005, but had to establish a system
(a so-called ￿mailbox￿) for receiving and filing
patent applications starting in 1995. The Indian
patent office will decide whether these mailbox
applications meet the patentability criteria laid
down in the Act, and accept or reject them ac-
cordingly. If the application is accepted, Indian
So far, India has not
experienced a manu-
facturing export boom of
the kind seen in other
rapidly growing Asian
economies.Income Growth and Shifting Trade Patterns in Asia 69
companies can continue producing such medicines
after payment to the patent-holder of a ￿reason-
able￿ royalty, provided that they made ￿significant￿
investment and were producing and marketing the
concerned medicines prior to 2005.22 Moreover,
exports to countries with no manufacturing capac-
ity of patented medicines produced in India
through a compulsory licence will be possible
based solely on the notification by the importing
country, in accordance with the implementation
of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement
and Public Health.23 If the granting of such com-
pulsory licences does not lead to protracted liti-
gation processes between the patent-holder and
the producers of generic medicines, India can con-
tinue supplying the developing world with, for
example, affordable antiretrovirals for the treat-
ment of HIV/AIDS.
So far, India has not experienced the kind of
manufacturing export boom that has characterized
the other rapidly growing economies in Asia. By
contrast, it has become a leading exporter, par-
ticularly to the United States, of software and
so-called information-technology (IT)-enabled
services. These services cover many different
kinds of data processing and
voice interactions that use
some IT infrastructure as in-
puts. India￿s software exports
have increased about sixfold
since the early 1990s, and
were worth almost $30 billion
in 2003. Given the relatively
slower growth of merchandise
exports, the share of software
and IT-enabled services in In-
dia￿s total export earnings
increased from about 20 per cent in 1990 to more
than 30 per cent in 2003. This improved India￿s
share in total developing-country services exports
from about 3 per cent in 1990 to about 7 per cent
in 2003. But it is also interesting to note that
China￿s services exports have increased about
eightfold since 1990, reaching a level of about
$47 billion in 2003, and they correspond to a share
of 8 per cent in total developing-country services
exports. Given the strong increase in China￿s mer-
chandise exports, the contribution of services to
the country￿s total export earnings rose only mar-
ginally, from 9 to 10 per cent over the same period
of time.
India￿s high absolute number of high-skilled
labour supported the rise in its exports of soft-
ware and IT-enabled services. Singh (2003: 28),
for example, reports that about 140,000 Indian
engineers graduate every year, the largest number
in the world after the United States, and that every
year about 100,000 new IT professionals are added
to the workforce. However, the number of gradu-
ates available for employment in domestic com-
panies has suffered from outward migration of
graduates to the United States and elsewhere. But
the strong growth of Indian software and IT-
enabled services exports, destined mainly to the
United States, is probably mainly due to other
advantages that are specific to the sector, in par-
ticular: networks of Indian engineers recruited by
firms in the United States during the 1980s, wide-
spread command of the English language, the
country￿s convenient location (in terms of time
zones) with respect to the United States, minimal
regulation, the fact that transport by telecommu-
nications makes the services industry less vulner-
able to current infrastructure constraints (such as
poor water and road transport), and, perhaps most
importantly, the relatively low development of
India￿s manufacturing sector, which strongly re-
duces the opportunity costs for
skilled workers to work in the
software sector. But specific
demand-related events have
also played a crucial role in the
rise of India￿s IT-related serv-
ices exports: the adoption of a
common currency in Western
Europe, which required a large
amount of data to be converted
into euros, and the large num-
ber of Y2K-related projects in
the late 1990s (Arora and Gambardella, 2004). The
specific importance of these events lies in the fact
that they occurred just when some developed
countries were experiencing a shortage of labour
possessing specialized skills during the IT-indus-
try￿s unprecedented expansion. As a result, United
States firms, for example, outsourced IT-related
activities to countries where skilled workers were
more readily available, and at wages well below
those of their domestic counterparts.
It is highly uncertain whether the share of
software and IT-enabled services in India￿s export
earnings will continue to rise substantially over
The share of software and
IT-enabled services in
India￿s export earnings may
not continue to rise
substantially over the
medium term.Trade and Development Report, 2005 70
the medium term. This is because of strong com-
petition in the software market from producers
with equally well-educated labour forces (in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe, as well as elsewhere in
Asia), and, following the bursting of the IT-bubble,
the shortage of software engineers in developed
countries has eased. Moreover, it is widely ex-
pected that an improvement in transport facilities
and continued economic reforms could reduce the
current disadvantages of other Indian sectors in
exporting, so that resources could be diverted away
from the software sector (Wood and Calandrino,
2000). Also, greater automation of software de-
velopment may reduce the scope of outsourcing
such activities from developed to developing
countries. Over the next few years, the absolute
value of India￿s software and IT-enabled services
exports may continue to grow, because of the self-
perpetuating momentum of connections and
experience, in particular if the Indian industry
succeeds in upgrading towards systems architec-
ture, design, development and technology strategy
services (Chadwick, 2003). However, export dyna-
mism in other sectors is likely to become stronger.
D.  World market shares and prices
The discussion in sections B and C focused
on the evolution of domestic consumption and
external trade in China and India, with an empha-
sis on volumes and trade composition. However,
it is clear that the values associated with traded
volumes depend on prices. Given that a simulta-
neous expansion of the internationally traded
volumes of a specific good by a large number of
countries, or even by large individual countries
such as China and India, can have a significant
impact on international prices, this section high-
lights the effects that greater trade integration by
China and India has had over the past few years.
1. The growing impact of China and India
on global primary commodity markets
The evolution of real commodity prices ￿ i.e.
nominal prices deflated by the unit value index of
manufactures exported by developed countries ￿
has been characterized by sizeable short-term vari-
ation around a long-term downward trend (fig. 2.6).
This downward trend was particularly strong be-
tween the mid-1970s and late 1980s. It has been
most pronounced for those commodity groups that
are of export interest to developing countries, such
as tropical beverages, food and vegetable oilseeds
and oils. By contrast, since 2002, commodity
prices of all commodity groups have surged both
in real and, in particular, nominal terms (table 2.8).
But this price increase is most marked for miner-
als, ores and metals, reflected by the fact that the
UNCTAD price index for this commodity group
(as well as individually for a number of metals
such as copper, iron ore and nickel) approached
all-time record levels in nominal terms at the end
of 2004 and early 2005.
The long-term downward trend of real prices
for primary commodities has been related to the
relatively low income elasticity of demand that
characterizes many primary commodities. It has
also been related to the transmission of produc-
tivity growth in primary production to lower prices
in the commodity-consuming industrialized coun-Income Growth and Shifting Trade Patterns in Asia 71
Figure 2.6
NON-FUEL PRIMARY COMMODITY PRICES, NOMINAL AND REAL,
BY COMMODITY GROUP, 1960￿2004
(Index numbers, 2000 = 100)
Source: UNCTAD, Commodity Price Bulletin, various issues; and United Nations Statistics Division, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics,
various issues.
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tries, rather than to higher wages in the commod-
ity-producing developing countries. Substitution
of raw materials by synthetics and, particularly
since the mid-1980s, sharp increases in the sup-
ply of primary commodities (owing to the need of
many developing countries to maintain export rev-
enues to service growing debt obligations in the
presence of credit rationing, and to the disman-
tling of international commodity agreements) have
also had an adverse effect on commodity prices.
Much of the short-term variations in com-
modity prices have traditionally been attributed
to fluctuations in the real exchange rate of the
Table 2.8
WORLD PRIMARY COMMODITY PRICES, 1999￿2004
(Percentage change over previous year)
Commodity group 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
All commoditiesa -14.0 2.0 -4.0 1.0 8.2 20.0
Food and tropical beverages -17.4 0.0 0.0 1.0 2.0 13.6
Tropical beverages -21.3 -15.3 -21.0 12.7 5.6 6.4
Coffee -21.3 -25.1 -29.0 4.7 8.7 19.8
Cocoa -32.1 -22.1 22.7 63.3 -1.3 -11.8
Tea -7.0 6.7 -20.1 -9.6 8.4 2.0
Food -16.9 2.0 3.0 -1.0 2.0 14.4
Sugar -30.0 30.4 5.6 -20.3 2.9 1.1
Beef 6.2 5.6 10.0 -0.3 0.5 17.8
Maize -10.0 -2.8 1.1 10.5 6.4 5.0
Wheat -11.0 3.1 9.0 16.5 -0.8 7.1
Rice -18.7 -18.0 -15.0 10.6 4.3 23.5
Bananas -9.9 -2.3 38.8 -9.6 -28.7 39.9
Vegetable oilseeds and oils -26.5 -20.0 -6.0 24.5 17.1 13.1
Soybeans -17.4 5.3 -8.0 8.7 25.0 16.0
Agricultural raw materials -10.2 3.1 -4.0 -2.1 19.1 9.8
Hides and skins -6.3 11.1 5.0 -2.9 -16.7 -1.2
Cotton -18.6 11.5 -19.0 -3.6 37.2 -3.3
Tobacco -7.1 -3.8 0.0 -8.0 -3.3 3.4
Rubber -12.6 7.9 -14.1 33.1 41.7 20.3
Tropical logs -7.2 3.7 6.4 -10.5 20.1 19.2
Minerals, ores and metals -2.2 12.4 -11.0 -2.2 12.6 39.8
Aluminium 0.3 13.8 -6.8 -6.5 6.1 19.9
Phosphate rock 4.6 -0.4 -4.5 -3.3 -5.9 7.8
Iron ore -9.2 2.7 4.5 -1.1 8.5 17.4
Tin -2.9 1.0 -18.0 -8.5 20.0 74.4
Copper -4.9 15.3 -13.0 -1.1 14.1 61.1
Nickel 29.9 43.7 -31.2 14.0 42.2 43.5
Tungsten ore -9.3 12.1 45.5 -41.8 18.0 22.9
Lead -5.0 -9.7 4.9 -5.0 13.8 72.0
Zinc 4.6 4.0 -21.0 -12.0 5.2 29.1
Crude petroleum 38.7 55.6 -13.3 2.0 15.8 30.7
Source: UNCTAD, Monthly Commodity Price Bulletin, various issues.
Note: This table has been revised from TDR 2004, table 2.2, because the base year for the commodity price index has been
changed to 2000.
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dollar24 and to the state of the business cycle in
the developed countries. However, it is clear that,
in addition to mere short-term effects related to
the business cycle, demand
conditions in commodity-con-
suming countries also have
long-term price effects result-
ing from shifts in the share of
industry in total income. Thus,
structural change in developed
countries away from raw-mate-
rial-intensive industrial pro-
duction to services has con-
tributed to the long-standing
price decline of primary commodities over the past
three decades. More recently, the growing impor-
tance of manufacturing in a number of develop-
ing countries is poised to have an opposite effect.
The recent upward movement in commodity
prices has been driven by very strong demand and
emerging supply constraints. Rising imports by
China, and, for some commodities also by India,
have been the main sources of additional demand.
Sustained industrialization and income growth
have led to China￿s emergence as the world￿s larg-
est consumer of many primary commodities.
While China is also a major producer of several
commodities, in many cases domestic producers
have been unable to satisfy the growing domestic
demand. The resulting surge in China￿s imports,
particularly since 2002, has occurred in the con-
text of largely stagnating demand for primary
commodities in developed countries and short-
term supply constraints. These constraints are, at
least partly, the result of sluggish investment in
primary commodity produc-
tion and processing capacities
that followed the decline of
commodity prices from their
previous short-term peak be-
tween 1994 and 1997.
The current situation
therefore contrasts with that
prevailing when primary com-
modity imports by Japan and
the NIEs were increasing rapidly. The growth of
import demand from these economies was smaller
in magnitude. Moreover, it occurred when a
number of developed countries had started to ex-
perience structural change away from the raw-
material-intensive industrial sector (TDR 2003),
which liberated production and processing capaci-
ties to meet the growing demand for primary com-
modity imports by Japan and
the NIEs.
Figure 2.7 shows the
change in world import shares
of China and India between
1990 and 2003 for selected
commodities that are important
during rapid industrialization
and per capita income growth.
It shows that by 2003 China
had become a major importer of most of these
commodities, resulting in their shares increasing
considerably from very low levels in 1990. Chi-
na￿s imports of iron ore and soybeans in 2003 are
the most outstanding examples, accounting for
28.7 per cent and 32.1 per cent, respectively, of
total world imports. The share of India in world
imports of all these commodities also increased
(except for copper and natural rubber), although
at lower levels than those of China.
In order to examine the possible influence of
growing commodity imports by China and India
on world commodity prices, figure 2.8 depicts the
net trade (in value terms) of the two countries
against the prices of some representative com-
modities of the different commodity groups
between 1990 and 2004. For most commodities,
China￿s net trade position has been moving in-
creasingly into deficit, in particular since 2000, a
trend associated with price increases that acceler-
ated between 2002 and 2004. For India too, the
figure shows growing net trade
deficits with recently rising
commodity prices, particularly
of petroleum, but also of nickel.
The changes in China￿s
net trade position for a number
of primary commodities has
made the country a key par-
ticipant in the world trade of a
range of products. For exam-
ple, China has become the world￿s largest importer
of natural rubber (driven by higher demand for
tyres), tropical sawn wood, pulp and paper, and
soybeans (resulting from rising demand for its use
as animal feed, as discussed earlier);25 its imports
Since 2002, commodity
prices have surged, driven
by strong demand and
emerging supply
constraints.
Rising imports by China,
and, for some commodities
also by India, have been
the main sources of
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of iron ore rose tenfold between 1990 and 2003,
accounting for almost 80 per cent of the expan-
sion of this commodity￿s world imports (in volume
terms) during this period. This is closely related
to the rapid growth of steel production and use.
While China￿s domestic production had covered
about 85 per cent of domestic consumption, by
2003 this share fell to about 45 per cent, making
the country the world￿s largest iron ore importer.
UNCTAD (2004b) expects China to remain the
most dynamic force in the global iron ore market
for many years to come.
Changes in world cotton prices are closely
related to the evolution of the Chinese market. This
is because China accounts for about one fourth of
world production and, as the world￿s leading cot-
ton consumer, it represents approximately one
third of total world consumption and over one
fourth of total world imports (in volume terms).
Thus, China￿s bad harvest, combined with its in-
creasing demand for cotton for its booming clothing
industry, strongly influenced the sharp rise in in-
ternational cotton prices in 2003. Since then,
growing cotton production in all the major pro-
ducing countries, including China, has eased price
pressures on world cotton markets. But sustained
high world oil prices will make cotton an increas-
ingly attractive substitute for man-made fibres in
clothing production, thus boosting demand for this
commodity. The future dynamism of China￿s
clothing exports will be a key determinant of its
cotton imports. But if the growing clothing ex-
ports of China are associated with production
relocation from other countries, the resulting ad-
ditional demand from China should be matched
by reduced cotton consumption in other countries,
as a result of their lower clothing production, and
thus may not push up prices.
Between 2003 and 2004, China￿s petroleum
imports increased by more than 40 per cent, ac-
counting for more than 30 per cent of the incre-
mental global oil demand (IEA, 2005). Since 1999,
Figure 2.7
SHARES IN WORLD IMPORTS OF SELECTED PRIMARY COMMODITIES,
CHINA AND INDIA, 1990 AND 2003
(Per cent)
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on UN COMTRADE.
Note: India￿s imports of soybeans were negligible.
5
0
10
15
20
25
30
35
Copper Iron ore Nickel Crude 
petroleum 
Cotton Natural
rubber
Soybeans Total
primary
commodities
India 2003 India 1990 China 2003 China 1990Income Growth and Shifting Trade Patterns in Asia 75
Figure 2.8
NET TRADE BY CHINA AND INDIA AND WORLD PRICES,
SELECTED PRIMARY COMMODITIES, 1990￿2004
(Billions of dollars and index numbers 2000 = 100)
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on UN COMTRADE; and UNCTAD, Commodity Price Bulletin, various issues.
Note: India￿s trade of soybeans was negligible. Trade data available only to 2003.
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India￿s petroleum trade deficit has also markedly
increased, its value exceeding that of China￿s defi-
cit. But there has also been a strong increase in oil
imports by the United States,
which is by far the world￿s lead-
ing oil consumer, accounting
for over one fourth of total
world oil consumption and im-
ports. Continuous growth of
its oil consumption, combined
with a lower level of its self-
sufficiency in oil, made the
United States the second larg-
est source of incremental oil
demand after China for the period 1995￿2004; the
two countries accounted for 19.9 per cent and
24.3 per cent, respectively (Brook et al., 2004).
While the growing demand from China and
India has clearly had a significant impact on the
recent rise in international commodity prices, a
number of other factors have also played a part.
For example, many raw material producers
succeeded in raising dollar prices in order to com-
pensate for the negative effect of the depreciation
of the dollar on their export earnings. Moreover,
speculators have at times taken substantial posi-
tions on commodity exchanges to benefit from
frequent punctuations in the general upward price
movements, as prices have reacted with substan-
tial volatility to news of emerging or easing supply
constraints.26
Emerging supply constraints, particularly in
the metals and energy sectors, have played a key
role in the strong price reaction of commodity
markets to the rising demand from China, India
and other major importers, in-
cluding for replenishing in-
ventories. However, additional
supply capacity is due to go
on-stream following a recent
increase in investment in pro-
duction and processing ca-
pacities, as well as in explora-
tion.27 As a result, it is widely
expected that by the end of
2005 many commodity prices
will start falling. Prices may, nonetheless, remain
at levels above their averages since the mid-1980s,
as the mining industry is likely to be more cau-
tious when planning new investment. This is be-
cause of concerns that past episodes of over-
investment, and the consequent dramatic fall in
prices, may be repeated, and because of a steep
rise in the discovery cost per
unit of metal due to a decline
in discovery rates and in the
average size of discovered de-
posits.28 Contrary to the time
lag in supply response to the
rise in world metal prices, tight
supply conditions tend to be
short-lived for most soft com-
modities.29
In conclusion, the strong Asian demand for
primary commodities may persist for several years
to come. This could lead to a substantial rise in
the volume of international trade in some primary
commodities, particularly petroleum, copper, iron
ore, nickel, natural rubber and soybeans. Conse-
quently, the prices for these commodities might
remain, for some time, at levels above their aver-
ages for the period since the mid-1980s. These
factors combined could boost the volume and/or
prices of other developing countries￿ primary ex-
ports. On the other hand, developed countries still
account for two thirds of non-fuel commodity
imports, and they are likely to remain a dominant
influence in commodity markets for many years
to come (United Nations, 2004b). Thus it is unlikely
that the growing imports of primary commodities
by China and India will cause a reversal of the
long-term decline in their real prices.
Rising prices of China￿s commodity imports
have considerably increased its import bill. In
2004 alone, the surge in the prices of a number of
primary commodities (such as
copper, iron ore, nickel, petro-
leum and rubber), combined
with a rise in their import vol-
umes, resulted in an increase
in China￿s import bill for pri-
mary commodities by almost
$50 billion (a year-on-year in-
crease of almost 60 per cent).30
Moreover, while data on price
inflation of raw materials in
China are not available, there can be little doubt
that the sharp increase in prices of primary com-
modity imports has considerably exceeded domes-
tic consumer price inflation, which has remained
Supply constraints in the
metals and energy sectors
have played a key role in
the strong price reaction of
commodity markets.
The long-term downward
trend in real commodity
prices is unlikely to be
reversed by higher demand
from China and India.Income Growth and Shifting Trade Patterns in Asia 77
below 4 per cent despite a sharp rise between 2002
and 2004. Consequently, a number of enterprises
whose activities contain a large input of imported
primary commodities have suffered a profit squeeze.
2. The role of textile and clothing
exports
Much of the recent attention on the impact
of China￿s growing exports on world trade flows
has focused on textiles and clothing. For this rea-
son, this sector is examined here.
The production of textiles and clothing re-
lies on relatively simple technology and a com-
paratively large input of low-skilled labour. There-
fore, countries with a relatively abundant supply
of such labour and a relatively scarce supply of
natural resources per worker have a comparative
advantage in these industries. Thus textiles, and
especially, clothing production, have often pro-
vided the ￿natural￿ entry point for industrializa-
tion and for diversification of exports away from
primary commodities. Indeed, these industries
have led industrial development, creating a wide
range of production, employment and export op-
portunities across the developing world over the
past five decades. In particular, they have played
a key role in export growth and industrialization
in East Asia over the past five decades.
The ￿flying geese￿ paradigm has often been
used to describe the pattern of the spread of la-
bour-intensive production and exports in East
Asia. It explains the life cycles of various indus-
tries in the course of economic development, and
the relocation of industries from one country to
another through trade and FDI in response to shifts
in competitiveness (TDR 1996). The ￿flying geese￿
paradigm considers rising labour costs during the
process of economic development to be the main
reason for the gradual erosion of export competi-
tiveness in the relatively more advanced countries.
Table 2.9 reflects the flying geese pattern in
its comparison of the evolution over the past four
decades of world market shares in clothing and
total manufactures of some major developed coun-
tries and developing Asian economies. Japan￿s
market share of clothing exports consistently de-
clined while those of the Republic of Korea and
Taiwan Province of China first rose and then fell,
giving way to China and other countries, includ-
ing Viet Nam. The table also shows that the fall in
world market shares of clothing exports from the
Republic of Korea and, less markedly, from Tai-
wan Province of China was initially accompanied
by a rise in these economies￿ world market shares
of other manufactured exports.
It is clear that, apart from shifts in relative
unit labour costs, access conditions in the mar-
kets of the United States and the EU have shaped
the relocation of production activities in the tex-
tiles and clothing industry across East Asian coun-
tries. Indeed, the rapid growth of textiles and
clothing exports first from Japan and then from
the Republic of Korea, as well as a number of other
Asian developing economies, stirred protectionist
sentiments in North America and Western Europe.
In 1956 the Japanese Government imposed so-
called ￿voluntary export restraints￿ (VERs) on
cotton products to the United States for the first
time in the post-war period. Subsequently, exports
of cotton textiles from Japan and other major Asian
economies, such as Hong Kong (China), India,
Pakistan, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Prov-
ince of China encountered discriminatory quantita-
tive restrictions under the Short-term and Long-term
Arrangements on Cotton Textiles. Japan and the
three East Asian economies responded to these
external pressures by shifting their production of
textile materials from cotton to synthetic fibres.
However, the new VER arrangements for wool and
man-made fibre products between the above four
Asian exporters and the United States, which were
concluded in 1971￿1972, paved the way, in 1974,
for the Arrangement on International Trade in
Textiles, better known as the Multi-Fibre Arrange-
ment (MFA). The MFA formally governed quan-
titative restrictions on trade in textiles and clothing
until 1994, when it was succeeded by the Uru-
guay Round Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
(ATC) (UNCTAD, 1994a, chap. V). With the full
implementation of the ATC at the beginning of
2005, all textile and clothing products became
subject to all the multilateral disciplines under the
rules of the WTO. This terminated the series of
trade-distorting regimes that had governed the tex-
tiles and clothing trade for about four decades and
put an end to its status as the only sector of inter-T
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SHARES IN WORLD EXPORTS OF MANUFACTURES
a OF SELECTED ASIAN DEVELOPING ECONOMIES AND
MAJOR DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, 1962￿2003
(Percentage)
Taiwan Province
United Statesb United Kingdom Germanyc Japan Republic of Korea of China China
Total Total Total Total Total Total Total
manu- manu- manu- manu- manu- manu- manu-
Period factures Clothing factures Clothing factures Clothing factures Clothing factures Clothing factures Clothing factures Clothing
1962￿1965 19.2 5.5 12.2 6.0 18.2 7.9 7.1 11.7 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.5 .. ..
1966￿1970 17.2 5.1 9.6 5.1 18.3 7.7 9.1 9.6 0.2 2.5 0.4 2.1 .. ..
1971￿1975 14.4 3.1 7.8 4.3 19.3 8.0 11.1 4.1 0.7 6.5 0.8 5.6 .. ..
1976￿1980 13.8 3.4 7.6 5.2 17.8 8.7 12.2 1.9 1.5 10.1 .. .. .. ..
1981￿1985 14.5 2.9 6.3 4.1 14.8 7.3 14.9 1.8 2.3 11.2 .. .. 0.9 5.5
1986￿1990 11.9 2.3 6.1 3.0 15.5 6.9 13.5 0.9 2.7 9.9 2.8 4.4 1.5 7.8
1991￿1995 13.1 3.5 5.4 2.7 13.2 5.4 12.2 0.5 2.9 4.7 2.9 2.9 2.9 13.7
1996￿2000 13.3 4.6 5.3 2.5 10.8 4.2 9.4 0.3 3.0 2.6 2.8 1.8 3.9 16.5
2001￿2003 12.0 3.0 5.1 1.9 11.1 4.1 8.1 0.3 3.1 2.0 2.6 1.2 6.2 20.8
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on UN COMTRADE.
a SITC 5￿8 less 68.
b Including Puerto Rico for 1962￿1980.
c Including eastern L￿nder after 1991.Income Growth and Shifting Trade Patterns in Asia 79
national trade in industrial goods that had re-
mained outside multilateral rules since the con-
clusion of the Uruguay Round.
While there are many similarities in the suc-
cessive rise and fall of production and export ac-
tivities in textiles and clothing
across East Asia, there is also
one major distinction between
these cycles. When Japan
emerged as a major textile and
clothing exporter during the
first three decades of the twen-
tieth century, it did not face
much competition from any
other newly emerging major
clothing exporters. By con-
trast, the rapid growth of tex-
tile and clothing exports in the second wave of
Asian economic catch-up occurred among the en-
tire group of NIEs, giving rise to fears that the
risk of a fallacy of composition could arise if an
increasing number of developing countries were
trying to achieve the same export￿GDP ratio
(Cline, 1982). According to the fallacy of compo-
sition (sometimes also called the ￿adding-up prob-
lem￿), what is viable for one small exporter act-
ing in isolation may not be viable for a group of
exporters acting at the same time. If all, in par-
ticular large, developing countries try to substan-
tially increase their exports of labour-intensive
manufactures, they risk not
only encountering rising pro-
tective resistance from devel-
oped countries, but also losses,
as the falling prices of those
manufactures will not be com-
pensated by a sufficient in-
crease in the volume of ex-
ports (TDR 2002; see also Kap-
linsky, 2004). Indeed, the rise
of China￿s clothing exports oc-
curred at a time when several developing coun-
tries had adopted more outward-oriented devel-
opment strategies, and many had developed pro-
duction and export activities in the clothing sec-
tor partly as a reaction to the quota regulations
under the MFA. This simultaneous move of many
developing countries towards clothing exports,
combined with the large size of the Chinese econo-
my, may have accentuated the risk of a fallacy of
composition.
Indeed, evidence from United States apparel
imports suggests a positive relation between the
rise in China￿s market share and the decline in
import unit values (table 2.10). The rise of China￿s
share in United States imports between 2001 and
2004, by about 50 per cent in value terms, corre-
sponds to a more than dou-
bling of its market share in
volume terms, as the unit value
of China￿s imports fell by more
than one third during this pe-
riod. However, from the Greater
China area (comprising main-
land China, Hong Kong (China),
Macao (China), and Taiwan
Province of China), these im-
ports increased much more
modestly, by about 20 per cent
in value and 45 per cent in volume. This implies
that the unit value of imports from the Greater
China area declined only by about one fifth. Part
of the rise in mainland China￿s market share was
due to a shift towards direct exports (i.e. bypass-
ing middlemen in Hong Kong (China), Macao
(China) and Taiwan Province of China).
The middlemen factor aside, there has clearly
been a genuine growth of exports from China to
the United States. Yeung and Mok (2004) note that
in 1998 the Chinese Government implemented a
restructuring, downsizing and efficiency policy
leading to the closing down of
a number of firms and to fierce
competition among Chinese
producers for export market
shares. These factors com-
bined may have enabled some
Chinese firms to export a larger
share of their output at lower
prices. The surge in China￿s
clothing exports may even have
led to a glut in the United States
market as indicated by the decline, albeit small,
in the unit value of United States imports from
the rest of the world between 1998 and 2002.31
This evidence indicates that China￿s increas-
ing participation in international trade, and its
consequent weight in international markets due to
the very large size of its economy, could contribute
to a decline in the unit values of some of its cur-
rently major export items. However, it is not clear
Exploiting its current export
market potential in textiles
and clothing may not be in
China￿s own development
interest.
China￿s increasing
participation in international
trade could contribute to a
decline in the unit values of
some of its major export
items.Trade and Development Report, 2005 80
Table 2.10
UNITED STATES APPAREL IMPORTS FROM SELECTED SOURCES,
MARKET SHARES AND UNIT VALUES, 1995￿2005
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005a
Value-based market shares (per cent)
Greater China area 30.3 28.5 26.7 24.6 22.9 21.3 20.8 21.4 22.6 24.3 27.6
Mainland of China 10.2 10.4 10.5 8.9 8.6 7.9 8.2 9.8 11.9 13.8 21.2
Hong Kong, China 12.1 10.6 9.2 9.2 8.4 7.8 7.5 6.8 6.1 5.9 3.5
Macao, China 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.2 1.4
Taiwan Province of China 5.9 5.4 4.8 4.4 3.9 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.6 2.4 1.6
Other Asia
Bangladesh 3.1 3.1 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.7 3.7 3.3 3.0 3.1 3.3
India 3.2 3.3 3.1 3.1 3.0 3.1 3.0 3.3 3.3 3.4 5.0
Indonesia 3.4 3.6 3.7 3.4 3.3 3.6 3.9 3.6 3.5 3.7 4.2
Pakistan 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.7 1.8 1.7
Republic of Korea 4.7 3.8 3.5 3.9 4.1 4.0 3.9 3.6 3.0 2.8 1.7
Viet Nam 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 1.6 3.9 4.0 3.6
Sub-Saharan Africa
Kenya 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4
Lesotho 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.6
Mauritius 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3
Mexico 7.4 9.8 11.8 13.5 14.8 14.7 13.8 13.0 11.3 10.3 9.5
Volume-based market shares (per cent)
Greater China area 26.3 24.3 21.6 20.2 18.4 17.3 17.2 19.0 21.4 23.7 29.0
Mainland of China 9.3 8.9 8.3 7.1 6.5 5.8 6.1 9.1 12.1 14.9 24.4
Hong Kong, China 8.9 7.9 6.5 6.7 6.0 5.7 5.7 4.8 4.2 3.7 1.9
Macao, China 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 2.0 2.2 1.1
Taiwan Province of China 6.5 5.9 5.2 4.8 4.5 4.2 3.8 3.3 3.1 2.9 1.6
Other Asia
Bangladesh 5.6 5.5 5.9 5.8 5.5 6.0 6.0 5.4 4.8 4.7 5.0
India 2.8 3.1 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.5 2.5 2.9 2.8 3.1 4.2
Indonesia 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.4 3.1 3.3 3.7 3.4 3.3 3.5 4.0
Pakistan 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.6
Republic of Korea 3.7 3.0 2.8 3.6 3.8 3.7 3.9 3.8 3.1 3.1 1.5
Viet Nam 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 1.8 3.9 3.9 3.4
Sub-Saharan Africa
Kenya 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4
Lesotho 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.5
Mauritius 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2
Mexico 8.4 11.4 13.7 15.4 16.4 15.8 14.2 12.5 10.5 9.5 8.6
Unit values ($ per square metre)
Greater China area
Mainland of China 4.1 4.4 4.7 4.7 4.8 4.8 4.7 3.6 3.2 3.0 2.7
Hong Kong, China 5.1 5.1 5.3 5.1 5.1 4.9 4.6 4.7 4.7 5.2 5.5
Macao, China 4.9 4.9 5.3 4.9 4.9 4.5 4.2 3.6 3.4 3.2 4.0
Taiwan Province of China 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.4 3.1 3.1 2.9 2.7 2.7 2.7 3.1
Other Asia
Bangladesh 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.0
India 4.3 3.9 4.3 4.2 4.1 4.5 4.3 3.7 3.8 3.6 3.7
Indonesia 3.8 4.0 4.1 3.8 3.8 3.9 3.7 3.4 3.5 3.4 3.3
Pakistan 3.6 3.5 3.2 3.1 3.1 2.8 2.7 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.0
Republic of Korea 4.7 4.8 4.7 4.1 3.9 3.9 3.5 3.2 3.1 2.9 3.5
Viet Nam 1.3 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.7 2.8 3.2 3.3 3.3
Sub-Saharan Africa
Kenya 2.6 2.6 3.0 3.3 3.1 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.6 3.8 3.5
Lesotho 3.6 4.3 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.1 4.2 3.8 3.8 4.1 3.9
Mauritius 4.1 4.8 5.4 6.3 6.0 6.2 5.8 5.4 6.0 6.1 5.6
Mexico 3.3 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.5 3.4
Memo item:
World, excluding China 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.2
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on data from United States Department of Commerce, Office of Textiles and
Apparel (OTEXA).
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whether, as some contend, there is likely to be a
further strong rise in China￿s share in world cloth-
ing exports.
Indeed, it is not clear whether fully exploit-
ing its current export market potential in textiles
and clothing is in China￿s own developmental in-
terest. Figure 2.4 above indicates that China￿s
comparative advantage is not in low-skill, labour-
intensive production, such as clothing, but in
manufacturing sectors with a higher skill content.
Important clothing exporters from South Asia
(such as India) have an unu-
sual combination of relatively
low levels of skill per worker
and land per worker that gives
them a strong comparative ad-
vantage in labour-intensive
manufactures, which use little
of either skill or land per unit
of labour. Moreover, since there
has been hardly any change in
the relative endowment posi-
tions of the various country
groups, there is little reason to anticipate a large
move of South Asian countries away from, and of
China towards, a comparative advantage in labour-
intensive manufactures. Instead, rising incomes in
China are likely to be associated with higher wages
for low-skilled workers so that the share of skill-
intensive items in China￿s manufactured exports
is likely to increase. Indeed there are indications
of rising wages in China￿s coastal provinces. This
is partly because of the growing reluctance of
workers to migrate to coastal provinces to work
in export-oriented production, and partly due to
the effects of previously strict family planning
policies, which have resulted in fewer entrants to
the labour market. Consequently, exporting firms
in the coastal areas are finding it increasingly dif-
ficult to recruit workers unless they offer higher
wage incentives (Financial Times, 5 July and
3 November 2004).
The fact that in China most labour-intensive
activities have been heavily concentrated in the
coastal areas raises the question as to whether in
the years to come a similar relocation pattern will
occur across the different prov-
inces within China (as well as
moving further afield to, for
example, Viet Nam). This could
facilitate the upgrading of
clothing exports of the coastal
provinces towards higher value-
added products, for which short
turnover periods and speed to
market play a more important
role in export competitiveness.
Moreover, the relocation of
labour-intensive production to the Chinese hin-
terland could make a valuable contribution to em-
ployment creation and poverty alleviation, while
also serving as a supply base for pent-up domes-
tic demand. But for the country as a whole, a gen-
eral upgrading of its export basket towards more
skill-intensive manufactures is likely to facilitate
the financing of its growing imports of primary
commodities, required to sustain the country￿s con-
tinued economic catch-up and industrialization proc-
ess. As discussed above, such a process seems to
be already under way in the electronics sector.
Relocation of labour-
intensive production to the
Chinese hinterland could
contribute to employment
creation and poverty
alleviation.Trade and Development Report, 2005 82
1 Rising incomes and industrialization also boost the
demand for capital equipment and intermediate pro-
duction inputs. But the higher demand for these lat-
ter goods is usually met by imports, as discussed in
section C.
2 In Japan, per capita calorie intake increased only
slowly after the Second World War ￿ given the al-
ready high level of per capita income ￿ and peaked
around 1970￿1975. By contrast, the shift in the com-
position of food consumption continued, with a ris-
ing share of household expenditure on animal prod-
ucts, mainly marine fish and, more recently, meat,
dairy products and products with a high sugar con-
tent. The Republic of Korea experienced a similar
change in dietary structure, but with a time lag of
about 20 years. While at the end of the 1960s cere-
als still accounted for more than half of total calorie
intake in the Republic of Korea, their share fell to
less than 30 per cent by the mid-1990s. At the same
time, the intake of animal products increased sig-
nificantly: meat and poultry consumption, for ex-
ample, increased tenfold between 1969 and 1995
(Popkin, 1993; and Kim, Moon and Popkin, 2000).
3 All data from FAOSTAT.
4 Rosegrant et al. (2001: 75) project that between 1997
and 2020 the increase in per capita calorie intake in
China will be only about two thirds that in India.
5 Data are from the World Bureau of Metal Statistics,
various; World Bank, 2004a; International Iron and
Steel Institute, 2004; International Copper Study
Group, 2004; and World Bank, World Development
Indicators online database: http://publications.
worldbank.org/WDI/.
6 Figure 2.1 also shows that the intensity of metal use
in the Republic of Korea increased throughout the
period 1960￿2003, even though the pace of growth
slowed down considerably over the past decade,
particularly for aluminium and copper. This indi-
cates that the Republic of Korea is approaching the
peak of its intensity-of-use curve. The intensity of
metal use in both Japan and the United States has
declined over the past two decades, as anticipated
by the intensity-of-use hypothesis for mature, in-
dustrialized economies.
7 While the studies generally agree that gains in en-
ergy efficiency are the key determinant, their find-
ings differ as to the relative importance of struc-
tural change. The importance given to structural
change is higher in studies that employ firm-level,
rather than sectorally aggregated, data.
8 While there is clearly no one-to-one relationship be-
tween the size of a country￿s territory and the eco-
nomic value of its natural resources, technological
progress has increasingly narrowed the differences
in the relative economic values of different sorts of
land. For example, Diamond (1997) points out that
North Americans could realize the agricultural po-
tential of the western prairies only once they had
steel ploughs and draft animals; and it required
modern geologic prospecting technology for the
pastoralists in the Middle East to discover the fuel
resources under their sand.
9 While comparative advantage for broad product cat-
egories largely depends on differences in the rela-
tive abundance of factor endowments, comparative
advantage at a less aggregate level is heavily influ-
enced by industry-specific changes in relative lev-
els of unit labour costs. These changes can be the
result of uneven productivity growth across indus-
tries combined with more even growth in wage rates
and, more generally, of changes in the nominal ex-
change rate (TDR 2004).
10 One advantage of this formulation is that, contrary
to some other variants of the Heckscher-Ohlin trade
theory, it requires a much weaker and more plausi-
ble assumption of efficiency and factor-price equali-
zation, namely, that in all countries the ranking of
goods in terms of resource input combinations is
similar ￿ for example, that the land￿labour input
ratio in agriculture is always higher than in manu-
facturing and that the skill￿labour input ratio in
manufacturing is always higher than in agriculture.
11 It is clear that there is a variation, sometimes wide,
in terms of both the land￿labour ratio and, less so,
the skill￿labour ratio, among the countries within
all the country groups; nonetheless, regional aver-
ages provide a useful broad-brush starting point for
further analysis.
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12 Data from UNESCO Institute of Statistics, Statisti-
cal tables online: http://www.uis.unesco.org/;
UNESCO, 2003; and OECD, 2003.
13 Rodrik and Subramanian (2004: 19) argue that the
reforms of the 1980s ￿were not pro-liberalization
but pro-business in the important sense that they
served to boost the profits of existing businesses
without threatening them with real competition￿,
and that this attitude change of the Government and
the associated pro-business policy changes, imple-
mented in a very haphazard and gradual manner,
elicited a large productivity response, particularly
in manufacturing. This was followed by a sustained
rise in exports from 1987 onwards. Panagariya
(2004: 29) argues that the policy changes in the
1980s were deeper than is generally appreciated, and
that they can be characterized as ￿liberalization￿.
He notes that, given their ad hoc and quiet imple-
mentation, they were often described as ￿liberaliza-
tion by stealth￿, while the reforms in the 1990s were
systematic and systemic. Panagariya (2004: 15) also
mentions the importance of export incentives dur-
ing the rapid export expansion of the late 1980s.
These incentives resembled the measures taken ear-
lier in the Republic of Korea to animate a profit￿
investment and an investment￿export nexus; they
included income tax deductions for business prof-
its from exports, subsidization of interest rates on
export credit, and facilitation of imports of capital
goods in selected export industries. By contrast, the
standard policy-oriented account of India￿s integra-
tion process (e.g. Ahluwalia, 2002) emphasizes the
adoption of far-reaching reforms in the 1990s and
argues that India embarked on the economic reform
and trade liberalization process in earnest only fol-
lowing its balance-of-payments crisis in 1991.
14 The data refer to trade excluding trade among the
member States of the EU. All data are from WTO,
2005b.
15 Anderson (2003: 12￿13) estimates that China￿s food,
feed and fibre self-sufficiency will be only slightly
reduced by reforms associated with WTO accession,
and that additional net food imports will represent
only one per cent of total imports by 2007.
16 For a further discussion of these categories, see TDR
2002, chap. III.
17 The quota regulations of the Multi-Fibre Arrange-
ment (MFA) have also played an important role, as
discussed below.
18 Comprehensive product-specific import data for
China are available only from 1987, so that the evo-
lution of China￿s imports during its first 15 years of
economic catch-up and greater trade integration is
not reflected in the table.
19 While the fallout from the Asian crisis certainly
played a role in the observed decline of imports in
the Republic of Korea, it is more likely to have ac-
celerated than provoked the decline.
20 According to Ernst (2004), chips designed by for-
eign or domestic companies in China are eligible
for a 14 per cent rebate on the nominal 17 per cent
value-added tax on sales of imported or domesti-
cally produced chips.
21 These price ceilings were introduced mainly to guar-
antee widespread access to medicines, in spite of
the virtual absence of health insurance coverage.
22 The Act does not include a clear definition of what
￿significant investment￿ and a ￿reasonable royalty￿
actually are.
23 The relevant decision of the WTO is contained in
document WT/L/540 of 2 September 2003. This de-
cision introduced a waiver of the TRIPS Agreement
with respect to the granting by an exporting Mem-
ber of a compulsory licence.
24 Commodity prices are measured by a dollar-denomi-
nated index and deflated by a dollar-denominated
price index, while demand in countries other than
the United States depends on the price of commodi-
ties relative to output prices in those countries.
25 For further detail see International Rubber Study
Group and Economic Social Institute (2003); and
ITTO (2003).
26 According to Burghardt (2005), for example, specu-
lative trading on commodity exchanges increased
substantially in 2004: the volume of global futures
and options in agricultural commodities increased
by nearly 5 per cent, while the growth in the vol-
ume of trading was close to 12 per cent for energy
products and 16.4 per cent for non-precious metals.
27 More precisely, worldwide non-ferrous metal ex-
ploration budgets had fallen at an average annual
rate of 17 per cent between 1997 and 2002, before
strongly bouncing back in 2003 and 2004. More-
over, the last quarter of 2004 was the seventh con-
secutive quarter that showed an increase in planned
mining investment, with a pipeline of projects
amounting to $122 billion (Metals Economics Group
(2005); and Raw Materials Group, Sweden, quoted
in the Mining Journal, London, 4 February 2005:
18￿19).
28 Barton Suchomel, WMC Resources, quoted in Min-
ing Journal, London, 22 April 2005: 2.
29 For instance, in response to the rising Chinese de-
mand for soybean imports and higher soybean prices
in 2002 and 2003, soybean growers in the United
States and major Latin American producing coun-
tries rapidly increased their soybean production. In
the 2002/03 season, soybean production increased
by 19.5 per cent in Brazil, 18.3 per cent in Argen-
tina and 26.8 per cent in Paraguay (United States
Department of Agriculture, 2005).
30 Data for 2004 from China￿s Customs Statistics, 2004,
12, Series No. 184.
31 For detailed evidence and discussion, see Mayer,
2004.Evolution in the Terms of Trade and its Impact on Developing Countries 85
Price movements of internationally traded
goods, as well as changes in the volume and prod-
uct composition of trade, affect the gains an
individual country can reap from international
trade. These gains are traditionally measured by
the terms of trade (the evolution of a country￿s
export prices relative to its import prices) and the
purchasing power of its exports (defined as the
export value deflated by import prices). The im-
pact of price movements in global markets for
primary commodities and manufactures on both
these measures is determined, in the short term,
by the composition of a country￿s imports and
exports, and, in the medium term, by its flexibil-
ity in being able to adapt the composition of its
exports and imports to changing international de-
mand and supply conditions. Clearly, the impact
of a change in the terms of trade on an economy
increases with the relative importance of external
trade in its GDP.
The significance of the terms-of-trade con-
cept has long been recognized in the context of
international trade theory (Benham, 1940). Origi-
nally, the discussion of the terms-of-trade problem
of developing countries focused on movements in
the prices of primary commodities relative to those
of manufactures. The works of Prebisch (1950,
1952) and Singer (1950) triggered broader debate
on this issue. This was supported by empirical
research underlying what came to be known as
the Prebisch-Singer thesis of a secular decline in
the terms of trade of internationally traded primary
commodities vis-￿-vis manufactures. Subsequent
studies also found support for this thesis for a
number of commodities (see Bleaney, 1993;
Akiyama and Larson, 1994; World Bank, 1996: 55;
TDR 1993: 98￿102; Ocampo and Parra, 2003; and
UNCTAD, 2003a: 13￿19).
Today, a large number of developing coun-
tries, particularly in Africa, are still highly depend-
ent on exports of primary commodities, and their
terms of trade continue to be closely correlated
with the terms of trade of primary commodities
vis-￿-vis manufactures (UNCTAD, 2003a). But it
Chapter III
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is also true that the share of primary products in
the merchandise exports of some developing coun-
tries, particularly the successful late industrial-
izers, has been diminishing in favour of manufac-
tures. These countries have become suppliers of
manufactured goods not only to developed coun-
tries but also to other devel-
oping countries. Against this
background, the evolution of
the prices of manufactures ex-
ported by developing coun-
tries relative to those exported
by developed countries has re-
ceived increasing attention.
Moreover, in the process of
their industrialization the ex-
porters of manufactures among
the developing countries have also gained in im-
portance as importers of primary commodities
from other developing countries, to such an ex-
tent that their increasing demand has been a deci-
sive factor in the recent price hikes of a number
of internationally traded primary commodities.
This has even led to expectations that the long-
term downward trend in the terms of trade of com-
modity prices could be reversed.
The objective of this chapter is to show how
recent developments in the world economy, in
particular changes in the direction and product
composition of world trade resulting from rapid
growth in the large Asian economies, have affected
the terms of trade of different groups of develop-
ing countries, and the growth of their national
income. The chapter first revisits the terms-of-
trade concept in the context of
the declining importance of
primary commodities in the
total exports of an increasing
number of developing coun-
tries. It then analyses recent
developments in terms of trade
resulting from changing inter-
national supply-and-demand
patterns, where some develop-
ing countries have become
important drivers of the global economy at a time
when demand in major developed countries has
been insufficient to stimulate worldwide growth.
Section D looks at the effects of terms-of-trade
changes on real domestic income in countries with
different export structures and different degrees
of openness to international trade; section E takes
up the issue of how income gains or losses are
shared between the national economy and foreign
investors. The final section addresses a specific
issue in this context: the sharing of rents from oil
and mining activities.
Increasing demand from
developing countries has
been decisive in the recent
price hikes of primary
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In the terms-of-trade debate of the early
1950s, the observed downward trend in the prices
of primary commodities relative to those of manu-
factures (and, consequently, the terms of trade of
developing countries vis-￿-vis developed coun-
tries) was attributed to the different modes of price
formation in the markets for primary commodi-
ties and those for manufactures. As a result of these
differences, productivity gains in the production
of food and raw materials in developing countries
translated into lower prices (increasing the real
income of consumers) rather than into higher re-
muneration for local factors of production. This
was because surplus labour in the producing coun-
tries exerted a downward pressure on wages. By
contrast, technical progress in manufacturing in-
dustries in the industrialized countries led to a rise
in wages and profits (Singer, 1950: 311) as a result
of a higher degree of organization of labour and
the practice of mark-up pricing.
This widening gap between the prices of
manufactures and primary commodities was also
attributed to the fact that the income elasticity of
demand for food is less than unity, and that tech-
nical progress in manufacturing tends to reduce
the amount of raw materials used per unit of out-
put (Singer, 1950: 312). This tendency was further
strengthened by the protection of domestic pri-
mary production in the industrialized countries.
On the other hand, faster growth in developing
countries depends to a large extent on imports
of manufactures, mainly capital goods, for the
creation or expansion of industrial capacity and
infrastructure. Simultaneous attempts by an in-
creasing number of developing countries with
similar natural-resource endowments to boost pri-
mary exports to finance such imports added to the
downward pressure on commodity prices (TDR
2002, chap. IV).
A strategic consequence of these observed
trends was that developing countries had to aim
at changing their position in the international di-
vision of labour by accelerating their pace of
industrialization. Indeed, over the past five dec-
ades, progress with industrialization in a number
of developing countries, and their increasing par-
ticipation in trade in manufactures, has added new
dimensions to the problem. Thus, while the issue
of prices of primary commodities vis-￿-vis those
of manufactured goods continues to be as relevant
as ever for many developing countries whose ex-
port earnings still depend on a very limited number
of primary commodities, developing countries as
a group can no longer be stereotyped as exporters
of primary commodities and importers of manu-
factures.
Accordingly, increasing attention has been
paid to relative movements in the prices of manu-
factures exported by developing countries vis-￿-
vis those exported by developed countries. Em-
pirical studies conducted so far have generally
found evidence of a decline in developing coun-
tries￿ terms of trade in manufactures since 1975
(TDR 2002: 117￿121), due to more intense global
competition for the specific types of manufactures
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typically produced by developing countries at
early stages of their industrialization (i.e. low-
skill, labour-intensive manufactures). The rapid
export growth of these types of manufactures by
the large Chinese economy and by a number of
other developing countries has intensified com-
petition in the markets for
these goods, thereby exerting
downward pressure on their
prices.
For example, according
to data from the United States
Department of Labor, prices of
electronic products, including
computers and telecommuni-
cations equipment, have been falling worldwide
since the early 1990, as indicated by the decline
in both United States export and import prices
(fig. 3.1). Within this overall trend, the fall in im-
port prices has been stronger than the fall in export
prices in the United States since the mid-1990s,
suggesting that goods in this product category that
are exported from developing countries have been
subject to a sharper decline than goods exported
from the United States that fall into the same broad
product category.
There is also evidence that the export prices
of textiles and clothing (apparel) from developing
countries have followed a declining trend since
the mid-1990s, though less steep than those of
electronic products. Accord-
ing to UNCTAD secretariat es-
timates, prices of apparel ex-
ported from developing coun-
tries to the world market fell
by more than 7 per cent be-
tween 1996/97 and 2002/03.
This trend is also confirmed
by data from the United States
Department of Commerce,
which show a decline in the
unit value of United States
apparel imports from developing countries of more
than 10 per cent between 1995 and 2004 (see chap-
ter II, table 2.10).
The main reasons for the weak prices of
manufactures produced in developing countries
are by and large the same as those that were iden-
tified as causing the decline in the terms of trade
of primary commodities vis-￿-vis those of manu-
factures: different labour market conditions and
the existence of abundant and unorganized low-
skilled labour. This implies that productivity gains
are to a large extent reflected in lower prices and
that wages in the developing countries tend to be
more flexible than in devel-
oped countries. The downward
pressure on prices resulting
from a simultaneous export
drive by developing countries
in standardized labour-inten-
sive products is also a phe-
nomenon that in the past was
typical of primary commodity
markets. Thus price formation
for low-skilled manufactures resembles that of
primary commodities more than price formation
for manufactures produced in developed countries.
However, there is one major difference: while the
relative decline in the export prices of low-skilled
manufactures has generally been associated with
considerable volume growth, declining export
prices for primary commodities are typically as-
sociated with lower volume growth (and vice
versa), due to the much lower price elasticity of
demand.
Applied to a country￿s external trade, the
concept most widely used since the beginning of
the terms-of-trade debate in the 1950s has been
the ￿net barter terms of trade￿, defined as the ra-
tio between the unit value in-
dex of exports and that of im-
ports (hereinafter referred to
as terms of trade, tout court).
Obviously, this only captures
one of the factors determining
a country￿s gains (or losses)
from trade, while neglecting
changes in the volume of ex-
ports that may accompany, and
in some cases even cause, the
observed changes in export
prices. In order to assess a country￿s capacity to
import essential goods for its development, it is
more meaningful to look at the ￿income terms of
trade￿, also known as the purchasing power of
exports. This is defined as the value index of ex-
ports deflated by the unit value of imports. If the
fall in a country￿s terms of trade is overcompen-
sated by a rise in the volume of its exports result-
Commodity issues continue
to be as relevant as ever
for many developing
countries ...
... but developing countries
as a group can no longer
be stereotyped as
exporters of primary
commodities and importers
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Figure 3.1
UNITED STATES IMPORT AND EXPORT PRICE INDICES
 FOR SELECTED ELECTRONICS PRODUCTS, 1980￿2004
(Index numbers, 1995 = 100)
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on United States Department of Labor database (www.bls.gov/data/).
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ing from growing international demand or an in-
crease in the country￿s world market share, the
country will register a rise in the purchasing power
of its exports, indicating that it is able to increase
real imports without adverse-
ly affecting its trade balance.
Similarly, if productivity in its
export industries rises fast
enough, a country may obtain
a larger quantity of imports
from the same quantity of fac-
tors embodied in its exports,
even if its terms of trade dete-
riorate.1
The variability of a coun-
try￿s terms of trade is deter-
mined to a large extent by the
share of primary commodities in its exports and
imports. The share of primary commodities (in-
cluding fuels) in total developing-country exports
has plunged, from around 65 per cent in 1980￿
1983, to around 30 per cent in 1999￿2003 (ta-
ble 3.1). This steep fall has been partly due to the
fall in primary commodity prices, especially fu-
els, in the 1980s. But the most significant factor
in the changing export structure has been the rapid
expansion in the value of manufactured exports.
By contrast, the product composition of develop-
ing countries￿ imports has not changed signifi-
cantly. As a result, the sectoral composition of
exports is now more similar to that of imports; in
1999￿2003, manufactures accounted for 74 per
cent of the total merchandise imports of all devel-
oping countries taken together and 68 per cent of
their total merchandise exports.
A shift in the structure
of exports towards a greater
share of manufactures occurred
in all developing regions. In
Latin America, manufactures
rose to become the major ex-
port category in the late 1990s,
and in East and South Asia,
where they had already been
the largest category in the
early 1980s, their share rose
further, to reach 85 per cent in 1999￿2003. By
contrast, despite a considerable increase in the ex-
port share of manufactures, primary products still
constitute the majority of exports in Africa (around
75 per cent) and in West Asia (78 per cent), the
bulk of which are still fuels (around 51 per cent
and 72 per cent respectively). Moreover, the in-
crease in the share of manu-
factures has been heavily con-
centrated in a relatively small
number of countries. With the
exception of East and South
Asia, primary commodities
still account for the largest
share of exports in a majority
of developing countries (ta-
ble 3.2).
The shift towards manu-
factures in Latin America main-
ly reflects the rapid growth of
manufactured exports from Mexico and, to a lesser
extent, Brazil. In 2003, these two countries gen-
erated more than 75 per cent of the region￿s manu-
factured exports. In Mexico, 55 per cent of such
exports in 2004 were generated by maquila in-
dustries which assemble imported inputs (INEGI,
2005). Several smaller Central American and Car-
ibbean countries, which formerly specialized in
food and beverages, have also become exporters
of manufactures, owing largely to the expansion
of their maquila plants. However, most South
American countries still export mainly primary
products: predominantly food in Argentina, Para-
guay and Uruguay; ores and metals in Chile and
Peru; and fuels in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and
Venezuela.
Similarly, in Africa and West Asia only a
small number of countries account for the increase
in the share of manufactures in
total exports. Manufactured
exports have expanded rapidly
in Morocco, Tunisia and South
Africa; they have also gained
a relatively high share of the
total exports of some sub-
Saharan countries, such as
Lesotho, Mauritius, Senegal
and Swaziland. In West Asia,
where the trade structure is
largely dominated by fuel exports, Turkey￿s manu-
factured exports account for over 84 per cent of
the total for the region.
Demand for manufactures
is much more elastic with
respect to prices and
income than demand for
primary commodities.
Export prices of textiles
and clothing from
developing countries have
been declining since the
mid-1990s, though at a
slower rate than those of
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It is also important to note that in the major-
ity of developing countries where the share of
primary commodities in total exports has fallen,
industrial development, and thus manufactured
exports, are concentrated in natural-resource-in-
tensive and low-skill, labour-intensive products.
Only a few of them have a sizeable share of ex-
ports of higher skill and technology-intensive
manufactures.
The increasing share of manufactures in the
total exports of developing countries implies that
they face different global demand dynamics than
in the past. When commodities were their major
exports, developing countries faced inelastic de-
mand, and therefore relative export prices were
the main determinant of real export earnings, as
export volumes could not increase significantly
given the slow growth of aggregate demand. Since
demand for manufactures is much more elastic
with respect to prices and income, this situation
has changed, and export volumes respond more
strongly to price changes.
Table 3.2
DISTRIBUTION OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES BY
THEIR DOMINANT EXPORT CATEGORY,a 2003
(Number of countries)
Non-fuel
primary Manu-
Fuels commoditiesb facturesb Total
Africa 9 30 9 48
Latin Americac 31 1 62 0
Caribbeand 286 1 6
East and South Asia 1 2 16 19
West Asia 10 0 3 13
T o t a l 2 55 24 1 1 1 8
Source: See table 3.1.
a Dominant signifies more than 50 per cent of total
exports.
b For definitions see table 3.1.
c Including Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Haiti.
d Including Belize, Guyana and Suriname.
Table 3.1
EXPORT STRUCTURE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, BY REGION
AND BY BROAD PRODUCT CATEGORY, 1980￿2003
(Per cent share in total exports)
Non-fuel primary
Fuels   commoditiesa Manufacturesb Otherc
1980￿ 1989￿ 1999￿ 1980￿ 1989￿ 1999￿ 1980￿ 1989￿ 1999￿ 1980￿ 1989￿ 1999￿
1983 1992 2003 1983 1992 2003 1983 1992 2003 1983 1992 2003
Developing countries 38.8 22.5 18.0 26.0 19.7 12.7 31.4 55.7 68.1 3.9 2.2 1.2
Latin America and
the Caribbean 23.3 22.6 16.2 42.9 40.7 25.7 32.6 35.9 56.6 1.3 0.9 1.5
Africa 40.8 47.9 50.6 32.7 24.9 24.0 12.7 15.7 23.0 13.8 11.5 2.4
West Asia 70.0 73.4 72.2 11.5 8.6 6.1 16.8 17.7 21.0 1.7 0.2 0.6
East and South Asia 18.5 7.2 4.9 24.3 15.1 9.1 54.9 76.5 84.8 2.3 1.2 1.1
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on UN COMTRADE.
a SITC Rev. 2: 0 to 4 plus 68, 661 and 667 less 3.
b SITC Rev. 2: 5 to 8 less 68, 661 and 667.
c SITC Rev. 2: 9.Trade and Development Report, 2005 92
Trends in the terms of trade of the different
developing regions and countries vary, depend-
ing on the composition of their exports and
imports; and over the past few decades, these
trends have increasingly diverged across differ-
ent groups of developing countries. Since the early
1980s, all developing countries taken together
have been experiencing a downward trend in their
net barter terms of trade (fig. 3.2). The deteriora-
tion of about 15 per cent was accompanied by a
rise in the volume of exports from the mid-1980s
onwards, but this was mainly on account of a few
economies in East and South Asia. It is only from
the early 1990s onwards that Latin America has
seen faster growth of export volumes, which sup-
ported the purchasing power of exports. In Africa,
export volumes also expanded in the 1990s, but
at a much slower rate.
Since the late 1990s these trends have been
increasingly influenced by the growing impor-
tance of China and India in shaping the structure
of international trade. The same factors that im-
proved the terms of trade of some developing
countries, especially the higher prices of oil, and
mineral and mining products, led to a worsening
of the terms of trade in others. In some countries,
particularly in Latin America, but also in Africa,
the positive effect of price movements on the pur-
chasing power of exports was reinforced by an
increase in export volumes. In others, however,
gains from higher export unit values were offset
by higher import prices. China and India them-
selves have seen their terms of trade deteriorate
since 2002.
In East and South Asia, terms of trade were
stable for more than 15 years before declining in
the aftermath of the financial crisis in 1997. Until
2002 the reduction in the unit value of their ex-
ports (mainly of manufactures) was partly com-
pensated by falling unit values of their imports
(of both manufactures and primary commodities).
But since then import prices of oil, industrial raw
materials and a number of food items have rein-
forced the downward trend in their terms of trade,
which fell by about 15 per cent between 1997 and
2004. Over the same period, there was a dramatic
increase in the export volumes of countries in these
subregions, so that the purchasing power of their
exports almost doubled in a context of falling
terms of trade. This was mainly due to a rapid
growth of their exports to developed countries, as
well as to transition economies and to those de-
veloping countries that have increased their im-
port capacity owing to higher primary commodity
export earnings. Moreover, the rapid expansion
of their exports has occurred at a time of slow
growth in the industrialized countries.
Africa and Latin America saw a dramatic
deterioration in their terms of trade from the be-
ginning of the 1980s until the beginning of the
1990s. Thereafter, there were considerable fluc-
tuations around a slightly increasing trend, which
has been reinforced in the past three years. In Latin
America, the sharp deterioration in the terms of
trade during the 1980s reflects the consequences
of the debt crisis. Many countries in the region
responded to the crisis by seeking to expand their
exports to compensate for the abrupt ending of
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Figure 3.2
TERMS OF TRADE, EXPORT VOLUMES AND PURCHASING POWER OF EXPORTS
IN DEVELOPING ECONOMIES, BY REGION, 1980￿2004
(Index numbers, 1980 = 100)
Source: UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics database.
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capital inflows, and to generate a trade surplus
for debt servicing, but this merely led to a fall in
export prices. But unlike in East Asia in the after-
math of the financial crisis in the late 1990s, the
fall in the dollar prices of exports was not accom-
panied by a commensurate increase in the volume
of exports, which consisted of a much larger pro-
portion of primary commodities. Moreover, the
export push in Latin America coincided with a
slowdown of growth in the major industrialized
countries and a stagnation of global demand. The
decline in Latin America￿s
terms of trade bottomed out
only by the beginning of the
1990s when the purchasing
power of exports from the re-
gion also picked up. During
the second half of the 1990s,
the purchasing power of ex-
ports in Latin America rose
almost at the same rate as that
of East and South Asia, sup-
ported by both an acceleration of export volume
growth and more favourable export and import
unit values. Since then, many Latin American
countries have benefited from a much higher share
of manufactures in their exports than in the 1980s
(see TDR 2003, table 5.8.).
In Africa, where much less progress was
made in export diversification, the terms of trade
were more unstable during the 1990s than in other
regions, and export volume growth was very mod-
est. As a consequence, the purchasing power of
Africa￿s exports recovered to its level of 1980 only
in 1996, where it remained until the end of the
decade. Since 2000 Africa￿s terms of trade have
risen more than those of the other regions as a
result of higher demand from the fast growing
Asian developing countries for certain primary
commodities. Between 1999 and 2004, changes
in the international prices of these commodities
have resulted in an improvement of about 30 per
cent in Africa￿s terms of trade, compared to some
8 per cent for Latin America, and a decline of
11 per cent for East and South Asia. In parallel,
export volumes in Africa have grown at a pace
not seen since the late 1960s. Yet, since the dif-
ference between Africa and Latin America in the
recent evolution of the terms of trade is partly
explained by the higher share of primary com-
modities and the lower degree of diversification
of African countries￿ export structures, the region
remains more vulnerable than any other region to
a deceleration of global demand. Thus, the recent
positive evolution in Africa￿s terms of trade might
well be just another temporary boom rather than
the beginning of a sustained recovery.
A broad picture of how groups of develop-
ing countries with different trade structures have
been affected by terms-of-trade movements over
the past few years is given in figure 3.3. It shows
the terms-of-trade movements
of 40 developing economies,
classified in five groups ac-
cording to the major product
category in their exports: oil,
minerals and mining products,
agricultural products, or manu-
factures. For some exporters of
manufactures the classifica-
tion is not straightforward, be-
cause their terms of trade con-
tinue to be highly sensitive to changes in the prices
of the remaining primary commodities in their
export basket, either because the share of the lat-
ter is still relatively high or because their prices
are characterized by a particularly high variabil-
ity (or a combination of both). For the purpose of
this analysis such countries have been classified
as ￿exporters of manufactures and primary com-
modities￿.
Since 2002, economies with a high share of
oil, and minerals and mining products in their to-
tal merchandise exports have gained the most from
recent developments in international product mar-
kets. According to preliminary estimates, the terms
of trade of countries with a dominant share of
fuels in their exports increased by 30 per cent be-
tween 2002￿2004, and those of countries with a
dominant share of mineral and mining exports in-
creased by about 15 per cent.
The stronger improvement in the terms of
trade of oil exporters is due not only to the sharp
increase in international oil prices, but also to
the fact that oil exporters have, on average, a less
diversified export structure than exporters of
minerals and mining products. Moreover, the com-
position of the latter product category is less
homogeneous, and the different products in that
category display large differences in price trends
In East and South Asia,
the decline in the terms of
trade has been accompa-
nied by a dramatic increase
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(see chapter II, table 2.8). For these reasons there
is also greater diversity among the countries within
the group of exporters of mineral and mining prod-
ucts.
Among the countries with a dominant share
of exports of minerals and mining products, ex-
porters of uranium (Niger) and copper (Chile, Peru
and Zambia) saw the strongest improvements
in their terms of trade. Gold exporters (such as
Kyrgyzstan) also experienced significant, al-
though more gradual, improvements between 2002
and 2004. For these countries, the positive effect
of the surge in the international prices of copper
and gold exceeded the combined negative effects
of rising oil prices and adverse movements in the
prices of manufactures (see figure 3.4 for a de-
composition of the changes in the terms of trade
of selected countries, including Chile and Peru).
But soaring export prices since 2003 have been
insufficient, in most cases, to fully reverse the
dramatic losses experienced in the 1980s; for some
countries in this group, such as Chile and Peru,
terms of trade in 2004 were still around 50 per
cent lower than in 1980. Jamaica and Mozambique
saw a slight deterioration in their terms of trade
between 2000 and 2004. Both are exporters of
bauxite and aluminium, the prices of which rose
less than those of other mineral and mining prod-
ucts, and both were also negatively affected by
higher import prices and un-
favourable price developments
for the agricultural commodity
components of their exports
(sugar in Jamaica, and sugar,
tobacco and cotton in Mozam-
bique).
Terms-of-trade develop-
ments have varied the most
among economies where agri-
cultural commodities have
dominated their total merchandise exports. This
reflects large differences in the movement of
prices for specific products within this category,
and differences across countries in the share of
other primary commodities in total exports, as well
as differences in the share of oil in their imports.
For cotton exporters, such as Benin and Burkina
Faso, the terms of trade were subject to wide fluc-
tuations around a declining trend during the period
2000￿2004. In Malawi, weakness in the prices of
tobacco and sugar has caused the terms of trade
to decline dramatically every year since 2000,
whereas in Cuba, another exporter of tobacco and
sugar, this effect was largely offset by a sharp rise
in the price of its nickel exports (see chapter II,
table 2.8). In some coffee-exporting countries,
such as Burundi, the slight improvement in the
terms of trade in 2003 and 2004 was insufficient
to make good the sharp deterioration of previous
years. By contrast, in C￿te d￿Ivoire, the world￿s
leading cocoa exporter, the terms of trade rose by
more than 20 per cent between 2000 and 2004,
despite a considerable reversal in 2004. The two
other countries in the group of agricultural export-
ers that witnessed increases in their terms of trade,
Argentina and Uruguay, benefited from higher
prices for soybeans, beef and some cereals. In Ar-
gentina, this trend was strengthened due to the
country being a net exporter of oil and mining
products, although the impact of higher prices of
these product categories was dampened by an in-
crease in import prices of manufactures (fig. 3.4).
On the other hand, all the fuel-importing de-
veloping countries with a dominant share of manu-
factures in their merchandise exports have suffered
from a deterioration in their terms of trade in the
past two or three years. The terms-of-trade losses
for East and South Asian exporters of manufac-
tures in 2003 and 2004 ranged between 8 per cent
for Taiwan Province of China,
and more than 14 per cent for
India. The losses were largely
due to the heavy dependence
of the countries in this group
on fuel and metal imports, and
to the relative decline in the
prices of their manufactured
exports. For example, the de-
cline in the unit value of their
machinery exports, which in
large part consist of electron-
ics products, was larger than the decline in the
unit value of their imports of the same product
category; while for other manufactures, import
unit values grew faster than export unit values.
The particularly unfavourable terms-of-trade trend
in Pakistan since 2000 reflects an export struc-
ture dominated by labour-intensive clothing prod-
ucts and a higher-than-average share of oil in total
imports. On the other hand, for some exporters of
manufactures, higher prices of their food and bev-
Since 2000, Africa￿s terms
of trade have risen more
than those of the other
regions as a result of
higher demand for certain
primary commodities.Trade and Development Report, 2005 96
Figure 3.3
TERMS OF TRADE OF SELECTED DEVELOPING ECONOMIES,
BY DOMINANT EXPORT CATEGORY, 2000￿2004
(Index numbers, 2000 = 100)
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Figure 3.3 (concluded)
TERMS OF TRADE OF SELECTED DEVELOPING ECONOMIES,
BY DOMINANT EXPORT CATEGORY, 2000￿2004
(Index numbers, 2000 = 100)
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on UN COMTRADE; United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Import/Export Price Indexes database (www.bls.gov/mxp/home.htm); Japan Customs, Trade Statistics
database (www.customs.go.jp); IMF, International Financial Statistics database; and UNCTAD, Commodity Price Bulletin,
various issues.
a Non-weighted average of 70 developing countries, including those presented in this figure.
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Figure 3.4
CONTRIBUTION OF DIFFERENT PRODUCT GROUPS TO TERMS-OF-TRADE CHANGES,
SELECTED DEVELOPING ECONOMIES, 2000￿2004
(Per cent)
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Figure 3.4 (concluded)
CONTRIBUTION OF DIFFERENT PRODUCT GROUPS TO TERMS-OF-TRADE CHANGES,
SELECTED DEVELOPING ECONOMIES, 2000￿2004
(Per cent)
Source: See figure 3.3.
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erage exports alleviated the negative effects of
high prices of fuel and some manufactures. This
applied, for example, to Sri Lanka (tea) and Mo-
rocco (fish, fruits and vegetables).
In general, the combined effect of the lower
prices of low-skill, labour-intensive manufactured
exports and higher prices of imports was less pro-
nounced in the countries classified as ￿exporters
of manufactures and primary commodities￿,
which, while having become
important exporters of manu-
factures, are still relatively
sensitive to fluctuations in the
prices of specific primary com-
modities. This is the case in
particular for some countries
in Latin America (Brazil, Co-
lombia, Costa Rica and
Mexico) and East Asia (Indo-
nesia, Malaysia and Viet
Nam), as well as South Africa.
In many of them, price move-
ments in the different product
categories neutralized each
other in their impact on the terms of trade. In Bra-
zil, for example, recent movements in the prices
of primary commodities and manufactures have
not changed the positive long-term trend in its
terms of trade since the early 1980s. This can be
attributed to the diversification of the country￿s
exports, involving an increase in the share of
manufactures, and to a progressive reduction of
its dependence on oil imports. Since 2003, higher
prices of food exports compensated for the effect
of increasing oil import prices on Brazil￿s terms
of trade (fig. 3.4).
In Malaysia and Mexico, where fuels still
account for 10 and 12 per cent, respectively, of
total merchandise exports, the positive contribu-
tion of higher fuel prices largely compensated for
the negative impact of trade in manufactures on
their terms of trade in 2003 and 2004 (fig. 3.4).
Although manufactures dominate exports in both
countries, they are highly import-intensive and the
lower cost of imported inputs mitigated the nega-
tive impact of the falling prices of their manufac-
tured exports. This is especially true for assem-
bly industries, which import and re-export the
manufactures belonging to the same product group
at different stages of processing; in Mexico they
represent 35 per cent of total imports and 47 per
cent of total exports.
These examples of some economies illustrate
the diversity in the impact of recent international
price movements on the terms of trade of devel-
oping countries. The variations in the global pat-
tern of demand and their impact on individual
countries has led to a redistribution of income,
not only between developing and developed coun-
tries, but also, to an increas-
ing extent, among different
groups of developing coun-
tries. This does not necessar-
ily imply absolute losses in
real income for countries that
have experienced a deteriora-
tion in their terms of trade, as
long as global demand and,
hence, export volumes of all
countries, are expanding. Over
the past few years, most devel-
oping countries have indeed
gained from the expansion of
global demand. However, for
some countries, less buoyant demand or unfavour-
able supply conditions of primary commodities
have affected their export prices; this, combined
with rising prices for fuel and food imports, has
resulted in a severe deterioration in their terms of
trade, which has not been redressed by higher ex-
port volumes.
The expansion of global demand for specific
primary commodities and manufactures over the
past few years has been stimulated mainly by the
fast growth of demand from China and India, in
addition to that of the United States. Europe and
Japan, on the other hand, have contributed little
to that expansion. This geographical pattern is not
without risks, given the imbalances in the world
economy and the possibility that adjustments of
these imbalances could lead to a reduction of glo-
bal demand (see chapter I, section B). Such a re-
duction might occur directly as a result of lower
United States imports, and indirectly as a result
of lower imports from the fast growing exporters
of manufactures among the developing countries,
which themselves depend on exports to the indus-
trialized countries. In such a scenario, the recent
improvements in the terms of trade of many coun-
tries could well be reversed, adding yet another
Increasing supplies of raw
materials, along with efforts
in East and South Asia to
reduce their dependence
on imports of such goods,
could bring the price
increases to a halt, or even
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episode of terms-of-trade volatility to the histori-
cal record.
Another reason for caution in forecasting
terms-of-trade trends is that supply adjustments
in the commodity sector, especially in fuels and
mining, could soon arrest the upward price trend.
They could even reverse the trend if increased
production capacity were to coincide with reces-
sionary tendencies in the world economy as a
result of disorderly adjustments to the current
imbalances. Furthermore, the fast-growing devel-
oping economies of East and South Asia are likely
to reinforce their efforts to reduce their dependence
on raw material imports in response to the rising
prices of such imports, partly through domestically
produced substitutes and partly through reduced
intensity of metal and energy use (see chapter II,
section B.2). Their efforts could also contribute
to a slowdown, or even to a reversal, of price in-
creases of imported raw materials, particularly if
there is a further expansion of supply capacity.
The strength of the impact of terms-of-trade
changes on real national income depends on a
number of factors. First, the income effects de-
pend on whether a change in the terms of trade is
accompanied by, or is even the result of, produc-
tivity growth that enables domestic exporters to
reduce their prices. A second important determi-
nant is the economy￿s open-
ness to international trade.
While terms-of-trade changes
have a relatively minor impact
on income in economies where
exports and imports are small
relative to GDP, even moder-
ate terms-of-trade changes
have a sizeable impact on na-
tional income in very open
economies. Finally, secondary
income effects from changes in the terms of trade
depend on the use of income gains (or the form of
adjustment to income losses), which, in turn, is
influenced by the distribution of the gains or losses
among the domestic private firms, employees, con-
sumers and the State, as well as foreign investors.
D.  Effects of terms-of-trade changes on domestic income
A deterioration in the terms of trade due to
lower export prices associated with, or resulting
from, productivity growth in the exporting indus-
tries, does not mean an absolute loss of real in-
come; yet part of the productivity gains, rather
than accruing to the domestic economy, benefits,
instead, the consumers, traders or producers of the
importing countries. Similarly,
for rapidly growing economies
that face a rise in import prices
resulting, at least in part, from
their own growing demand (as
China and other fast-growing
Asian economies), the conse-
quent deterioration in the terms
of trade needs not lead to a net
loss of real income. For most
of the fast growing exporters
of manufactures that have recently witnessed a de-
terioration in their terms of trade these two ele-
ments were combined. By contrast, suppliers
whose export prices come under pressure but
whose productivity is increasing less than that of
their foreign competitors, tend to lose real income
Developing countries must
not get complacent about
industrialization and
diversification.Trade and Development Report, 2005 102
from exports, either due to lower export volumes
(reducing profits and employment) or lower ex-
port prices (reducing profits and wages).
Table 3.3 shows the exposure of different
groups of countries to changes in the terms of trade
as measured by the absolute difference between
the growth rate of real gross domestic income
(GDI) and that of gross domestic product (GDP).
In the system of national accounts this difference
corresponds to the ￿trading gain or loss resulting
from changes in the terms of trade￿.2 The table
also shows the factors contributing to the size of
that gain or loss: terms-of-trade variability and
openness to international trade. Terms-of-trade
variability is to a large extent conditioned by the
degree of export diversification.
In the period 1996￿2004, the effects on domes-
tic income were the strongest in the oil-exporting
countries, where terms-of-trade variability and
export concentration are the most pronounced, and
where the exports-GDP ratio is relatively high. In
this group of countries, the average annual gain
or loss of income from terms-of-trade movements
amounted to more than 4 per cent of GDP. By
contrast, in countries that export mainly manufac-
tures much lower terms-of-trade variability com-
bined with a similar degree of openness led to an
average annual gain or loss of income of 1.1 per
cent of GDP. The more closed economies of coun-
tries that export mainly non-oil primary commodi-
ties attenuated the impact of terms-of-trade
changes on GDI, which amounted to 1.5 per cent.
These differences resulting from distinct ex-
port structures, are also reflected in the sensitivity
of the different developing regions to terms-of-
trade changes. The impact has been the strongest
in West Asia, a region that includes many oil ex-
porters. In Africa, where terms-of-trade variability
has been considerably higher than in East and
Table 3.3
SENSITIVITY OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES TO TERMS-OF-TRADE CHANGES, BY BROAD
PRODUCT CATEGORY AND BY REGION,a 1996￿2004
Memo item:
Share of the five
Terms-of-trade leading products
effects on GDIb Terms-of-trade Exports￿GDP in total exportse
(Per cent) variabilityc ratiod (Per cent)
Exporters of manufactures 1.1 4.6 30.2 40.7
Oil exporters 4.3 19.3 29.1 71.4
Non-oil primary commodity exporters 1.5 10.0 18.5 64.7
East and South Asia 1.6 6.6 35.7 44.0
West Asia 4.9 19.9 31.5 76.0
Africa 2.2 12.1 23.1 71.4
Latin America 1.3 7.4 20.3 49.8
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on UN COMTRADE; United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Import/Export Price Indexes database (www.bls.gov/mxp/home.htm); Japan Customs, Trade Statistics database
(www.customs.go.jp); UN Statistics Division Common Database; UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics database; and UNCTAD,
Commodity Price Bulletin, various issues.
a Non-weighted average for the 12 African, 12 Latin American, 4 West Asian and 11 East and South Asian developing
countries, listed in table 3.4.
b Average annual impact of terms-of-trade changes on GDI as a percentage of GDP, in absolute value, 1996￿2004. It is
calculated as the difference between the growth rates of GDI and GDP in real terms.
c Standard deviation of the annual rate of change of the net barter terms of trade.
d In current dollars, average for 1996￿2004.
e 2002, at SITC Rev. 2 three-digit level.Evolution in the Terms of Trade and its Impact on Developing Countries 103
South Asia and in Latin America, and where most
countries also depend on a small number of pri-
mary commodity exports, the terms-of-trade effects
on domestic income have tended to be stronger than
in the two other regions, where manufactures ac-
count for a greater share of exports.
The differences in the size of the terms-of-
trade movements and their income effects also
show that the dependence on exports of primary
commodities remains a central problem of devel-
opment. Thanks to higher price and income elas-
ticity of demand for manufactures, lower prices
for exports of such products from developing
countries will often be accompanied by higher
volume growth. Therefore, it is imperative for
developing countries not to become complacent
about industrialization and diversification. There
is a risk that the recent recovery of primary com-
modity markets could lead to a shift away from
investment ￿ both domestic and foreign ￿ in the
nascent manufacturing sectors of commodity-
exporting countries in favour of extractive indus-
tries. While higher investment in that area may be
beneficial in terms of creating additional supply
capacity and raising productivity, this should not
be at the expense of investment in manufactur-
ing. Exporters of primary commodities that have
recently benefited from higher prices and, in some
cases, from higher export volumes, have to con-
tinue their efforts towards greater diversification
within the primary commodity sector, as well as
upgrading their manufacturing and services sec-
tors. The recent windfall gains from higher pri-
mary commodity earnings provide an opportunity
to step up investment in infrastructure and pro-
ductive capacity ￿ both essential for boosting de-
velopment.
Table 3.3 gives figures for the direct income
gains or losses from terms-of-trade changes. In-
direct effects, resulting from the use of direct
income gains or adjustments to direct income
losses, are not measurable empirically and thus
are not considered in that table. Therefore it shows
only part of the full impact of terms-of-trade
changes on real national income. Indeed, from a
development perspective, the use of the additional
income resulting from terms-of-trade changes is of
crucial importance. For example, if terms-of-trade
gains resulting from higher export prices accrue
in the form of higher company profits, and if these
are reinvested, the medium-term impact on growth
will be much greater than in a situation where the
gains accrue to the government through transfers
from State-owned enterprises, which are used to
E.  The distribution of gains or losses from terms of trade
service the public debt, or in a situation where
they accrue to workers in the form of higher wages
that are spent for consumption. Similarly, a dete-
rioration in the terms of trade resulting from higher
import prices or lower export prices can lead, in-
ter alia, to either a reduction of investment, an
increase in government indebtedness or higher
unemployment and wage compression if it is not
counterbalanced by productivity and export vol-
ume growth. Regarding the distribution of income
effects of terms-of-trade changes, sharing of prof-
its from export-oriented activities among domestic
and foreign actors is of particular importance, to
the extent that the latter may repatriate higher prof-
its arising from increases in international prices,
thereby reducing the positive effect of terms-of-
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A central aspect in the distribution of income
gains and losses from the terms of trade is cap-
tured by the distinction between gross domestic
income (GDI) and gross national income (GNI).3
The difference is accounted for by net factor pay-
ments abroad; it is often considerable when the
income effects of terms-of-trade changes are as-
sociated with changes in profit remittances by
TNCs. Since the beginning of the 1990s many de-
veloping countries have
strengthened their efforts to
attract FDI, and the most suc-
cessful have been some fast
growing exporters of manu-
factures and exporters of fuels
and mining products. Espe-
cially in some of the latter
countries, a large proportion of
export activities are controlled
by TNCs, and changes in their domestic income
as a result of higher terms of trade may be partly
absorbed by an increase in profit remittances. The
inverse is of course, theoretically, also true. How-
ever, the reaction pattern is unlikely to be
symmetrical; given the labour market situation in
most developing countries, higher export prices
(or falling prices for imported inputs) will more
likely translate into higher profit remittances
rather than higher wages, while lower export
prices will more likely translate into lower wages
rather than lower profit remittances.4
What appears as profit remittances in the
current account of the balance of payments is of-
ten partially reinvested in the same host country,
recorded in the capital account as an inflow of
FDI. But this does not mean that there is a direct
link between profit remittances and new FDI; like
domestic investment, FDI is primarily determined
by expected rather than current profits. Conse-
quently, the reinvestment of TNC profits in the
host country where they originate as a result of
terms-of-trade gains, especially from increasing
prices for oil and mineral and mining products,
cannot be assumed to be systematic and therefore
is not considered in the analysis presented in this
and the following section.
Figure 3.5 presents estimates for growth rates
of GDP, GDI and GNI for selected developing
countries; it also shows the evolution of their terms
of trade, which explains to a large extent the dif-
ferences between those rates. For example, in C￿te
d￿Ivoire, Indonesia, Malaysia and Venezuela, the
impact of terms-of-trade changes on GDI was con-
siderable, but there were no large differences in
the changes in GDI and GNI. This was not the
case in other countries, such as Chile and Zam-
bia, where net income payments were higher.
These two exporters of mining products experi-
enced a significant worsening of their terms of trade
after 1997, which exacerbated
the economic slowdown of
1998￿1999. This procyclical
impact of terms of trade also
played a role in the upswing
of 2003￿2004, when it added
to domestic income. In 2004,
the gains from terms of trade
were huge: more than 8 per-
centage points of GDP in Chile
and 7 percentage points in Zambia. However, a
considerable proportion of these gains was cap-
tured by TNCs, leading to an increase in net fac-
tor payments abroad. As a result, GNI grew more
than GDP, but much less than GDI.
In China and El Salvador, countries with very
different economic structures, but whose exports
are dominated by manufactures, the terms of trade
have been much less volatile than in countries
whose exports are dominated by primary com-
modities. However, their terms of trade have been
declining since 1998, a trend that explains the
lower growth rate of income (both domestic and
national) compared to GDP, especially in 1999 and
in 2003￿2004. While this has not prevented China
from maintaining a rapid growth rate, it has con-
tributed to weak growth in El Salvador in the past
few years (fig. 3.5).
These examples illustrate the varying trends
among developing countries since the mid-1990s.
Table 3.4 presents an estimate, for a larger number
of countries, of recent gains and losses in income
arising from terms-of-trade changes and real net
income payments. Despite the diversity of cases,
it is possible to discern some general features. In
2002, the terms of trade generally had little effect
on domestic income in developing countries.
Among the 39 countries for which reliable data
are available, gains or losses from terms-of-trade
changes amounted to 1 per cent of GDP or more
in nine countries and 5 per cent or more of GDP
The distribution and use of
income gains from terms-
of-trade changes is of
crucial importance.Evolution in the Terms of Trade and its Impact on Developing Countries 105
Figure 3.5
CHANGES IN GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, GROSS DOMESTIC INCOME, GROSS NATIONAL
INCOME AND TERMS-OF-TRADE INDICES, SELECTED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 1996￿2004
(Per cent and index numbers, 2000 =100)
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on UN Statistics Division Common Database; IMF, Balance-of-Payments
Statistics database; and UNCTAD estimates of unit value and volume of exports and imports.
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Table 3.4
IMPACT OF CHANGES IN TERMS OF TRADE AND NET INCOME PAYMENTS ON
NATIONAL INCOME, SELECTED ECONOMIES, 2002￿2004
(Per cent of GDP)
Gains or
losses from Effects of
Gains or losses Effects of net terms of net income
from terms of tradea income paymentsb tradea paymentsb
2002 2003 2004 2002 2003 2004 Average 2002￿2004
Exporters of manufacturesc -0.5 -0.6 -1.1 0.4 -0.1 -0.0 -0.7 0.1
Bangladesh -0.4 -1.0 -0.8 0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.7 -0.1
China 0.0 -1.1 -2.1 0.5 0.6 0.1 -1.1 0.4
India -0.3 -1.0 -0.7 -0.1 -0.7 0.1 -0.7 -0.2
Indonesiad 2.5 1.1 -0.5 0.2 0.4 -1.5 1.0 -0.3
Malaysia 0.0 1.1 -2.3 0.8 1.2 -0.4 -0.4 0.5
Pakistan -0.8 -1.1 -1.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.5 -1.0 -0.3
Philippines -6.0 -1.8 -2.3 1.4 0.8 1.0 -3.4 1.1
Republic of Korea -0.4 -1.6 -3.7 0.4 0.0 0.0 -1.9 0.2
Sri Lanka 0.9 -1.5 -1.6 0.2 0.4 -0.1 -0.7 0.1
Taiwan Province of China -0.5 -1.5 -3.3 0.3 1.0 0.1 -1.7 0.5
Thailand -0.7 0.5 1.0 0.2 -0.4 -0.3 0.3 -0.2
Turkey -0.3 0.5 0.6 0.6 -0.6 -0.1 0.3 -0.0
Morocco -0.4 -0.2 -0.4 0.2 -0.2 0.2 -0.3 0.1
South Africad 0.1 2.7 2.4 1.0 -0.6 -0.6 1.7 -0.1
Tunisia 0.0 -0.7 0.0 -0.1 -0.6 -0.8 -0.2 -0.5
Brazil -0.2 0.2 0.6 0.4 -0.3 -0.5 0.2 -0.1
Costa Rica 0.5 -0.5 -1.7 1.9 -2.0 1.9 -0.6 0.6
El Salvador -0.2 -0.9 -0.6 -0.4 -0.7 -0.5 -0.6 -0.5
Mexico 0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.4 0.2 -0.2 0.0 0.1
Oil exportersc -0.3 3.2 6.1 -1.1 -1.0 -0.1 3.2 -0.7
Iran, Islamic Republic of -2.1 2.2 4.6 0.2 -0.1 0.4 1.6 0.2
Kuwait -0.5 7.9 11.3 -3.9 -1.4 6.2 6.3 0.3
Saudi Arabia 0.0 5.5 10.0 0.2 -0.6 0.6 5.2 0.1
Algeria -1.1 6.8 6.6 -1.0 -0.5 -0.5 4.1 -0.6
Nigeria 0.8 6.8 10.7 -5.4 -4.0 -4.9 6.1 -4.8
Sudan -0.4 1.9 2.8 -0.2 -1.7 -1.2 1.4 -1.0
Colombiad -0.2 0.5 2.2 -0.2 -0.7 -1.0 0.8 -0.7
Ecuador 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 -0.7 -0.0 0.8 -0.0
Venezuela 0.3 2.7 7.8 -0.7 0.1 -1.2 3.6 -0.6
Non-oil commodity exportersc 1.4 0.6 1.5 0.0 -1.1 -1.5 1.2 -0.9
Burundi 1.0 -0.2 -0.6 0.4 -1.1 -1.0 0.1 -0.6
C￿te d￿Ivoire 10.3 -1.4 -3.8 0.0 -1.2 -0.5 1.7 -0.5
Ethiopia 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 -0.1 -0.3 0.2 -0.1
Ghana 5.0 1.8 -0.6 -1.1 0.4 -0.7 2.1 -0.5
Uganda -0.2 0.2 -0.3 0.2 -0.2 -0.5 -0.1 -0.2
Zambia -1.0 1.0 7.1 0.4 0.3 -3.8 2.3 -1.0
Argentina 0.0 1.3 1.8 -0.2 -0.2 -0.7 1.1 -0.4
Bolivia -0.0 1.0 1.6 0.2 -1.2 -1.3 0.9 -0.7
Chile -0.5 0.8 8.4 -0.5 -2.9 -5.4 2.9 -2.9
Peru 1.0 1.1 2.2 -0.6 -1.2 -2.5 1.4 -1.4
Uruguay 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.9 -5.1 -0.3 0.3 -1.5
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on UN Statistics Division Common Database; IMF, Balance-of-Payments
Statistics database; national sources; and UNCTAD estimates of unit value and volume of exports and imports.
a Difference between the growth rates of GDI and GDP in real terms.
b Difference between the growth rates of GNI and GDI in real terms.
c Non-weighted averages.
d Not included in the product group average because the other product groups have an untypically strong influence on
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in three countries: C￿te d￿Ivoire (10.3 per cent),
Ghana (5.0 per cent) and the Philippines (-6.0 per
cent). In 2003 and 2004, the situation changed
perceptibly. In both years, gains or losses from
terms of trade exceeded 1 per cent of GDP in
24 countries, with 15 countries registering gains
and 9 losses. On average, ex-
porters of manufactures regis-
tered relative losses of GDI
from terms of trade of 0.7 per
cent of GDP in 2002￿2004.
Oil exporters, on average, saw
relatively large domestic in-
come gains in that period
(3.3 per cent), while improve-
ments in the terms of trade of
non-oil primary commodity
exporters led to relative gains
in GDI, averaging 1.2 per cent
in 2002￿2004. These gains
and losses were partly offset by changes in net
income payments abroad. Over the three years,
from 2002 to 2004, roughly 10 per cent of the rela-
tive income losses of exporters of manufactures
were offset by lower net income payments abroad,
while the oil exporters saw 25 per cent of their
relative income gains vanish through higher net
income payments abroad. The outcome has been
dramatic for the exporters of primary commodi-
ties other than oil: on average, 75 per cent of their
relative income gains from terms-of-trade im-
provements were absorbed by higher net income
payments abroad.
In 2003 and 2004, the
deterioration of the terms of
trade of most economies of
East and South Asia meant a
loss of income frequently ex-
ceeding 1 per cent of GDP.
Among Latin American coun-
tries, the terms of trade had a
negative impact only on some
exporters of manufactures that
are also oil importers. In Costa
Rica in 2004, a reduction in the profit remittances
of TNCs compensated for the loss of income, re-
flected in the positive effect from net income pay-
ments. Chile and Venezuela obtained the greatest
gains from terms of trade in the region, by as much
as 8.4 and 7.8 percentage points of GDP, respec-
tively, in 2004 alone. However, in Chile, a large
part of the gain was offset by higher net income
payments abroad ($8.1 billion in 2004, compared
to $4.6 billion in 2003), mostly by exporting TNCs.
Other exporters of mining products (e.g. Peru) and
hydrocarbons (e.g. Colombia and Bolivia) also ex-
perienced significant gains from terms of trade and
suffered a negative effect from
higher net income payments
abroad. In Argentina, improv-
ing terms of trade contributed
to a recovery from the 2001￿
2002 crisis, not least because
a larger-than-average share of
this gain remained inside the
country.
The oil-exporting coun-
tries of West Asia, and, to a
lesser extent, those of Africa
(Algeria, Nigeria and Sudan)
registered relatively large domestic income gains.
However, in the case of the West Asian oil ex-
porters, the positive terms-of-trade effects on rela-
tive income growth were reinforced by increases
in income payments received from abroad, reflect-
ing the rising government revenues from foreign
investments. By contrast, the domestic income
gains in Nigeria and Sudan were in large part off-
set by higher net outflows of profit remittances.
The African exporters of minerals and mining
products, South Africa and Zambia, had large rela-
tive gains in domestic income. The effects of net
income payments were nega-
tive in 2004 for almost all the
African countries examined,
and particularly so for Nigeria
and Zambia, as profit remit-
tances from oil and mining
companies, respectively, in-
creased.
Overall, the recent im-
provements in the terms of trade
of many developing countries,
as a result mainly of higher
international prices for a broad range of primary
commodities ￿ especially fuels, and ores and met-
als ￿ have translated into real income gains. In
principle, these gains can have positive develop-
ment effects by strengthening the ability of these
countries to finance new investments in infrastruc-
ture and productive capacity, with attendant im-
Foreign investors may
repatriate the higher profits
arising from increases in
international prices,
thereby reducing the posi-
tive effect of terms-of-trade
improvements on national
income.
Profit remittances are
often reinvested in the
same host country, but
there is no systematic link
between such remittances
and new FDI.Trade and Development Report, 2005 108
provements on employment, productivity and out-
put growth. However, this depends on how the
higher earnings from exports, resulting from ris-
ing export prices (or falling prices for imported
inputs), are used. They may translate into higher
wages, higher government revenue from taxes,
royalties or profits of public enterprises, higher
net profits of local firms, or higher net profits of
foreign investors. The developmental effect fur-
ther depends on the extent to which the different
groups use the higher income on investment or
consumption. The observations in this section sug-
gest that in a number of countries that have ben-
efited in recent years from domestic income gains
through improvements in their terms of trade, the
potential of these gains to enhance the financing of
development has not been fully realized because
they were associated with increasing outflows of
profit remittances, an issue that is examined fur-
ther in section F.
F.  The distribution of export income and
rent from extractive industries
In order to accelerate their economic and
social transformation, and advance towards
achieving the Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs), developing countries need to use the in-
come generated by export-oriented activities in a
way that is conducive to faster capital accumula-
tion and stronger productivity growth. That in-
come may accrue to private agents in the form of
profits, interest or wages, or to
the government through prof-
its transferred by State-owned
enterprises (SOEs), or through
royalties or taxes paid by com-
panies in the export sectors. It
may be used to reduce poverty
and boost private consump-
tion, or to increase private
capital formation or public in-
vestment. When TNCs in-
volved in export activities repatriate their profits,
the potential development-enhancing effects are
reduced (assuming that new FDI is independent
of current profits). In the capital-intensive min-
ing, oil and gas sectors, TNCs typically control a
particularly large share of export activities. These
are also the sectors where large differential rents
can occur, since production costs differ consider-
ably depending on the localization, accessibility
and richness of the deposits. On the other hand,
the share of the government in the rent from ex-
port-oriented activities in these sectors is a po-
tentially important source of revenue for financ-
ing development. Careful management of the rent
from extractive industries is of special importance
in the context of sustainable
development, because these
rents are generated from the
exploitation of non-renewable
resources, which will eventu-
ally be depleted.
In this context, the State￿s
retention of a part of the rents
generated in these sectors has
traditionally received special
attention in developing countries. Until the mid-
1980s, the State controlled extractive activities in
most developing countries. Subsequently, priva-
tization of SOEs in the mining sector, along with
tax incentives for foreign investors has led to a
considerable reduction of government revenues
from this sector (box 3.1).
The rent from extractive
industries is a potentially
important source of
revenue for financing
development.Evolution in the Terms of Trade and its Impact on Developing Countries 109
Fiscal revenues from external trade in gen-
eral and extractive industries in particular still
provide a significant share of total revenue in a
number of developing countries (table 3.5), al-
though the amount and mechanisms for collecting
the revenues differ widely from one country to
another. Government revenue accrues from trans-
fers of State-owned exporting companies or as a
share of export income through royalties and in-
come taxes paid by private
operators. Despite the tendency
towards a general reduction of
import and export duties, they
have remained an important
source of public revenue for
many countries, especially
LDCs.
Although taxes on inter-
national trade mainly take the
form of import duties, fiscal
revenues from that source depend indirectly on
the value of exports, since the latter largely deter-
mines the level of imports. Thus, recent increases
in the export earnings of many developing coun-
tries have contributed, directly and indirectly, to
an increase in their fiscal revenues. Moreover,
some countries such as Argentina, C￿te d￿Ivoire
and Ghana have applied taxes on exports ￿ which
are easier to collect ￿ as a substitute for taxes on
the profits of exporters, especially in agriculture.
In C￿te d￿Ivoire, taxes on exports of coffee and
cocoa provided 18 per cent of the public revenue
in 2002. In Argentina, export taxes, at rates of
5 per cent for manufactures and 20 per cent for
primary commodities, were introduced to absorb
part of the windfall profits resulting from the large
currency devaluation of 2002 and from the higher
international prices of agricultural and energy
products.
Government revenue from export-oriented
activities is frequently reduced by fiscal incen-
tives accorded to foreign investors. Although such
incentives may have been successful in attracting
additional FDI, they have increasingly come un-
der criticism, especially in a number of Latin
American countries. In response, some countries
have recently revised their fiscal and ownership
regulations relating to the oil and mining sectors.
The rise in the prices of most mineral and mining
products in the past few years has further stimu-
lated the debate on the distribution and use of the
windfall. Revenue systems and the structure of
ownership of these sectors differ considerably
across countries, and reliable, detailed informa-
tion on the income they generate in developing
countries, or the government revenue realized
from them, is not systematically available.5 How-
ever, it is possible to identify some general trends
and orders of magnitude based on rough estimates
of the distribution of rents in
the oil and mining sectors.
As a first approximation,
government revenue from
natural resources may be com-
pared with the value of the
natural resources produced or
exported (table 3.6). In some
major oil-exporting countries
for which data are available,
such as Algeria, Ecuador, the
Islamic Republic of Iran, Kuwait and Nigeria,
transfers to the public budget exceeded 60 per cent
of total fuel export earnings in the reference year;
and they amounted to between 16 per cent of GDP
in the Islamic Republic of Iran and 43 per cent of
GDP in Kuwait, depending on the degree of di-
versification of the economy. In these countries,
with mature hydrocarbon industries, most govern-
ment income is generated directly through SOEs
or joint ventures.6
In several sub-Saharan African countries,
such transfers account for a much smaller share
of oil export earnings, especially in Chad, where
they amount to only 6.7 per cent. In these coun-
tries, oil extraction industries are more recent and
mainly operated by TNCs. The lower fiscal in-
come in these countries is explained partly by high
start-up costs and high initial depreciation allow-
ances that reduce the taxable income, but also by
fiscal incentives accorded to the foreign-owned
companies. For example, in Chad, a country that
has been presented as an example of sound man-
agement of oil revenues, TNCs only paid royalties
of about $2 per barrel in 2004.7
The counterpart of the relatively low share
of the public sector in total oil earnings in sub-
Saharan Africa is the higher share obtained by
TNCs, which explains the sizeable income pay-
ments abroad in the balance of payments. Angola,
Privatization and tax
incentives for foreign
investors have led to a
considerable reduction of
government revenues from
the mining sector.Trade and Development Report, 2005 110
Chad, Congo and Equatorial Guinea had a large
surplus in their trade balance in 2003 and 2004,
the value of merchandise exports being roughly
double that of imports. However, all these coun-
tries posted current-account deficits owing to
profit remittances and other service payments,
mainly linked to the oil sector.
A more precise estimate of the rent from ex-
tractive industries that is retained in an economy
can be obtained from a comparison of the income
of the different domestic agents and foreign in-
vestors with the total rent generated in that sector.
This requires information on costs, production and
prices, which is not, however, systematically avail-
able. Nonetheless, in the annex to this chapter,
such estimates are undertaken for some countries
in Latin America during the period 1999￿2004.
The country studies suggest that there are
large differences in the distribution of the rents
from extractive activities across countries and sec-
Box 3.1
STATE INCOME FROM EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
In many countries, economic activities in the energy and mining sectors have long been directly
controlled by the State. For example, in Argentina a public oil company was founded in 1922, and
in Bolivia and Mexico private companies in these sectors were nationalized in 1937 and 1938
respectively. In other countries, where these activities were entirely or partly in the hands of do-
mestic or foreign private operators, part of the income resulting from oil and mineral exports went
to the State in the form of royalty payments or taxes on profits and export earnings. The size of
those payments was often a source of conflict between host countries and foreign firms and their
home countries. Well-established States, such as Chile, were able to collect significant revenues
from exports of raw materials,1 but this was the exception rather than the rule. Less organized
independent States, colonies and protectorates would typically receive only a small share of export
revenues, if any. Moreover, disclosure of costs and profits was not always obligatory. In the case of
oil, for example, extraction costs, and thus the profits of the dominant firms (the ￿Seven Sisters￿),
were kept secret until the early 1950s.2
In the process of decolonization, the situation changed in many countries, particularly in respect of
the oil sector. In the 1940s, the Venezuelan Government first imposed taxes on oil companies and
later it required a 50/50 distribution of net oil earnings. Similar regimes were introduced by Ku-
wait, Iran (now the Islamic Republic of Iran) and Saudi Arabia in 1950. With the creation of the
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), its member States worked towards a
harmonization of their oil regimes, and in 1970 they agreed to establish a minimum tax rate of 55
per cent. In parallel, State-owned oil firms were created during the 1960s in Algeria, Iraq, Kuwait,
Venezuela and Saudi Arabia, and in the early 1970s, these and other OPEC countries went further
by nationalizing or acquiring a majority share in their oil industries.
Beginning in the early 1950s there was also a nationalization wave in other sectors, as an increas-
ing number of developing countries tried to increase their revenues and reaffirm their sovereignty.
This included mining activities in Bolivia (1952), Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the
Congo) (between 1967 and 1974), Zambia (starting in 1970) and Chile (1971). As a result, the
SOEs from Chile, Zaire and Zambia were the three major world copper producers in 1980.3
But soon many SOEs in developing countries, especially in the mining sector, faced serious prob-
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tors as a result of differences in the role of SOEs
and fiscal regimes. For example, in the case of
the oil industry in Mexico, the entire rent went to
the Government; in Ecuador and Venezuela, the
Government received close to two thirds of the
total rent throughout the period 1999￿2004, and
in Venezuela a sizeable share of the rent also ac-
crued to domestic consumers. In Argentina, the
government share in the oil rent fell from around
45 per cent in 2001 to an estimated 36 per cent in
2004. In these countries, State ownership of the
oil industry has been the main vehicle for capturing
all or a large part of the rent from oil extraction.
This is most apparent in Mexico, where PEMEX
operates the State monopoly, but in Ecuador and
Venezuela, where SOEs and private contractors
coexist, the SOEs have also provided the bulk of
fiscal receipts generated from the rent of the oil
sector.
In the case studies on the mining sector in
Chile and Peru, the distribution of the rent was
Prices of most metals fell in the second part of the 1970s and much of the 1980s. Falling prices and
economic problems due to the debt crisis of the 1980s aggravated the fiscal situation in many
developing countries, as a result of which the SOEs had to transfer an increasing share of their
revenues to central governments. This deprived them of the means of financing the investments
needed for maintaining and expanding their production capacities. On the other hand, TNCs un-
dertook a radical restructuring process that involved several mergers and acquisitions. They also
developed new technologies that enabled them to profitably exploit lower-grade deposits despite
lower prices.
As access to new technologies and capital had become crucial at a time when many SOEs were
facing financial problems and losing their relevance as a source of public revenue towards the end
of the 1980s, the doors were again opened to TNCs. They returned to developing countries or
reinforced their presence through acquisitions of privatized companies, joint ventures and conces-
sions in the extractive industries. In the oil sector, where OPEC members produced at very low
costs, the position of public firms had remained viable and national ownership of most companies
was maintained. But in the mining sector, most public companies were privatized. Ghana reformed
its mining sector between 1985 and 1989, reducing State ownership and encouraging FDI through
a reduction of corporate income tax from 55 to 35 per cent and royalties from 6 to 3 per cent. This
early example was followed by other African countries, including Guinea, Madagascar, Mali and
the United Republic of Tanzania.4 In Latin America, a wave of opening up to FDI in the mining
sector was pioneered by Chile, and followed by other countries including Argentina and Peru. A
similar opening also occurred in the Latin American hydrocarbons industry (see also the annex to
this chapter). In some cases, good management and sufficient resources enabled State firms to
survive (e.g. the copper company in Chile).
1 Taxes on saltpeter exports accounted for roughly half of Chile￿s fiscal income for almost 40 years in the
late 19th and early 20th centuries (Bethell, 1986).
2 Only in 1952, with the publication of The International Oil Cartel (a report by the Federal Trade Com-
mission of the United States) was the modus operandi of the major international oil companies unveiled.
For an analysis on the energy market from a historical perspective, see Chevalier, 2004.
3 For a historical analysis of the copper sector, see UNCTAD, 1994b, and Moussa, 1999.
4 For a recent account of FDI in Africa, see UNCTAD, 2005c, in particular section D.
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less favourable for the State than in the case stud-
ies on the oil industry of other countries. For
example, in Chile between 1999 and 2002 less than
20 per cent of the total rent originating from cop-
per extraction accrued to the State; in 2003 this
share rose to about 30 per cent and in 2004 to more
than 50 per cent. The State-owned copper com-
pany, CODELCO, provided around 80 per cent of
the public sector revenue from copper between
1999 and 2004, although its share in total copper
production was less then 40 per cent (see annex
to this chapter). In Peru, the proportion of the
public sector￿s share in the total rent from gold
and copper extraction averaged 15 per cent dur-
ing that period. Similarly, in Argentina, the State
has been able to obtain only a relatively small pro-
portion of the growing total rent of its copper and
gold sectors.8 The relatively small government
revenue generated by the mining sector in these
countries appears to be largely the result of the
policy of offering fiscal benefits to mainly foreign-
owned private companies operating in that sector.
A general conclusion arising from these ex-
amples is that the ability of the State to capture a
significant share of the rent has been relatively
weak in the developing countries that privatized
their national companies. In particular, government
revenue from private oil and mining companies
in the form of income taxes have been low com-
pared to the oil and mining rent.
The increasing participation of TNCs in oil
and mining activities since the mid-1980s has gen-
erally expanded production, but it has also reduced
the share of the rent retained by the host coun-
tries. This is because the role of SOEs has been
considerably reduced and fiscal charges for pri-
vate foreign companies greatly lowered. Rising
global demand for oil and mining products in the
wake of fast output growth in East and South Asia,
and the associated sharp price increases since
2003, have further attracted foreign investors in
these activities. At the same time, governments
of countries with large oil and mineral deposits
have begun to review their regimes governing the
distribution of rents in these sectors, and some
reforms have already been initiated. This is the
case in some Latin American countries that had
been pioneers in privatizing their oil and mining
activities or opening up their natural-resource sec-
tors to private investment.
Table 3.5
GOVERNMENT REVENUEa FROM
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND
EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES,
SELECTED DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES
(Per cent of total current
government revenue)
Revenue
Import  from Period
and export  extractive con-
 duties  industriesb sidered
Algeria 7.3 68.7 2003
Angola 5.9 75.1 2003
Argentina 16.9 7.1 2004
Bahrain 4.4 74.2 2003
Boliviac 3.5 26.2 2003
Botswana 11.0 52.7 2002
Chile 5.7 8.2 2003
Chad 17.3 33.8 2004
Congo 7.2 69.8 2003
C￿te d￿Ivoire 38.6 1.4 2002
Dem. Rep. of the Congo 28.5 20.7 2002
Ecuador 9.2 29.8 2002
Egypt 13.0 16.4d 2003/04
Equatorial Guinea 0.9 91.9 2004
Ghana 22.7 3.5 2002
Guinea 19.8 14.0 2003
Indonesia 3.1 25.9 2002
Iran, Islamic Republic of 8.8 53.8 2004
Kuwait 1.3 71.6 2002
Malaysia 5.9 22.7 2004
Mexicoc 1.7 33.1 2004
Namibia 24.9 18.4 2002/03
Nigeria 8.3 76.5 2003
Peru 7.3 2.4 2003
Sudan 20.7 44.8 2002
United Arab Emirates 2.8 69.2 2003
Venezuela 3.0 49.7 2003
Viet Nam 18.5 30.3 2002
Yemen 6.4 47.6 2003
Source: IMF, Government Financial Statistics Yearbook, and
Country Reports; and UNCTAD secretariat calcula-
tions, based on national sources.
a Central government unless otherwise indicated.
b Government revenue from royalties, income taxes
of exporting firms, and profits of State-owned enter-
prises transferred to the government budget.
c Non-financial public sector.
d Including revenues from the Suez Canal Authority.Evolution in the Terms of Trade and its Impact on Developing Countries 113
Several other countries have adapted their
taxation rules to the changes in international pri-
mary commodity markets, especially in countries
where taxes paid by private companies had been
particularly low. For example, in 2004 the Gov-
ernment of Kazakhstan introduced a progressive
￿rent tax￿ on oil exports with
a maximum tax rate of 33 per
cent when the oil price rises
to $40 or more per barrel.9 A
similar progressive tax was
also introduced in the Russian
Federation.10 In Argentina, du-
ties on oil exports were raised
with a view to increasing the
public sector￿s share in the
windfall profit from higher oil
prices.11 In a number of other
Latin American countries the conditions for pri-
vate investors￿ participation in the oil and mining
industries have also been modified recently (see
annex to this chapter), while in Bolivia, where the
hydrocarbons sector was privatized in 1996, a con-
troversy about the distribution of the oil and gas
income between the State and foreign companies
led to a severe political crisis.12
In order to ensure that the considerable rents
accruing in the extractive industries are used in a
way that maximizes the gains
for development and social
welfare, governments need to
design an appropriate fiscal
framework for these indus-
tries, that strikes a balance
between promoting long-term
investment and realizing pub-
lic revenue. On the one hand,
a ￿race to the bottom￿ in the
provision of fiscal incentives
should be avoided. On the
other, efforts to obtain adequate fiscal revenue
should not deprive the operators, private or pub-
lic, of the financial resources they need to increase
their productivity and supply capacity, or their in-
ternational competitiveness.
Table 3.6
GOVERNMENT REVENUE FROM FUEL INDUSTRY IN SELECTED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Value Share in Share in fuel Share in
($ million)  fuel exports production total GDP Year
Algeria 17 442 72.7 72.5 26.2 2003
Angola 3 892 44.8 58.3 28.2 2003
Chad  128 6.7 7.5 3.0 2004 *
Congo  725 34.4 42.0 20.7 2003 **
Ecuador 1 363 67.0 51.5 5.6 2002
Equatorial Guinea 1 513 32.8 38.0 33.7 2004 *
Gabon 1 136 33.3 36.3 15.7 2004 *
Iran, Islamic Republic of 22 521 83.3 73.8 16.1 2003 *
Kuwait 14 752 98.5 91.2 43.1 2001
Nigeria 16 298 61.3 64.0 27.9 2003 **
Sudan  905 59.9 n.a. 6.7 2002
United Arab Emirates 15 567 52.6 42.8 19.5 2003 **
Yemen 1 725 46.8 47.4 15.5 2003
Source:  IMF, Country Reports; and UNCDB.
* Estimates.
** Preliminary estimates.
Progress towards the MDGs
can be enhanced only if the
income gains from favour-
able terms of trade are used
strategically for physical and
human capital formation.Trade and Development Report, 2005 114
Recent upward trends in world market prices
of fuels, and mineral and mining products as a
result of growing demand from East and South
Asia have themselves attracted higher FDI and
new entrants to these sectors, including TNCs from
China. This situation provides an opportunity to
review the existing fiscal and ownership regimes.
Such a review, and possible strategic policy ad-
justments, could be more effective if oil and
mineral exporting countries would cooperate in
the formulation of some generally agreed principles
relating to the fiscal treatment of foreign inves-
tors. Obviously, a higher share for the Government
in the rent generated by extractive industries, or a
higher share obtained by domestic consumers or
investors, does not automatically enhance devel-
opment and progress towards the MDGs; this will
occur only if higher national income due to gains
from the terms of trade is used strategically for
physical and human capital formation.
Notes
1 A fall in the terms of trade ￿does not mean that pri-
mary producers are worse off than they were be-
fore. Everything depends on the degree of increased
productivity reached and the extent to which it is
transferred to industrial manufacturers. If the index
falls to 80, for instance, primary producers will be
able to obtain 20 per cent less manufactured goods
than they did before, for the same amount of pri-
mary goods. However, if to obtain the same amount
they need work only half as long as before, one
hour￿s labour would now allow them to purchase
60 per cent more manufactured goods, instead of
100 per cent more, as would have been the case had
they received the full benefits of their own techni-
cal progress￿ (ECLA, 1951: 47).
2The System of National Accounts defines the in-
come effect of terms-of-trade changes as follows:
￿GDP in constant prices, plus the trading gain or
loss resulting from changes in the terms of trade,
equals real gross domestic income￿ (United Nations
et al., 1993: 405). Trading gains or losses (T) are
measured by the formula:
X￿M X M
T = ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
PP x Pm
where X and M are exports and imports at current
prices; Px and Pm are the price indices for exports
and imports, and P is a price index expressed in a
selected numeraire. For the analysis in this TDR the
numeraire is Pm (which is one of the most frequently
used), and the reference year for the price indices
is the previous year. The formula thus becomes
T = X/Pm ￿ X/Px (i.e. the difference between the pur-
chasing power of exports and the volume of exports).
3 See United Nations et al., 1993: 405.
4 If, as is frequently the case, lower export prices are
accompanied by real currency depreciation, the real
effect of income payments will probably be greater
in terms of current GDP, measured in local currency,
even if the income payments fall in current dollars.
5 Different initiatives have been proposed for increas-
ing the availability of information on revenues stem-
ming from various extractive industries. In particu-
lar, in 2002 the British Prime Minister and the De-
partment for International Development (DFID) of
the United Kingdom launched the Extractive Indus-
tries Transparency Initiative, which was endorsed
by the World Bank in 2003. The IMF also seeks to
improve the quality of such information within the
Article IV consultations with developing countries.
6 The situation is quite similar in the United Arab
Emirates, but a significant proportion of the trans-
fers to the Government are not included in the re-
spective figure in table 4.6, because ￿some revenue
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ing of investments, or is transferred directly to Abu
Dhabi￿s government￿s foreign assets, rather than
accruing to the budget￿ (IMF, 2004d: 26).
7 ￿Royalties, set at 12.5 percent of the wellhead price,
were paid in 2004 using the agreed 2003 wellhead
price of US$ 16.9 per barrel because of a disagree-
ment between the authorities and the oil companies
on export prices and transportation costs. Negotia-
tions on these issues are ongoing￿ (IMF, 2005b: 11).
8 Following the economic policy reforms, the min-
ing industry in Argentina has benefited from spe-
cial fiscal treatment such as accelerated deprecia-
tion allowances and exemption from the 20-per-cent
export duty that was introduced in 2002 for all other
primary exports. Moreover, although the peso has
lost two thirds of its value since the end of 2001,
payments of royalties and taxes by mining compa-
nies continue to be determined on the basis of an
exchange rate of 1 peso to the dollar. As a conse-
quence, the dollar value of government revenue from
royalties and tax payments by the copper and gold
mining sectors may have fallen between 2001 and
2004, although, as a result of higher production and
prices, the rent from those sectors is likely to have
increased considerably since 2001.
9 As a result of new tax legislation the Government￿s
share in oil income will be raised to a range of 65￿
85 per cent. The former guarantee for investors of a
fixed tax rate throughout the duration of a contract
was abolished, while an excess profit tax and a mini-
mal Government share of oil to be produced under
new production-sharing agreements were introduced
(see EIA, 2004: 3).
10 Below $15 a barrel there is no export duty; between
$15 and $20, the rate of duty is 35 per cent of mar-
ket price minus $15; in the $20￿$25 range, the ex-
porter must pay 45 per cent of market price minus
$20, plus $1.75 a barrel; over $25 a barrel, export
duties are 65 per cent of market price minus $25,
plus $4 a barrel.
11 In May 2002, a tax of 20 per cent was introduced
for all primary commodity exports. The rate appli-
cable for oil exports was raised in May 2004 to
25 per cent, and since August 2004, a progressive
scale is being applied, ranging from 25 per cent when
the reference oil price ￿ the West Texas Intermedi-
ate (WTI) price ￿ is below $32, to 45 per cent when
it exceeds $45.
12 Since 1996, the royalty rate for the exploitation of
old fields was 50 per cent, while the rate for new
exploitations was reduced that year to 18 per cent.
This new regime attracted significant amounts of
FDI in the gas sector, in particular for the construc-
tion of a pipeline to Brazil between 1997 and 1999.
In anticipation of rising export demand, TNCs also
invested in exploration that resulted in the discov-
ery of huge new gas reserves, exceeding what the
Brazilian market could absorb. In 2001, an interna-
tional consortium prepared a $6-billion project for
the export of liquefied gas to North America, which
included the construction of a pipeline to the Pa-
cific Ocean (Campod￿nico, 2004). This project met
with strong public opposition, as both the price for
the gas agreed with the North American importers
and the royalties were considered too low. Popular
concerns that, as on previous occasions, the income
from the exploitation of the natural resources would
not be used for national development, triggered
massive protests, which led to the President￿s res-
ignation in October 2003. In a subsequent referen-
dum, a large majority approved the abrogation of
the 1996 hydrocarbons law, the restoration of a pub-
lic oil and gas company and the imposition of taxes
or royalties on private companies of up to 50 per
cent of the value produced. As a consequence, a new
law promulgated in May 2005 has introduced a tax
of 32 per cent, in addition to the 18 per cent roy-
alty; it also requires mandatory conversion of old
contracts to make them compatible with the new
rules. However, political tensions persist: on the one
hand, TNCs complain about a ￿confiscatory change
in the rules￿, and, on the other, ￿civilian commit-
tees￿ in the gas-producing provinces have been
claiming regional autonomy for gas policies. There
have also been massive demonstrations calling for
the nationalization of the hydrocarbons industry.
Continuing protests led to the resignation of the
President in June 2005, and the control of hydro-
carbons and the distribution of the income they gen-
erate remain a burning political issue.Distribution of Oil and Mining Rent: Some Evidence from Latin America, 1999￿2004 117
Methodology
The oil rent is estimated as the difference
between the values of production at the relevant
international price and the cost of production. It
considers only the ￿upstream￿ rent, thus excluding
profits at the refinery and the commercialization
stages (￿downstream￿ income). Following the cri-
teria used by the United States Energy Information
Administration, cost of production includes the
costs of exploration, extraction and production,
plus administrative costs and depreciation.
The part of the rent accruing to the Govern-
ment consists of proceeds from income tax and
other relevant taxes plus royalties paid by private
and State-owned firms, plus the latter￿s profits
transferred to the Government. Indirect taxes on
hydrocarbons, such as value-added tax and spe-
cific consumption taxes, are not considered to be
a part of the oil rent. The share of the rent ob-
tained by the private sector (business sector and
consumers) is estimated as the difference between
total and public rent. Undistributed profits of SOEs
are included in the business sector rent. Subsidies
for domestic oil consumption are considered as
the portion of the rent that accrues to consumers.
Argentina
In 2004, Argentina produced an average of
690,000 barrels per day (bpd), 14 per cent less
than in 1999. Higher oil prices more than com-
pensated for this decline. Devaluation of the
currency in 2002 reduced production costs to an
estimated $6.1 a barrel. As a result of all these fac-
tors, oil rent increased significantly, reaching
$7.1 billion in 2004 (table 3.A1).
The State-owned oil company, YPF, was pri-
vatized in the 1990s, and in 2004 a new public
firm in the energy sector, ENARSA, was created
but its activities are not yet significant. The Gov-
Annex to chapter III
DISTRIBUTION OF OIL AND MINING RENT:
SOME EVIDENCE FROM LATIN AMERICA,
1999￿2004
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ernment obtains part of the revenues from the oil
industry through royalties, income tax and export
duties (table 3.A2). As the 1994 Constitution con-
fers the original ownership of natural resources
to the provinces, they receive the royalties, which
at present amount to 12 per cent of the well-head
value in dollars. The Government collects taxes
on profits (35 per cent) and on exports (between
25 to 45 per cent, depending on the international
price). Total government receipts have increased
considerably in absolute terms over the past few
years, owing to the expansion of total rent and to
the introduction of export taxes; between 2002 and
2004, 30 per cent of the production was exported.
However, the share of the Government shrunk
from 44.6 per cent in 2001 to 36.0 per cent in 2004,
the remainder accruing to private firms. Domes-
tic prices were similar to prices for exported oil,
so that domestic consumers did not benefit from
the rent.
Table 3.A1
ARGENTINA: ESTIMATE OF OIL RENT, 1999￿2004
Price Cost of
Production (f.o.b.) production Rent Total rent
(Million barrels) ($ per barrel) ($ million)
1999 293 16.0 7.9 8.1 2 373
2000 282 26.6 7.9 18.7 5 273
2001 285 22.2 7.9 14.3 4 075
2002 276 22.2 6.1 16.1 4 444
2003 270 26.7 6.1 20.6 5 562
2004 252 34.4 6.1 28.3 7 132
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on National Energy Secretariat of Argentina, Mercado de hidrocarburos
database (http://energia.mecon.gov.ar); Repsol YPF S.A. and PetrobrÆs Energia S.A., Estados contables, memoria y
reseæa informativa, various years.
Table 3.A2
ARGENTINA: ESTIMATE OF GOVERNMENT REVENUE FROM OIL RENT, 1999￿2004
(Millions of dollars and per cent)
 Total  govern- Share of govern-
Taxes on Taxes on ment revenue ment revenue
Royalties  oil exports oil income  from oil in total oil rent
($ million) (Per cent)
1999 503 ..  481  984 41.5
2000 842 .. 1 061 1 903 36.1
2001 691 .. 1 128 1 819 44.6
2002 661 431  781 1 873 42.1
2003 735 447 1 109 2 291 41.2
2004 843 508 1 217 2 568 36.0
Source: See table 3.A1.Distribution of Oil and Mining Rent: Some Evidence from Latin America, 1999￿2004 119
Ecuador
Oil production in Ecuador is controlled by
the State-owned firm, Petroecuador, and by pri-
vate companies. The latter operate mainly through
production-sharing contracts, financing the invest-
ment and paying to the State a share of their
revenue of approximately 25 per cent. Private
companies must also pay royalties and 25 per cent
income tax on their profits. Royalties vary be-
tween 12.5 per cent if production is less than
30,000 bpd, 14 per cent if production is between
30,000 and 60,000 bpd, and 18.5 per cent if pro-
duction exceeds 60,000 bpd.
While Petroecuador￿s production fell from
256,000 bpd in 1999 to 189,000 bpd in 2004 due
to insufficient investment, total oil production in
Ecuador strongly increased after the completion
of a pipeline for heavy crude oil in October 2003.
This pipeline transports oil from areas mainly ex-
ploited by private firms. As a consequence, the
share of Petroecuador in total production fell from
69 per cent to 36 per cent. Production costs have
increased since 2000 due to inflation in the context
of dollarization and higher costs of exploitation
by private companies in the new fields. Never-
theless, the rise in international prices and in oil
production led to a significant increase in the oil
rent (table 3.A3).
The State obtained about two thirds of the
oil rent, mainly from Petroecuador, which, despite
its falling share in total oil production, still pro-
vided 75 per cent of the public revenue from oil in
2003. Public revenue from private companies came
mainly from royalties and production-sharing;
income tax represented only 3 per cent, on aver-
age, of total public revenues from oil activities.
Part of the rent has been transferred to consumers
through subsidized pricing of liquefied natural gas,
diesel and fuel oil by Petroecuador (table 3.A4).
Mexico
Mexico￿s Constitution provides for a State
monopoly in the oil industry, including the explo-
ration, production, refining, stocking, transport
and distribution of crude oil and derivates. These
activities are performed by the State-owned com-
pany PEMEX. Crude oil production increased at
an average annual rate of 3 per cent between 1999
and 2004, reaching 3.4 million bpd in 2004. Pro-
duction costs, which have traditionally been low,
have recently increased due to insufficient invest-
ment in new fields and higher costs of secondary
exploitation of old fields. Nevertheless, the evo-
lution of international prices has led to a sizeable
increase in the rent per barrel and in total oil rent
(table 3.A5).
Table 3.A3
ECUADOR: ESTIMATE OF OIL RENT, 1999￿2004
Price Cost of
Production (f.o.b.) production Rent Total rent
(Million barrels) ($ per barrel) ($ million)
1999 136 15.0 2.5 12.5 1 700
2000 140 24.9 4.1 20.8 2 906
2001 149 19.9 4.6 15.3 2 282
2002 143 22.1 5.7 16.4 2 348
2003 152 26.3 6.1 20.2 3 078
2004 193 30.2 6.4 23.8 4 582
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on Petroecuador, Estados Financieros 2003, and Indicadores Estadisticos,
2005; Energy Information Administration (EIA), Monthly Energy Review, January, 2005; Gaffney, Cline and Associates,
2004; and Ministry of Economy and Finance, Macroeconomic Programme 2004.Trade and Development Report, 2005 120
This rent is almost entirely earned by the
Government, given the special tax rules applying
to PEMEX: the firm must pay various taxes (￿ex-
traction tax￿, ￿extraordinary and additional duties￿
and an income tax) amounting to a total of about
61 per cent of its revenue. In addition, when the
oil price exceeds the level stated in the govern-
Table 3.A4
ECUADOR: ESTIMATE OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF OIL RENT, 1999￿2003
(Millions of dollars and per cent)
Government revenue After Share of
tax profits government
Transfers from of private Subsidiesb revenue in
Petroecuador Royaltiesa Income tax Total companies  to consumers total oil rent
($ million) (Per cent)
1999  889 118 42 1 049 359 200 61.7
2000 1 377 239 45 1 661 637 300 57.2
2001 1 196 251 41 1 488 579 200 65.2
2002 1 286 313 31 1 630 643 200 69.4
2003 1 538 441 70 2 049 1020 192 66.6
Source: See table 3.A3.
a Including income from production-sharing contracts.
b Implicit subsidy resulting from the difference between international and domestic sales prices.
Table 3.A5
MEXICO: ESTIMATE OF OIL RENT, 1999￿2004
Price Cost of
Production (f.o.b.) production Rent Total rent
(Million barrels) ($ per barrel) ($ million)
1999 1 061 15.9 3.5 12.4 13 121
2000 1 099 25.4 4.2 21.2 23 318
2001 1 141 18.9 4.6 14.3 16 275
2002 1 160 21.6 5.0 16.6 19 249
2003 1 230 24.8 5.5 19.4 23 808
2004 1 235 31.6 7.5 24.1 29 759
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on PEMEX, Statistical Yearbook and Annual Report, various years; EIA,
Monthly Energy Review, January, 2005; and Gaffney, Cline and Associates, 2004.
ment budget, it must pay a supplementary 39.2 per
cent of the excess revenue. As a result, the firm￿s
after-tax profits are low, if any. PEMEX charges
the same prices on the domestic market as it does
on the international market, so that domestic con-
sumers do not share in the oil rent.Distribution of Oil and Mining Rent: Some Evidence from Latin America, 1999￿2004 121
Venezuela
The bulk of oil income in Venezuela is gen-
erated by the State-owned company PDVSA,
which accounted for 65 per cent of total produc-
tion in 2004. In addition there are ￿operating
service agreements￿ for marginal areas, which
contributed 17 per cent to the total in 2004; the
remaining 19 per cent comes from joint ventures
(￿strategic associations￿) created for extracting the
extra-heavy crude in the Orinoco River basin.
Under the operating service agreements, private
contractors are paid by the State for exploiting
some fields. They pay a tax on their profits but no
royalties. The strategic associations, on the other
hand, are required to pay royalties as well as taxes
on their profits. The rate of the royalties is nor-
mally 16.7 per cent, but in case of low profitability,
the rate may be reduced to 1 per cent. The new
Organic Hydrocarbons Act (2002) changed the
conditions for the participation of private agents
in upstream oil activities, but the old regime was
still being applied in 2004.
Total oil production, which declined slightly
between 1999 and 2004, was around 3 million bpd
in 2004. In 2003, PDVSA￿s production fell mark-
edly following a strike. Production costs differ
widely depending on the area of exploitation. In
the fields exploited by PDVSA, the cost of a bar-
rel is below $2.5. In the marginal areas the cost
per barrel increased from $7.4 to $14 between 1999
and 2004, and the production cost of oil of the
extra-heavy type in the Orinoco basin is estimated
at $10 a barrel. The relative decline in the share
of PDVSA in total production explains the steady
increase in the average production cost. However,
this was compensated by rising international oil
prices, which led to a significant increase in oil
rent, especially in 2004 (table 3.A6).
Since 2001 the Government has received about
two thirds of the total rent, most of it in the form of
royalties, dividends and taxes paid by PDVSA.
Moreover, PDVSA has used part of its profits for
the financing of social programmes unrelated to
the company￿s main activities (table 3.A7 and
3.A8). The share of private companies in the total
rent has increased from 1 per cent in 1999 to nearly
9 per cent in 2004. Domestic consumers have ben-
efited from an implicit subsidy, as domestic prices
have been well below international oil prices.
The transfers from PDVSA have accounted,
on average, for about 95 per cent of government
revenue from the oil rent, the remaining 5 per cent
being paid by private companies. In view of the
relatively low fiscal contribution by private con-
tractors, the Government has announced its
intention to review the existing contracts to bring
then in line with the new Organic Hydrocarbons
Table 3.A6
VENEZUELA: ESTIMATE OF OIL RENT, 1999￿2004
Price Cost of
Production (f.o.b.) production Rent Total rent
(Million barrels) ($ per barrel) ($ million)
1999 1 117 14.3 2.9 11.5 12 817
2000 1 151 24.5 3.8 20.7 23 780
2001 1 115 18.0 3.9 14.1 15 750
2002 1 106 20.1 4.6 15.5 17 139
2003  989 23.8 5.6 18.2 17 995
2004 1 090 32.0 5.8 26.2 28 563
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on PDVSA, Estados Financieros Auditados, various years; Ministry of Energy
and Petroleum of Venezuela (PODE), Petr￿leo y otros datos estad￿sticos ￿ PODE 2002 database (www.mem.gov.ve);
EIA, Monthly Energy Review, January, 2005; and Espinasa, 2005.Trade and Development Report, 2005 122
Act.1 As a consequence, the share of PDVSA in
joint ventures would be increased to at least 51 per
cent, and the royalty rate to 30 per cent (with the
possibility of reducing the rate to 20 per cent in
special cases), while the tax rate on profits would
be reduced from 67 to 50 per cent. Former oper-
ating service agreements are to be replaced by
joint ventures with the State oil company, which
will hold a majority share, and those joint ven-
tures involved in exploiting the extra-heavy oil
from the Orinoco River basin will pay higher roy-
alties, from the present 1 per cent to 16.6 per cent.
Table 3.A7
VENEZUELA: ESTIMATE OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF OIL RENT, 1999￿2004
(Millions of dollars and per cent)
Total Non- Profits of Share of govern-
government distributed of private Subsidiesa Other Total ment revenue
revenue PDVSA profits companies to consumers paymentsb rent in total oil rent
($ million) (Per cent)
1999 7 492 1 099  125  409 3 692 12 817 58.5
2000 13 235 5 198  479 1 617 3 250 23 780 55.7
2001 12 284 - 447  393  826 2 694 15 750 78.0
2002 10 063  788  769 3 504 2 015 17 139 58.7
2003 11 310 1 618 1 416 2 774 877 17 995 62.8
2004 19 021  922 2 443 4 374 1 804 28 563 66.6
Source: See table 3.A6.
a Implicit subsidy resulting from the difference between international and domestic sales prices.
b Includes PDVSA￿s subsidies to its foreign subsidiaries, and financial costs.
Table 3.A8
VENEZUELA: COMPOSITION OF GOVERNMENT REVENUES FROM OIL, 1999￿2004
(Millions of dollars and per cent)
Average 1999￿2004
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 ($ million) (Per cent)
Tax revenues 2 764 6 226 3 602 1 640 2 618 3 139 3 332 27.2
PDVSA 2 521 5 748 3 122 1 102 1 823 2 058 2 729 22.3
Orinoco River basin  25  129  150  263  467  698  289 2.4
Operating service agreements  218  349  330  275  328  383  314 2.6
Royalties 3 009 4 992 3 907 5 671 6 085 9 653 5 553 45.4
PDVSA 3 008 4 986 3 900 5 659 6 063 9 621 5 540 45.3
Orinoco River basin  1  6  7  12  22  32  13 0.1
PDVSA dividends 1 719 2 018 4 774 2 752 2 283 2 217 2 627 21.5
PDVSA social programmes  0  0  0  0  324 4 011  723 5.9
Total government oil revenues 7 492 13 235 12 284 10 063 11 310 19 021 12 234 100.0
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Methodology
Rent from mining, as from oil exploitation,
is estimated as the difference between the values
of production at the relevant international price
and the cost of production. In estimating the min-
ing rent, however, costs of exploration and capital
depreciation are not considered. Since initial in-
vestment is quite high and the fiscal arrangements
typically allow for accelerated depreciation, a
considerable difference arises between calculated
rent and taxable profits, especially in the first years
of production.
Unit production costs are estimated by divid-
ing total costs (excluding depreciation) by total
production. They depend critically on the grade
of mineral ores. Following the accounting prac-
tices of Chilean firms, proceeds from the sale of
molybdenum, a by-product in copper production,
are deducted from the production cost. Due to lack
of data this was not possible in the case of Peru
implying that the calculation in this annex prob-
ably underestimates total copper rent in Peru.
Chile
Chile is the foremost copper producer in the
world, accounting for 37 per cent of global pro-
duction in 2004. About one third of its production
comes from the State-owned CODELCO and 60 per
cent from 10 large private companies, nine of
which are TNCs, and one (El Abra) a joint-venture
between a TNC and CODELCO. The remainder
is produced by several small- and medium-sized
private companies. The present analysis is lim-
ited to the activity of the 11 main producers, that
accounted for 93 per cent of Chilean copper output
between 1999 and 2004. Including its participa-
tion in El Abra, CODELCO provides 38 per cent
of this output. Total rent from copper production
has been rising since 1999, with a dramatic in-
crease in 2004 (table 3.A9).
The Government receives a part of this rent
through taxes paid by private companies and
through dividends and taxes paid by CODELCO,
as well as from the transfer of 10 per cent of the
latter￿s export revenues to the armed forces. Pri-
vate companies pay income tax on their profits,
like any other firm. The tax rate on undistributed
profits was 15 per cent until 2001 and increased
progressively thereafter, to reach 17 per cent in
2004. The tax rate on distributed profits is 35 per
cent. Most firms, until recently, had no taxable
profits, owing to an accelerated-depreciation re-
gime and a provision allowing unlimited carry-
forward of losses. Moreover, all the large private
mining firms had chosen the legal status of ￿min-
ing contractual firm￿ (instead of joint-stock com-
pany), which allowed them to transfer any
financial surplus to their parent company without
paying taxes on repatriated profits, if their finan-
cial statements showed no profits.2 Moreover, tax-
able profits can be reduced by interest payments
to the parent company. The tax rate on interest
payments is only 4 per cent, compared to 35 per
cent for the tax on distributed profits. This may
explain why debt-capital ratios tend to be rela-
tively high; investments are financed with a high
proportion of loans from parent companies rather
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than with capital provisions. The average debt-
capital ratio has been estimated at 3.5, with one
firm reaching a ratio of 16.9 (Lavandero, 2003).
This legal framework, which offers special
privileges to foreign investors in the mining sector,
largely explains the low share of the Government
in the copper rent until 2004, and the fact that this
share is mainly the result of transfers from the
State-owned company. The latter has contributed
more than 80 per cent of the public rent since
2002, much more than what would correspond
to CODELCO￿s share in copper revenues (ta-
ble 3.A10). In 2004, the rent obtained by the
Table 3.A9
CHILE: ESTIMATE OF COPPER RENT, 1999￿2004
CODELCO
Total share in total Price Cost of
production copper production (f.o.b.) production Rent Total rent
(Million pounds)  (Per cent) ($ per pound) ($ million)
1999 9 027 39.4 0.71 0.41 0.30 2 717
2000 9 505 37.4 0.82 0.42 0.41 3 849
2001 9 719 38.5 0.72 0.37 0.35 3 382
2002 9 312 38.6 0.71 0.38 0.34 3 120
2003 9 957 37.1 0.81 0.39 0.42 4 212
2004 10 898 37.2 1.30 0.38 0.92 10 026
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on Del Pino et al., 2005; CODELCO, Estados Financieros and Annual Report
2004; and annual reports and estados financieros of the following companies: La Escondida, Pelambres and Collahuasi,
various years.
Table 3.A10
CHILE: ESTIMATE OF GOVERNMENT REVENUE FROM COPPER RENT, 1999￿2004
(Millions of dollars and per cent)
Share of CODELCO
Taxes and Taxes from Total government government share in govern-
dividends from private revenue from revenue in total ment revenue
CODELCOa companies copper sector copper rent from copper
($ million) (Per cent)
1999  262  180  442 16.3 59.3
2000  564  230  794 20.6 71.0
2001  362  122  484 14.3 74.8
2002  303  59  362 11.6 83.7
2003 1 038  241 1 279 30.4 81.2
2004 4 568  950 5 518 55.0 82.8
Source: See table 3.A9.
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Government increased significantly, both in ab-
solute and relative terms, but the contribution of
the private companies has remained relatively
modest. The public debate on the relatively small
contribution of private operators to government
revenue, which had begun in the late 1990s, in-
tensified in 2001, when Exxon announced that it
was selling its mine, ￿La Disputada￿, for $1.3 bil-
lion. Exxon, which had acquired the mine in 1978,
had consistently declared losses for more than
20 years, and consequently had never paid taxes.
In May 2005, the Parliament approved a new leg-
islation introducing a supplementary 5-per-cent
levy on operational profits, for which there is less
possibility of tax evasion.
Peru
Following the privatization of public mining
companies and new private investments in the
1990s, the production of copper and gold has been
concentrated in four big companies controlled
by foreign investors. Two of these companies,
Yanacocha3 and Barrick, produced 64 per cent of
the gold in Peru in 2004, and two others, Southern
Peru Copper Corporation and Antamina, accounted
for 74 per cent of total copper production. The
analysis of the generation and distribution of min-
ing rent is limited to these companies.
Total rent generated in the gold and copper
sectors has increased significantly since 1999 (ta-
ble 3.A11 and 3.A12) owing to higher prices and
increasing production. Average unit costs of gold
have increased due to the lower grade of mineral
in one of the mines. The estimated rent that re-
mained with the private firms includes the ac-
counting after-tax profit and other income that is
used to cover administrative and financial costs,
as well as exploration and accelerated deprecia-
tion costs (corresponding to ￿other private sur-
plus￿ in tables 3.A13 an 3.A14 that was estimated
as a residual). Antamina, a company that took up
production in 2001, has not declared any profits
so far, and thus not paid any taxes.
The main source of fiscal revenue from these
mining activities has been the 30-per-cent income
tax on profits. Taxable income, if any, is normally
very low in the first years of operation, owing to
an accelerated-depreciation regime that can be
applied over five years. Moreover, the General
Mining Law of 1992 permits the deduction from
taxable income of the costs of investment in in-
frastructure considered to be of public interest.
Until August 2000, 80 per cent of retained profits
could also be deducted from taxable income, no
Table 3.A11
PERU: ESTIMATE OF GOLD RENT, 1999￿2004
Price Cost of
Production (f.o.b.) production Rent Total rent
(Million ounces) ($ per ounce) ($ million)
1999 2.49 279 83  196  488
2000 2.62 279 73  206  540
2001 2.81 271 91  180  506
2002 3.18 309 112  197  626
2003 3.71 360 111  249  924
2004 3.65 411 130  281 1 026
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on annual reports, various years, of the companies Barrick and Newmont
Mining Corporation; and Yanacocha, Social Balance, various years.Trade and Development Report, 2005 126
matter what their use. Other sources of public rev-
enue have been negligible: the firms did not pay
indirect taxes, since they exported 97 per cent of
their production and benefited from a regime of
anticipated reimbursement of these taxes. In June
2004, with a view to raise additional revenue from
private companies, a royalty on mining produc-
tion was introduced, at a rate of between 1 and
3 per cent, depending on the volume produced,
but due to prior agreements three of the four pri-
vate companies are still exempted from the royalty.
Table 3.A12
PERU: ESTIMATE OF COPPER RENT, 1999￿2004
Price Cost of
Production (f.o.b.) production Rent Total rent
(Million pounds) ($ per pound) ($ million)
1999  746 0.72 0.56 0.16  119
2000  751 0.84 0.54 0.30  225
2001  932 0.73 0.55 0.18  169
2002 1 493 0.73 0.49 0.24  357
2003 1 382 0.81 0.50 0.31  433
2004 1 694 1.29 0.48 0.81 1 374
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on Southern Peru Copper Corporation (SPCC) and Noranda, Annual Report,
various years; Lipkewich, 2003.
Table 3.A13
PERU: ESTIMATE OF GOVERNMENT REVENUE FROM GOLD RENT, 1999￿2004
(Millions of dollars and per cent)
Share of govern-
After-tax profits Other private ment revenue in
Income tax of private companies surplusa total gold rent
($ million) (Per cent)
1999 39 135 314 8.1
2000 42 226 271 7.9
2001 34 140 331 6.8
2002 72 290 264 11.5
2003 162 417 345 17.5
2004 181 476 369 17.6
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on Newmont, Annual Report, various years; Yanacocha, Responsabilidad
Social de la Empresa 2002; and Ministry of Energy and Mines of Peru, Presentation to the Congress of the Republic on
the financial and fiscal situation of Barrick, January 2005.
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1 See the Announcement by the Minister of Energy
and Oil, M. Rafael Ram￿rez, in Avances de la Nueva
PDVSA, 15 April 2005 (www.pdvsa.com), and
EIU, 2005b: 1.
2 For a comparative analysis (that includes the Chil-
ean case) of the legal framework for the mining in-
Table 3.A14
PERU: ESTIMATE OF GOVERNMENT REVENUE FROM COPPER RENT, 1999￿2004
(Millions of dollars and per cent)
Share of govern-
Income tax After-tax profits Other private ment revenue in
from copper sector of private companies surplus
a total copper rent
($ million) (Per cent)
1999 10 29 79 8.3
2000 43 93 89 19.1
2001 12 47 110 6.9
2002 34 61 262 9.5
2003 79 119 235 18.2
2004 317b 597 460 23.1
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on Noranda, Annual Report, various years.
a Residual from estimated rent and accounting profits.
b Including $15 million in royalties.
Notes
dustry, see Otto et al., 2000, and SÆnchez Albavera,
Ortiz and Moussa,  2001.
3 A minority share of Yanacocha￿s equity (43.6 per
cent) is held by a private Peruvian firm.Towards a New Form of Global Interdependence 129
In the past, developing-country trade relied
mainly on primary commodity exports to developed
countries in exchange for imports of manufactures.
The comparatively small proportion of develop-
ing-country manufactured exports tended to be in
resource- and labour-intensive products.
It has long been argued that such a trade pat-
tern provides insufficient support to economic
growth in developing countries. Both the pro-
ductivity potential and the income elasticity of
demand for primary commodities are usually
lower than for most manufactured products, with
the result that the global demand potential and the
growth stimulus of primary commodity exports
remain limited.
Furthermore, growth in demand for primary
commodity imports from developed countries has
weakened over the past three decades due to both
the slowdown in their growth and their move away
from raw-material-intensive industrial production
activities towards an increasingly service-based
economic structure. Long-standing market-access
barriers, combined with difficulties and high costs
of market entry, have also hampered developing-
country exports to developed countries.
Trade among developing countries, also
called South-South trade, has sometimes been pro-
moted as an alternative to this traditional trade
pattern. On this view, South-South trade can shield
against a decline in demand of developed coun-
tries for primary commodity exports, as well as
provide an opportunity for export diversification
away from a narrow dependence on primary com-
modities. In particular, manufactures with a
relatively high skill content could be more impor-
tant in manufactured trade among developing
countries than in their manufactured exports to
developed countries.
During the 1970s, some progress in this di-
rection was made, as South-South trade was grow-
ing considerably faster than both world trade and
trade among developed countries. It is true that
much of the increase in South-South trade as a
share of total world trade during the 1970s was
related to the rise in commodity prices, particu-
larly of petroleum, and it quickly dissipated fol-
Chapter IV
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lowing the price declines during the 1980s. But
some of it also resulted from a rise in intra-re-
gional trade of manufactures, particularly in East
Asia and Latin America. How-
ever, the economic and finan-
cial crises in much of the devel-
oping world, including many
Latin American countries, dur-
ing the early 1980s had a strong
adverse effect on South-South
trade.
The emergence of a
number of Asian developing
countries to form a new growth
pole in the world economy has renewed hopes that
South-South trade could provide additional mo-
mentum to development. Indeed, trade statistics
since the mid-1980s reveal three striking features:
(i) a dramatic increase in the value of manufac-
tured exports from developing countries; (ii) a ris-
ing share of developing countries in world trade;
and (iii) a strong increase of South-South trade in
both primary commodities and manufactures.
Taken together, these three fea-
tures have sometimes been re-
ferred to as the ￿new geography
of trade￿ (UNCTAD, 2004c).
Table 4.1 provides an il-
lustration of the evolution of
these three features over the
period 1965￿2003.1 It shows
that, as a share of developing
countries￿ total exports, South-South exports in-
creased from 25 per cent in 1965 to 43 per cent in
2003. This was accompanied by a decline in the
share of their exports to developed countries, from
69 per cent in 1965 to 54 per cent in 2003. At the
same time the share of the first-tier NIEs and China
in South-South imports rose from about one fifth
($1.3 billion out of $6.4 billion) in 1965 to almost
two thirds ($586 billion out of
$921 billion) in 2003, and
their share in developing-
country exports to developed
countries rose from 8 per cent
($1.5 billion out of $17.6 bil-
lion) in 1965 to almost 50 per
cent ($545  billion out of
$1,142 billion) in 2003. The
increase in their share of de-
veloping-country exports to
developed countries has been
particularly pronounced for manufactures, which
rose from 45 per cent ($0.9 billion out of $2.0
billion) in 1965 to 58 per cent ($512 billion out of
$879 billion) in 2003.2 The table also shows that
the shares of developing-country exports of pri-
mary commodities to developed countries fell
from 72 per cent in 1965 to 53 per cent in 2003,
while the share traded between them rose from
22 per cent in 1965 to 41 per cent in 2003. Yet,
again, the NIEs and China ac-
counted for more than half of
this growth.
These figures raise the
following questions: (i) What
are the reasons for the rising
importance of developing
countries in world trade?
(ii) How widespread is this
phenomenon? (iii) What are the prospects for a
further expansion of developing countries￿ trade
in world trade and of its role in stimulating eco-
nomic development? Sections B￿D of this chapter
focus on these questions.
Developing countries￿ tradi-
tional reliance on developed-
country markets and primary
commodities for their
exports cannot adequately
support growth. ...
... South-South trade has
been promoted as an
alternative.Towards a New Form of Global Interdependence 131
Table 4.1
MATRIX OF WORLD MERCHANDISE TRADE BY MAJOR PRODUCT CATEGORY,
1965, 1985 AND 2003
Importers
Developed countries Developing countries of which:
First-tier NIEs and China
Value Sharea Value Sharea Value Sharea
Exporters ($ billion) (Per cent) ($ billion) (Per cent) ($ billion) (Per cent)
1965
Developed countries
All merchandise 87.0 67.2 29.3 22.6 2.8 2.2
Manufactures 55.3 64.5 22.6 26.4 2.0 2.3
Primary commodities 30.4 75.2 6.2 15.2 0.8 2.0
Developing countries
All merchandise 17.6 68.9 6.4 25.1 1.1 4.3
Manufactures 2.0 53.4 1.6 43.8 0.2 5.1
Primary commodities 15.6 71.7 4.7 21.8 0.9 4.1
of which:
First-tier NIEs and China
All merchandise 1.5 53.7 1.3 47.1 0.2 7.7
Manufactures 0.9 55.5 0.7 47.2 0.1 6.7
Primary commodities 0.6 51.9 0.5 46.3 0.1 9.3
1985
Developed countries
All merchandise 851.3 67.5 279.2 22.1 79.1 6.3
Manufactures 616.9 67.0 221.2 24.0 63.6 6.9
Primary commodities 213.8 71.6 50.5 16.9 13.8 4.6
Developing countries
All merchandise 217.8 60.3 97.0 26.9 38.3 10.6
Manufactures 74.3 58.3 43.0 33.7 17.0 13.3
Primary commodities 131.9 59.4 40.3 18.2 12.7 5.7
of which:
First-tier NIEs and China
All merchandise 59.5 54.7 45.7 42.0 23.3 21.4
Manufactures 42.5 58.0 24.8 33.8 12.2 16.6
Primary commodities 6.7 25.5 7.9 30.1 2.8 10.7
2003
Developed countries
All merchandise 3 555.1  74.7 1 033.4  21.7  418.0  8.8
Manufactures 2 829.7  74.0  864.3  22.6  349.7  9.1
Primary commodities  614.3  78.0  136.2  17.3  53.9  6.8
Developing countries
All merchandise 1 141.7  53.8  921.4  43.4  510.4  24.1
Manufactures  879.1  54.4  714.3  44.2  429.2  26.5
Primary commodities  258.3  52.6  200.2  40.8  79.1  16.1
of which:
First-tier NIEs and China
All merchandise  545.4  47.5  586.0  51.0  385.1  33.5
Manufactures  511.6  48.6  526.8  50.1  350.6  33.3
Primary commodities  31.6  35.6  54.6  61.6  33.7  37.9
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on UN COMTRADE.
Note: The table is derived from data that countries report to the United Nations (see also text note 1). First-tier NIEs com-
prise Hong Kong (China), the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Taiwan Province of China.
a Share in group’s total exports of the product group. The shares of South-East Europe and the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) are not included in this table, which explains why the shares do not add up to 100.Trade and Development Report, 2005 132
The share of developing countries in world
merchandise trade has strongly increased over the
past few decades. Their export share has almost
doubled since 1970 and has stood at more than
30 per cent over the past few years, while their
import share has risen less rapidly, reaching 29 per
cent. Developed countries, on the other hand, have
experienced a decline in their share of world mer-
chandise trade by about 10 percentage points since
1970, but they still account for about two-thirds
of such trade (table 4.2).
The growing importance of developing coun-
tries in world merchandise trade has been neither
a continuous process nor uniformly spread across
the various developing regions. Their exports grew
very rapidly during the 1970s, but this was largely
due to the temporary hike in international oil
prices. Thus, the major oil exporting countries,
many of which are located in West Asia, were re-
sponsible for a significant part of the rise in
developing-country exports during the 1970s. The
subsequent sharp fall in oil prices, combined with
the effects of the debt crisis of the early 1980s,
led to the shrinking of developing countries￿ share
in world trade during the 1980s. As a result, in
1990 the shares of many developing countries, par-
ticularly in Africa and Latin America and the
Caribbean, were lower than their shares in 1970.
Despite a strong rebound during the 1990s, the
average shares in world trade of these two regions
have not recovered to the levels reached in 1980.
Contrary to the experience of the other de-
veloping regions, East Asia￿s share in world trade
has grown at a consistently rapid rate since the
early 1960s, except for a temporary decline in
the immediate aftermath of the Asian crisis in
1997￿1998. The share of the first-tier NIEs has
grown three- to fourfold since 1970, and China￿s
share has risen more than fivefold since 1980.
Indeed, over the period 1970￿2003 as a whole, the
NIEs and China together have been responsible
for almost the entire rise in the share of world ex-
ports of developing countries taken as a group.
The rapidly growing South-South trade has
often been identified as a major driving force
behind the rising share in world trade of all de-
veloping countries taken as a group. Indeed, be-
tween 1970 and 2003, South-South trade rose
considerably faster than both world trade and trade
among developed countries (table 4.3). The
share of South-South exports in total developing-
country exports roughly doubled, increasing from
about 23 per cent in the 1970s to over 40 per cent
in the period 2000￿2003. Moreover, South-South
exports as a percentage of developing-country
exports to developed country markets (South-
North trade) have also more than doubled, reach-
ing a level of about 74 per cent on average during
the period 2000￿2003 (and exceeding 80 per cent
in 2003).
Manufactures have been the most important
product category in South-South trade relative to
both developing countries￿ total exports and their
exports to developed countries. The only excep-
tion to this was a transitory period following the
Asian crisis when agricultural products overtook
B.  The growing importance of developing
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Table 4.2
THE ORIGIN AND DESTINATION OF MERCHANDISE TRADE, 1970￿2003
(Per cent)
Market share Average annual growth in value
1970￿ 1980￿ 1990￿ 2000￿
1970 1980 1990 2000 2003 1980 1990 2000 2003
A. World merchandise exports by region/country
Developed countries 75.0 65.3 72.0 65.7 64.8 18.8 7.3 5.9 4.6
Developing countries 19.2 29.5 24.3 31.6 32.1 25.6 3.1 8.9 5.8
of which:
Latin America
and the Caribbean 5.5 5.5 4.1 5.5 5.0 20.8 1.7 10.3 1.6
Developing Asia 8.5 18.0 16.9 23.8 24.7 29.6 4.6 9.5 6.7
South Asia 1.1 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.1 16.1 6.9 9.1 8.6
of which: India 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.8 17.3 7.3 9.5 10.7
East Asia 4.2 7.1 12.0 18.6 19.4 26.6 11.7 10.4 6.9
First-tier NIEs 2.0 3.8 7.6 10.3 9.4 28.2 14.4 8.8 2.6
China 0.7 0.9 1.8 3.9 5.8 20.0 12.8 14.5 20.8
West Asia 3.1 9.9 3.9 4.1 4.1 34.5 -6.3 5.8 5.2
Africa 5.0 5.9 3.2 2.3 2.4 21.6 -1.2 2.8 6.9
North Africa 1.6 2.2 1.2 0.8 0.9 23.7 -2.3 2.2 5.8
Other Africa 3.4 3.7 2.0 1.4 1.5 20.5 -0.5 3.2 7.5
Memo item:
Developing countries, excl.
first-tier NIEs and China 16.5 24.8 14.8 17.5 16.8 25.5 -0.9 8.1 3.8
B. World merchandise imports by region/country
Developed countries 75.6 70.8 73.1 69.5 68.4 19.4 6.9 6.2 4.3
Developing countries 18.8 24.0 22.5 28.7 29.0 23.6 4.0 8.3 5.4
of which:
Latin America and
the Caribbean 5.7 6.1 3.7 5.9 4.8 20.6 0.1 11.5 -2.5
Developing Asia 8.4 13.1 15.8 20.8 21.9 26.6 6.5 8.2 7.1
South Asia 1.3 1.3 1.1 1.2 1.4 20.0 3.7 8.6 9.2
of which: India 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.9 20.7 4.2 10.1 11.5
East Asia 5.1 7.2 11.7 16.7 17.6 24.4 10.9 8.9 7.0
First-tier NIEs 2.7 4.3 7.4 9.8 8.7 25.7 11.9 8.1 1.2
China 0.7 1.0 1.5 3.4 5.4 23.7 13.5 13.0 22.3
West Asia 2.0 4.6 2.9 2.8 2.9 33.6 -2.4 5.2 7.1
Africa 4.4 4.6 2.9 2.0 2.2 21.0 -0.2 3.5 8.8
North Africa 1.2 1.5 1.2 0.7 0.8 25.6 2.7 2.8 6.1
Other Africa 3.3 3.1 1.6 1.2 1.4 18.9 -2.1 4.0 10.3
Memo item:
Developing countries, excl.
first-tier NIEs and China 15.4 18.8 13.6 15.5 15.0 23.2 0.7 7.7 3.5
Source: UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics, various issues, table 1.1
Note: The group of first-tier NIEs comprises Hong Kong (China), the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Taiwan Province of
China. East Asia comprises China, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand, Viet Nam and
the first-tier NIEs. South Asia comprises Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri
Lanka. The shares of South-East Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) are not included in this
table, which explains why the shares do not add up to 100.Trade and Development Report, 2005 134
Table 4.3
SOUTH-SOUTH TRADE IN WORLD TRADE, 1970￿2003
Memo item:
1970￿1980 1980￿1990 1990￿2000 2000￿2003 1970￿2003
South-South trade
(Average annual percentage change)
Total merchandise exports 26.7 5.8 10.9 7.9 13.3
Agricultural products 20.5 4.9 7.9 7.3 9.4
Fuels, minerals and metals
a 30.2 -8.8 7.8 -0.9 7.6
Manufactures 26.4 16.9 12.1 9.6 18.3
South-South trade as a percentage of
total developing-country exports
(Period averages)
Total merchandise exports 22.9 29.5 39.1 40.9 31.6
Agricultural products 22.3 30.6 39.6 43.1 32.0
Fuels, minerals and metalsa 20.1 21.1 30.7 36.2 25.2
Manufactures 34.5 36.5 41.6 41.9 37.9
South-South trade as a percentage of
developing-country exports to
developed countries
(Period averages)
Total merchandise exports 35.3 48.0 71.2 74.3 53.8
Agricultural products 34.5 52.5 71.6 80.9 55.5
Fuels, minerals and metals
a 30.9 32.4 60.9 71.5 44.4
Manufactures 60.1 64.4 74.3 73.8 66.8
South-South trade as a percentage of
total developing-country imports
(Period averages)
Total merchandise imports 26.1 32.4 37.8 43.9 33.1
Agricultural products 37.9 36.3 42.0 44.9 39.4
Fuels, minerals and metalsa 74.1 72.9 67.2 66.8 70.9
Manufactures 11.6 20.1 33.1 39.8 23.3
South-South trade as a percentage of
developing-country imports from
developed countries
(Period averages)
Total merchandise imports 38.0 51.5 64.7 85.1 54.4
Agricultural products 65.7 62.2 76.8 87.1 70.4
Fuels, minerals and metals
a 394.2 396.2 261.3 327.9 344.3
Manufactures 13.8 27.4 51.8 69.6 34.7
Memo items:
Total world exports
(Average annual percentage change)
Total merchandise exports 20.2 6.7 7.4 4.5 9.2
Agricultural products 17.1 4.6 3.9 6.7 6.6
Fuels, minerals and metalsa 27.1 -3.7 6.7 -1.6 6.5
Manufactures 19.0 10.1 7.9 5.2 10.3
Trade among developed countries
(Average annual percentage change)
Total merchandise exports 17.2 9.5 6.8 5.0 9.2
Agricultural products 15.4 6.4 3.6 8.1 6.8
Fuels, minerals and metals 19.9 1.0 5.1 2.8 7.3
Manufactures 17.1 11.2 7.4 4.9 9.8
Source: See table 4.1.
Note: The table is derived from data that countries report to the United Nations (see also text note 1).
a Developing-country exports of fuels are underreported for recent years due to missing data.Towards a New Form of Global Interdependence 135
manufactures. But a comparison of South-South
trade with that of developing-country exports to
developed countries also reveals that primary com-
modities have been much more dynamic than
manufactures: the percentage share of agricultural
products and of fuels, minerals and metals in
South-South trade relative to
developing-country exports to
developed countries has more
than doubled since 1970, their
increase being particularly
strong since the early 1990s.
Table 4.3 also shows that
the importance of trade among
developing countries relative
to their trade with developed
countries has risen more strongly for imports than
for exports. This is the most apparent for manu-
factures, as their average share in South-South
trade relative to developing-country imports from
developed countries increased from about 14 per
cent during the 1970s to about 70 per cent in 2000￿
2003. As discussed in more detail below, much of
this is due to the rising importance of production-
sharing within East Asia, resulting in a ￿triangu-
lar trade￿ pattern. This means that, rather than ex-
porting directly to developed countries, the indus-
trially relatively more advanced countries such as
the Republic of Korea export intermediate pro-
duction inputs to China, for example, where these
inputs are used in production for export to devel-
oped countries. On an accounting basis, triangu-
lar trade leads to a rise of similar dimensions in
both South-South and South-North exports, while
in terms of imports it results in a rise only in South-
South trade, but not in a rise
of developing-country imports
from developed countries.
Thus the statistical effect of
triangular trade is that trade in
manufactures among develop-
ing countries relative to such
trade with developed countries
rises much more for imports
than for exports. This mecha-
nism also explains the different performance of
trade in primary commodities and manufactures
noted in the preceding paragraph: triangular trade
by and large causes South-South manufactured
exports to move pari passu with South-North
manufactured exports, while this is not the case
for primary commodities in which there is no tri-
angular trade.
The rapid rise in the importance of South-
South trade, particularly over the past two dec-
ades, reflects a number of factors. First, it reflects
an upswing after the downturn
of such trade during the 1980s.
Table 4.3 shows that growth in
South-South trade during the
1980s was significantly slower
than that of either world trade
or trade among developed
countries. While the global
recession of the early 1980s
affected the trade performance
of both developed and devel-
oping countries, it had a particularly damaging
impact on South-South trade. This is because it
was associated with economic and financial cri-
ses in many developing countries, particularly in
Latin America and Africa, caused by the collapse
of commodity prices, the rising cost of servicing
soaring external debts and the ensuing sharp con-
traction of the supply of commercial credit that
reduced their capacity to import. Combined with
slow or negative economic growth, the outcome
was a substantial fall in the volume of these coun-
tries￿ imports, including those from other devel-
oping countries (TDR 1993).
The impetus from Latin America and Africa
to South-South trade also weakened considerably
in the wake of the debt crisis, because many of
these countries shifted the direction of their ex-
ports, particularly of manufactures, towards de-
veloped countries. This shift
was partly motivated by the
slowdown of economic activ-
ity in developed countries be-
ing much less sharp than in
developing countries. Combined
with the large size of developed-
country markets, the relatively
faster growth of demand in
those markets provided better
opportunities for developing-country exporters.
Another reason was that foreign-exchange-starved
countries, particularly those in Africa, sought ex-
port revenues in convertible currencies in order
to service their debt and to import, as far as possi-
ble, on credit.
South-South trade is
concentrated in a few
economies, mainly in East
Asia.
South-South trade,
especially in manufactures,
has risen faster than both
world trade and trade
among developed countries.Trade and Development Report, 2005 136
The second reason for the rapid rise in the
importance of trade among developing countries,
particularly over the past two decades, has been
trade liberalization. The move towards the adop-
tion of more outward-oriented development strat-
egies, along with trade reform and regional trade
agreements, in a wide range of
developing countries has sig-
nificantly improved access to
their markets, including for
imports from other developing
countries. More generally, aver-
age tariffs in developing coun-
tries fell to about one third
their level of the mid-1980s,
and this decline was accompa-
nied by even larger reductions
in non-tariff barriers and in exchange rate over-
valuation. The reduction of developed-country tar-
iff and non-tariff barriers during the same period
of time was smaller (World Bank, 2004b: 76).
But the most important reason for the rapid
growth of South-South trade is probably a combi-
nation of three factors: the widening growth
differential between developing and developed
countries; the large size of the rapidly growing
developing countries; and the growing importance
of intraregional specialization and production-
sharing that has been closely linked to these
countries￿ buoyant growth performance. Over the
past three decades, developing countries as a group
have recorded more rapid average real income
growth than developed countries, and this differ-
ence has become increasingly larger over the past
two decades. During the 1980s developed and de-
veloping countries grew at a pace of 3.1 per cent
and 3.7 per cent, respectively; during the 1990s
economic growth in developed countries slowed
down to 2.4 per cent, but in developing countries
it accelerated to 4.8 per cent; and during the pe-
riod 2001￿2004, average real income growth in
developing countries was more than double that
in developed countries (chapter I, table 1.1; and
UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics, various issues,
table 7.2).
Apart from relatively weak economic growth,
developed countries (the traditional destination of
developing country exports of primary commodi-
ties) have increasingly undergone structural
change away from raw-material-intensive indus-
trial activities. This has limited their import de-
mand for non-food primary commodities. More-
over, given only little change in the level and com-
position of per capita food consumption and stag-
nating or declining populations, developed coun-
try markets have shown little dynamism with
respect to food imports from
developing countries. This con-
trasts with those developing
countries that have grown rap-
idly in the past few years. Given
their generally lower levels of
per capita income and rapidly
increasing populations, as well
as their still relatively low lev-
els of industrialization, the in-
come elasticity for food and
raw materials in these countries exceeds that in
developed countries (chapter II). Thus, once eco-
nomic growth and industrialization had gathered
sufficient momentum in developing countries,
many primary commodities that had previously
displayed lacklustre performance in the world
market for an extended period of time recovered
their dynamism on the basis of the rapid growth
and industrialization of some developing countries.
The impact on trade flows of the rising im-
portance of developing countries as a growth pole
in the world economy is largely due to the fact
that this growth performance has been concen-
trated in the NIEs, China and India. Combined,
these economies account for about one fifth of
total world income (in terms of purchasing power
parity) and two-fifths of the total world population.
Rapid economic growth and industrialization
in East Asia have been accompanied by a marked
trend towards greater integration and specializa-
tion in the region, which has led to a rapid expan-
sion of trade within production networks. As
discussed in some detail in TDR 2002, lower trans-
port and communication costs, and reduced trade
and regulatory barriers have facilitated production-
sharing on a global basis. Production-sharing is
generally concentrated in labour-intensive prod-
ucts; but it can also involve the location at differ-
ent sites of labour-intensive segments of otherwise
technologically complex production processes. It
allows firms to exploit the comparative advantage
of different locations specific to the production
of particular components, including scale econo-
Much of the increase in
South-South trade in
manufactures, as shown in
trade statistics, is due to
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mies, and differences in labour costs across coun-
tries. Firms operating in East Asian economies
have been particularly successful in spreading pro-
duction activities in clothing, footwear and elec-
tronics across this subregion, taking advantage of
labour-cost differentials.
International production networks promote a
new pattern of trade, in which goods travel across
several locations before reaching final consum-
ers, and the total value of trade recorded in such
products exceeds their value added by a consider-
able margin. As illustrated in figure 4.1, trade of
such products within production networks can
cause a very substantial increase in recorded trade
among developing countries, without any increase
in final consumption in developed countries. This
rise in recorded South-South trade is higher the
larger the import content of a good assembled in
a developing country and exported to another de-
veloping country. Recorded South-South trade
increases particularly fast if the trade within pro-
duction networks involves passing through tran-
shipment ports, such as Hong Kong (China) and
Singapore.
Figure 4.2 illustrates how triangular trade
leads to a rise in recorded South-South trade. It
shows that the strong rise in
manufactured exports from the
Republic of Korea and Malay-
sia to China since the early
1990s has been accompanied
by an almost equally strong rise
in China￿s exports to the United
States. This has two important
implications for South-South
trade. First, the magnitude of
South-South trade in manufac-
tures depends to a consider-
able extent on United States
import demand for products for which production-
sharing within East Asia plays an important role.
Thus the recent rise in South-South trade is partly
the result of strong growth in the United States
economy, which, combined with increased com-
petitiveness brought about by currency devalua-
tions in the aftermath of the Asian crisis, provided
an independent export stimulus; at the same time,
the trade impulse was amplified by strong intra-
regional trade linkages. But it also means that
slower economic growth in the United States
would reduce not only United States imports of
finished products, but also China￿s imports of parts
and components from which the finished products
are assembled. Second, the magnitude of South-
South trade in manufactures will decline to the
extent that China succeeds in reducing the import
content of its exports. As discussed in chapter II,
there are indications that China is indeed reduc-
ing the share of imported parts and components
in its electronics exports, many of which are di-
rected to the United States.
The new pattern of international trade result-
ing from international production networks, and
the strong involvement of East Asian economies
in these networks, goes a long way in explaining
two main new features of South-South trade, rela-
tive to the 1970s: its much larger size, already
mentioned, and its narrow concentration among
East Asian economies. In 2003, trade among East
Asian economies accounted for about two thirds
of total South-South trade (up from 21 per cent in
the 1970s), while trade between East Asia and
other developing countries accounted for about
another 14 per cent (table 4.4). Intra-East Asian
trade in manufactures has grown particularly rap-
idly. In 2003, trade among East Asian economies
was responsible for 72 per cent of total South-
South trade in manufactures,
up from 26 per cent in 1970.
But even for primary com-
modities, trade among East
Asian countries now represents
about one third of total South-
South trade ￿ broadly double
the share in 1970. The bulk
of this increasing importance
of intra-East Asian trade as
a share of total South-South
trade occurred during the
1980s, when rapid growth and
industrialization in the NIEs were accompanied by
increasing intra-regional specialization of produc-
tion and rapid trade integration by China.
South-South trade is concentrated in a few
individual economies, mainly in East Asia. In
2003, the top 10 economies in South-South trade
jointly accounted for about 84 per cent of total
South-South exports and for about 78 per cent of
total South-South imports. Brazil (as an exporter
and as an importer) and Mexico (as an importer)
￿ associated with
triangular trade within
international production
networks and indirect
maritime trade through
regional hub ports.Trade and Development Report, 2005 138
Figure 4.1
SCHEMATIC ILLUSTRATION OF THE IMPACT OF PRODUCTION-SHARING
ON THE STATISTICALLY RECORDED VALUE OF SOUTH-SOUTH TRADE
Source: UNCTAD secretariat.
Note: The numbers used are fictitious.
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are the only non-Asian countries that feature
among these top 10 economies. The top two
economies, China and Hong Kong (China), taken
together, are responsible for more than one third
of South-South trade (table 4.5).
The concentration of South-South trade is
particularly strong in exports of manufactures in
which the top 10 economies account for over 90 per
cent ￿ and China and Hong Kong (China) for about
40 per cent ￿ of total South-South exports. It is
less concentrated in primary commodities than in
manufactures. This is especially true for exports
where the top 10 economies account for roughly
two-thirds to three-fourths of total South-South
trade, and where countries from all developing
regions rank among the top 10 traders. The fact
that Singapore features among the leading coun-
tries in South-South trade of fuels, minerals and
metals reflects its function as a regional hub port
for transhipment of goods in this category to
neighbouring countries.
The function of Hong Kong (China) as a tran-
shipment port for China￿s external trade alone is
responsible for a substantial share of overall
South-South trade. More than 40 per cent of Chi-
na￿s exports to other developing countries go to
Hong Kong (China) and about three quarters of
the exports from Hong Kong (China) to other de-
veloping countries go to China. More specifically,
exchanges between China and Hong Kong (China)
represent about 20 per cent of total merchandise
trade ￿ and almost 25 per cent of manufactured
trade ￿ among developing countries.3
There are marked differences across indi-
vidual developing countries regarding both the
current reliance on developing-country markets
and the change in this reliance since the early
1990s (table 4.6). Among the developing coun-
tries for which comprehensive data are available,
Eritrea, Paraguay and Sudan rely more than 80 per
cent on other developing countries for their ex-
ports. The landlocked situation of Paraguay and
Sudan, and transhipment in the case of Eritrea,
probably explain these high levels.4 By contrast,
exports to other developing countries account for
only 5 per cent of Mexico￿s total exports, and for
10￿15 per cent of the total exports of a range of
countries such as Bangladesh, Fiji, Jamaica, Mada-
gascar, Mauritius, Morocco and Papua New Guinea.
Strong reliance on a single export item (such as
clothing, sugar, or a metal) and/or preferential
access to developed-country markets are probably
the main reasons, although they do not seem to
have played such a strong role for other develop-
ing countries.
Figure 4.2
TRIANGULAR TRADE IN MANUFACTURES
BETWEEN EAST ASIA AND THE
UNITED STATES, 1990￿2003
(Billions of dollars)
Source: See table 4.1.Trade and Development Report, 2005 140
Table 4.4
SOUTH-SOUTH MERCHANDISE EXPORTS, BY GEOGRAPHICAL REGION, 1970￿2003
Share in total South-South exports Average annual percentage Memo item:
of the respective product category  growth in value Value
(Per cent) (Per cent) ($ million)
1970￿ 1980￿ 1990￿ 2000￿
1970 1980 1990 2000 2003 1980 1990 2000 2003 1970 2003
Asia
Asian exports to
other developing countries
Total merchandise 9.7 11.8 4.8 8.4 8.1 29.8 -2.2 15.5 5.9 1 077 74 260
Manufactures 18.7 12.8 7.2 8.9 8.1 21.2 9.9 13.7 4.6 595 58 013
Primary commodities 6.2 11.2 0.1 6.8 7.0 34.7 -26.3 41.2 7.4 477 13 993
Intra-Asian exports
Total merchandise 49.3 56.1 80.0 76.0 77.9 27.9 9.8 10.3 8.9 5 452 717 882
Manufactures 49.4 59.7 82.5 82.4 84.6 29.0 20.7 12.0 10.8 1 568 604 404
Primary commodities 50.1 55.3 74.9 56.8 54.5 27.5 -1.1 5.0 0.4 3 838 109 047
East Asian exports to
other developing countries
Total merchandise 11.3 11.7 14.1 14.1 14.2 28.4 7.9 11.0 7.7 1 249 130 628
Manufactures 19.4 24.1 16.3 16.0 15.3 31.6 11.6 11.8 7.4  616 109 113
Primary commodities 8.0 6.4 9.8 8.3 9.0 24.4 1.3 7.1 5.0  614 18 076
Intra-East Asian exports
Total merchandise 21.0 20.1 57.5 62.1 64.4 25.6 19.5 11.6 9.6 2 326 593 650
Manufactures 26.5 31.5 67.2 70.5 72.1 27.1 27.5 12.5 10.7  842 514 702
Primary commodities 19.0 15.4 38.4 37.2 38.1 24.4 7.9 7.6 3.3 1 456 76 244
South Asian exports to
other developing countries
Total merchandise 7.0 3.5 2.5 2.6 3.6 20.4 3.7 10.9 20.0  778 33 128
Manufactures 14.2 5.7 2.4 2.7 3.2 18.0 5.8 13.2 15.8  452 23 186
Primary commodities 4.2 2.7 2.8 2.3 4.8 23.0 1.2 5.6 33.7  323 9 541
Latin America and the Caribbean
Latin American and Caribbean
exports to other developing countries
Total merchandise 9.8 9.6 4.2 2.6 3.5 25.4 -2.3 7.2 19.4 1 084 32 166
Manufactures 2.5 4.4 2.8 0.9 1.3 33.2 11.7 1.3 21.7  79 8 967
Primary commodities 13.1 12.0 7.2 7.5 11.6 24.6 -7.5 10.4 18.5 1 004 23 182
Intraregional exports
Total merchandise 18.7 13.6 8.5 8.3 6.6 22.7 1.6 11.6 -1.3 2 071 60 973
Manufactures 22.5 20.5 6.0 5.9 4.4 25.2 4.5 13.2 -2.4  714 31 094
Primary commodities 17.5 11.2 13.5 15.5 14.9 21.1 -0.7 10.0 -0.2 1 342 29 723
Africa
African exports to
other developing countries
Total merchandise 5.4 6.0 1.1 2.8 2.3 29.8 -10.4 19.6 1.2  599 21 006
Manufactures 1.6 1.1 0.7 0.7 0.7 20.6 10.4 11.2 8.6  50 4 851
Primary commodities 7.2 7.0 2.0 9.1 8.0 28.1 -13.9 23.9 -0.7  550 16 112
Intraregional exports
Total merchandise 5.7 1.2 1.2 1.9 1.6 13.5 0.1 17.0 4.8  629 14 506
Manufactures 4.9 1.4 0.9 1.1 0.9 13.5 6.7 16.1 7.0  157 6 620
Primary commodities 4.1 1.2 1.9 4.1 3.9 15.6 -3.6 18.6 2.9  315 7 817
Source: See table 4.1.
Note: See note to table 4.2 for country groupings. Total merchandise includes SITC 0 to 9, manufactures includes SITC 5 to
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There have also been wide cross-country
variations of shifts in the importance of South-
South trade in total exports. Since the early 1990s,
the importance of other developing countries as a
destination for their exports has halved for Bang-
ladesh and Mexico, whereas it has more than
tripled for the Dominican Republic, Honduras and
Nigeria. Most importantly, on a country-specific
basis, the importance of South-South trade for
Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean has
grown much more than for Asia, and it now ac-
counts for a similar share in all three developing
regions: for the countries included in table 4.6,
the unweighted average of the share of develop-
ing countries in total exports increased from 26 per
cent to 39 per cent for Africa and from 29 per cent
to 41 per cent for Latin America, compared to the
much smaller increase from 34 per cent to 38 per
cent for Asia.5
Indeed, many of the relatively small coun-
tries for which exports to other developing
countries accounted for a sizeable share of their
total exports over the past few years are located
in West Africa, such as Benin (79 per cent), Niger
(60 per cent), Senegal (53 per cent), and Togo
Table 4.5
TOP 10 ECONOMIES IN SOUTH-SOUTH TRADE, 2003
(Percentage shares of total South-South trade)
Rank Total merchandise Manufactures Fuels, mineral and metals Agricultural products
Leading exporting economies
1 China (19.7) China (22.4) Singapore (9.8) China (11.5)
2 Hong Kong (China) (14.2) Hong Kong (China) (17.2) China (9.7) Argentina (10.6)
3 Rep. of Korea (11.1) Rep. of Korea (13.2) Indonesia (7.3) Brazil (10.2)
4 Singapore (9.4) Taiwan Prov. of China (11.2) Nigeria (6.4) Malaysia (9.6)
5 Taiwan Prov. of China (9.3) Singapore (9.7) Iran, Islamic Rep. of (6.2) Thailand (8.2)
6 Malaysia (6.0) Malaysia (5.6) Venezuela (5.9) Indonesia (6.5)
7 Thailand (4.1) Thailand (3.9) Malaysia (5.8) India (5.5)
8 India (3.4) India (3.0) Rep. of Korea (5.0) Hong Kong (China)  (5.1)
9 Brazil (3.3) Brazil (2.4) India (4.4) Chile (2.6)
10 Indonesia (3.1) Indonesia (2.1) Chile (3.6) Singapore (2.5)
Memo item:
Share of
top 10 83.5 90.7 64.2 72.3
Leading importing economies
1 China (21.0) Hong Kong (China) (23.3) Rep. of Korea (20.4) China (17.9)
2 Hong Kong (China) (17.7) China (21.9) China (19.1) Hong Kong (China) (7.4)
3 Rep. of Korea (8.9) Singapore (8.1) Taiwan Prov. of China (8.7) Rep. of Korea (7.2)
4 Singapore (7.7) Rep. of Korea (5.7) Singapore (8.2) India (6.1)
5 Taiwan Prov. of China (5.9) Taiwan Prov. of China (5.4) Thailand (5.2) Malaysia (4.2)
6 Malaysia (4.6) Malaysia (5.0) Indonesia (4.1) Brazil (3.9)
7 Thailand (4.0) Mexico (4.4) Brazil (4.0) Thailand (3.6)
8 Mexico (3.5) Thailand (3.6) Hong Kong (China) (3.3) Saudi Arabia (3.6)
9 India (2.5) India (2.3) Turkey (3.2) Singapore (3.4)
10 Brazil (2.2) Philippines (1.9) Malaysia (2.9) Indonesia (3.0)
Memo item:
Share of
top 10 77.8 81.7 79.2 60.4
Source: See table 4.1.T
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Table 4.6
IMPORTANCE OF SOUTH-SOUTH TRADE FOR DEVELOPING ECONOMIES, 1990￿2003
(Share of exports to developing economies in total exports, per cent)
Africa Asia Latin America and the Caribbean
Exporting economy 1990￿1992 2000￿2003 Exporting economy 1990￿1992 2000￿2003 Exporting economy 1990￿1992 2000￿2003
Algeria 6.7 15.6 Bangladesh 21.9 10.4 Antigua and Barbuda .. 53.4
Benin 47.2 79.1 China 60.4 41.0 Argentina 46.0 63.2
Cameroon 13.2 24.8 Fiji 22.2 13.7 Barbados 35.7 48.8
C￿te d￿Ivoire .. 36.5 Hong Kong (China) 47.3 54.3 Bolivia 45.9 58.5
Egypt 23.4 35.4 India 28.0 44.5 Brazil 33.3 38.1
Eritrea .. 83.3 Indonesia 33.7 45.5 Chile 27.6 39.3
Ethiopia .. 43.1 Iran, Islamic Rep. of .. 31.1 Colombia 24.0 33.4
Kenya 45.9 56.5 Jordan 70.4 58.9 Costa Rica 20.5 29.0
Madagascar 18.1 12.8 Macao (China) 22.4 22.1 Dominican Rep. 4.5 21.7
Malawi 9.6 26.1 Malaysia 48.6 50.2 Ecuador 31.7 37.2
Mali 73.5 27.7 Nepal 21.2 52.5 El Salvador 34.8 68.0
Mauritius 6.6 10.2 Oman 27.8 37.8 Honduras 11.0 37.5
Morocco 24.1 14.5 Pakistan 38.3 40.3 Jamaica 13.1 11.1
Niger .. 59.6 Papua New Guinea 17.3 10.4 Mexico 8.2 5.0
Nigeria 7.3 31.4 Philippines 20.8 38.6 Montserrat .. 52.7
Senegal 37.4 53.1 Qatar 21.0 49.1 Nicaragua 28.8 43.0
Sudan .. 83.2 Rep. of Korea 34.6 49.8 Panama 18.7 26.5
Togo 42.7 72.5 Saudi Arabia 38.2 27.1 Paraguay 57.4 80.8
Tunisia 16.8 13.8 Singapore 49.2 58.8 Peru 31.4 32.7
United Rep. of Tanzania .. 31.0 Sri Lanka 25.7 20.7 Trinidad and Tobago 34.2 37.5
Zambia .. 16.0 Syrian Arab Rep. 24.6 30.1 Uruguay 53.4 60.7
Zimbabwe 23.7 36.2 Taiwan Prov. of China 34.1 50.2 Venezuela 22.0 29.7
Thailand 31.6 43.5
Viet Nam .. 40.6
Memo item:
Unweighted
   group averages 26.4 39.2 33.6 38.4 29.1 41.3
Source: See table 4.1.
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(72 per cent), or Central America and the Carib-
bean, such as Antigua and Barbuda (53 per cent),
Barbados (50 per cent), Honduras (38 per cent),
and Montserrat (53 per cent). This is similar to
the countries listed by Andriamananjara, Arce and
Ferrantino (2004: table 3) as small transhipment
countries for which re-exports account for a large
share of their gross exports. The emergence of a
worldwide hub-and-spoke system of shipping
routes that is discussed in some detail in box 4.1,
and that has proved to be an efficient way of serv-
icing smaller countries and of providing many
more port-to-port connections than direct services,
is probably the main reason for this high share for
many of these countries. The use of entrep￿t trade
to facilitate tariff evasion may explain some of it
for the other countries in the list.
However, given that, as discussed above, the
absolute level of trade in Asian developing coun-
tries is on average much higher than in Africa and
Latin America and the Carib-
bean, this has not altered the
predominance of Asian coun-
tries in South-South trade. In-
deed, the strong role of trade
among East Asian economies
in the rise of South-South trade
also partly explains the ob-
served inverse correlation be-
tween the number of regional
trade arrangements (RTAs)
and intraregional trade shares.
Asia has only one major RTA while Latin America
and the Caribbean as well as Africa have a large
number of RTAs (WTO, 2003: 26￿28). Regional
economic and trade cooperation, including through
bilateral and regional trade agreements, has been
a major mechanism employed by an increasing
number of developing countries to expand mutual
trade and investment. Regional arrangements
offer participating countries significant opportu-
nities to enlarge economic space and pool eco-
nomic, human, technological and infrastructural
resources. Where complementarities exist, re-
gional cooperation enables the participants to
expand trade in specific sectors. However, intra-
regional trade within existing RTAs has suffered
from continuing trade barriers, infrastructural
problems in transport and information technology,
and, often, few complementarities because of simi-
lar resource endowments. Recently, developing
countries have reinvigorated their regional liber-
alization programmes and entered into initiatives
aimed at deeper integration. These changes, if im-
plemented, may further boost intra-group trade
(UNCTAD, 2005d).
Relatively weak trade performance within
RTAs such as MERCOSUR in Latin America, has
also been due to the volatility in the economic
performance of its member States more generally.
For example, the sizeable fluctuations in real in-
come growth rates and in the real exchange rates
of Argentina and Brazil during much of the pe-
riod since the early-1990s have prevented indus-
try in these countries from taking a long-term view.
They have also impaired the investment in pro-
duction capacity needed for restructuring indus-
try and improving productivity and competitive-
ness following the economic crisis in the 1980s.
In particular, during the second half of the 1990s,
considerable fluctuations of the exchange rate
between the Argentinean and
Brazilian currencies hampered
trade within MERCOSUR.
Nevertheless, the expansion of
the automobile industry in Ar-
gentina and Brazil, based on
increased specialization and
production complementarity,
which was one of the objec-
tives of MERCOSUR, has con-
tributed significantly to the
growth of South-South trade in
automotive products (TDR 2002). Moreover, the
acceleration of economic growth in MERCOSUR
in 2004 and 2005 has been accompanied by a rise
in intra regional trade in Latin America. For ex-
ample, according to Argentina￿s National Statis-
tics and Census Institute (Instituto Nacional de
Estad￿stica y Censos),6 the dollar value of Argen-
tina￿s imports from MERCOSUR of the first five
months of 2005 exceeded that of the same period
in 2004 (2003) by 44 (149) per cent, the respective
numbers for Argentina￿s exports to MERCOSUR
being 9 per cent and 27 per cent.
Over the past few years, interregional trade
between developing countries has lacked the dy-
namism it had in the 1970s, and it has also been less
dynamic than intraregional trade. However, the
earlier performance was mainly a reflection of the
sharp increase in the value of oil shipments from
The rise of South-South
trade in primary
commodities, though
modest, is more
widespread, and probably
more resilient.Trade and Development Report, 2005 144
Box 4.1
TOWARDS A NEW STRUCTURE OF GLOBAL MARITIME TRADE
The rapidly growing importance of East Asian economies in international trade has been closely asso-
ciated with the emergence of a new structure of global maritime trade. While there is a continuation of
traditional maritime shipping patterns, based on shipments of manufactures among developed coun-
tries, and from developed to developing countries in exchange for primary commodities, the greater
participation in world trade of the NIEs and China has been accompanied by the emergence of a trian-
gular shipping pattern: these countries import much of their raw materials in the form of bulk cargo
from other developing countries and export much of their manufactured goods in the form of container-
ized cargo to developed countries.
The development of global shipping networks, the move towards containerization in maritime trans-
port, as well as port and customs reforms and increased investment in transport infrastructure by devel-
oping countries, have occurred at the same time as greater developing-country trade. In particular since
the early 1990s, the global exchange of goods has benefited from the establishment of global liner
shipping networks that connect regional, North-South and East-West shipping routes via transhipment
ports. Thus regular, albeit indirect, maritime transport connections have enabled even countries that are
not directly connected through liner shipping services to trade with each other. Moreover, the greater
time efficiency of port, customs and shipping services, including through investment in information
and communication technologies, has facilitated developing countries￿ participation in global produc-
tion networks and the associated requirement to comply with ￿just in time￿ delivery. Hummels (2001),
for example, estimates that each additional day spent in transport reduces the probability that the United
States will source from a particular country by 1￿1.5 per cent, and that each day saved in shipping time
is worth 0.8 per cent of the traded manufactured good￿s value. He also estimates that the advent of fast
transport (through air shipping and faster ocean vessels) was equivalent to a reduction in tariffs on
manufactured goods from 32 per cent to 9 per cent between 1950 and 1998.
The mode of maritime transport differs between manufactures and primary commodities. Most inter-
continental trade of manufactured goods and components is containerized and transported by regular,
so-called ￿liner shipping￿ services. Access to such services is therefore a crucial aspect of competitive-
ness in the international trade of such goods. The highest liner shipping connectivity has been measured
for Hong Kong (China), followed by Singapore, China, the United States and the Netherlands. The
main determinant of a country￿s liner shipping connectivity is the volume of its containerized trade ￿
greater volume attracts better liner shipping services. At the same time, ports that are located in favour-
able geographic locations (i.e. at the crossroads of shipping routes), and that provide fast and reliable
transhipment services to shipping lines, tend to attract far more shipping services than they would on
the basis of ￿national￿ trade alone. The main examples of such transhipment centres include Hong
Kong (China), Panama and Singapore. This has contributed to the fact that, today, 20 of the 30 busiest
container ports are located in Asia and Asian companies account for 46 per cent of global container ship
operations. Moreover, between 2003 and 2004, operations in the two top Chinese container ports of
Shanghai and Shenzhen grew by 28 per cent. It is estimated that in 2005, China will account for about
one fourth of the world￿s containerized exports (measured in container units); the next biggest Asian
exporters will be Japan (5.8 per cent of world containerized exports), the Republic of Korea (4.1 per
cent), Taiwan Province of China (3.9 per cent), Indonesia (3.3 per cent) and Thailand (2.6 per cent).
By contrast, primary commodities are shipped in the form of bulk cargo, which requires large carriers
that tend to be chartered for complete shiploads. Since East Asian countries, particularly China, have
become the world￿s leading importers of many primary commodities, they account for a large share of
bulk cargo; for example, in 2003 their share was 57 per cent of world trade in the three major dry bulk
cargo commodities: iron ore, coal and grains. Over the past decade, Chinese seaborne trade in bulk
cargo has grown by 17 per cent annually, compared to a growth rate of just 5.4 per cent for Japan,
2.3 per cent for Europe and negative growth for the United States.Towards a New Form of Global Interdependence 145
Although maritime transport of containerized trade and bulk cargo involves two separate markets, both
of them saw record price levels in 2004 and 2005. The cost of chartering a medium-sized container ship
was $40,000 per day at the beginning of 2005, compared to around $7,500 three years earlier. The index
of chartering a dry bulk vessel was 2.6 times higher than the previous historical high of 1995. Between
January 2003 and January 2005, prices for oil tankers doubled, and those for dry bulk vessels and
container ships even increased by two and a half times.
One reason for the price increase in containerized maritime transport is the fact that China sources
much of its manufactured imports from its trading partners in the region, while its manufactured exports
are shipped mainly to North America and Europe. This has contributed to a strong imbalance of demand
for containers and container ships, with a shortage of space for containerized cargo exports in Asia and
a surplus in North America and Europe. As a result, container freight rates are two to three times higher
for exports from China to North America or Europe than for trade in the opposite direction.
Another reason for the recent surge in the cost of maritime transport is the fact that the supply of ocean
vessel capacity is very price-inelastic in the short term. This is because of the relatively long time lag
between a rise in freight prices and the ordering of new vessels on the one hand, and new vessel con-
struction and delivery on the other. Two to three years ago, owing to expectations of low growth in trade
volumes, there were very few orders for new ships, which led to insufficient new vessel deliveries in
2003 and 2004. Today, shipyards are working at full capacity to deliver in 2007 or 2008; thus ample
new vessel capacity is scheduled to enter the market in the coming years. For example, the combined
container carrying capacity of new vessels expected to enter the market in 2006 will exceed the deliv-
eries of 2003 and 2004 taken together. In January 2005, the order book of new container vessels regis-
tered 4 million container units, equivalent to 55 per cent of existing capacity (up from just 20 per cent
in January 2002). This represents a historical record, more than double the previous record of mid-
2001. About 80 per cent of container ships are being built in China, Japan and the Republic of Korea,
with the latter country alone accounting for two thirds of global container-ship-building capacity.
Given the scheduled entry of new vessel capacity into the market, the present record freight and charter
levels will likely decline to more normal levels in the foreseeable future. In the meantime, however,
some developing countries are beginning to suffer from the adverse effects of high transport costs and
scarce vessel capacity. Some African, Latin American and South Asian shippers have complained about
export cargo not being carried on time, and, globally, the high transport costs have led to a measurable
increase in freight payments by developing countries. In Latin America, for example, between the first
six months of 2003 and the same period of 2004, the ratio of the cost of shipping to the total value of
exports increased by 39 per cent.
Indeed, the mutual reinforcement of traded volumes and the availability of transport services has pre-
vented many developing countries from benefiting from the tighter network of global shipping lines, in
addition to contending with the current shortage of vessel capacity and high freight costs. For example,
the average number of liner services to least developed countries (LDCs) is only one seventh of the
average number provided to other countries, and more than half of the world￿s least connected non-
landlocked countries are LDCs. The challenge for policy-makers in many of these countries is to initi-
ate a virtuous cycle between improved connectivity to international maritime transport services and
greater trade volumes.
Note: The data in the box are based on UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport, Geneva, various issues; UNCTAD,
Transport Newsletter, Geneva, various issues; Clarkson Research Studies, Container Intelligence Monthly,
London, various issues; ECLAC, The costs of international transport and the integration and competitiveness
of Latin America and the Caribbean, Bulletin FAL 191, Santiago, 2002.
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West Asia; and when oil prices declined during
the 1980s, interregional trade tapered off. More
recently, interregional South-South trade has
shown signs of a recovery. As in the 1970s, this
recent growth is due mainly to primary exports.
But this time, Africa and Latin America and the
Caribbean have benefited most from its rise.
Growth in Africa￿s primary commodity exports to
other developing country regions, of almost 20 per
cent per annum between 1990 and 2003, has
helped increase the share of Africa￿s primary ex-
ports in total South-South primary exports to
levels not seen since the mid-1980s. A similar
evolution can be observed for Latin America and
the Caribbean where primary commodity exports
to other developing regions grew by over 10 per
cent between 1990 and 2000, and by almost 20 per
cent between 2000 and 2003 (table 4.4).
To sum up, the most rapid growth of South-
South trade has been among a small number of
economies, mainly in East Asia, and primarily in
manufactures. However, a substantial part of this
increase in South-South trade in manufactures
shown in trade statistics is actually due to double-
counting associated with intraregional production-
sharing for products eventually destined for ex-
port to developed countries as well as to double-
counting associated with the function of Hong
Kong (China) and Singapore as transhipment ports
or regional hub ports. The rise in South-South
trade of primary commodities, which in trade sta-
tistics is apparently much more modest, has been
more widespread and has allowed Africa and Latin
America and the Caribbean to recoup some of the
market shares in total South-South trade that they
had lost in the 1980s.
C.  Shifts in the composition of
developing-country exports
As noted above, one reason for the promo-
tion of South-South trade has been the expectation
that manufactures in general, and manufactures
with a relatively high-skill content in particular,
will be more important in South-South trade than
in developing-country exports to developed coun-
tries. This expectation is based on the assumption
that developing-country consumers are mainly in-
terested in cheaper manufactured consumer goods,
and are less demanding than consumers in devel-
oped-country markets in terms of a wide range of
differentiated consumer manufactures ￿ often
having the same basic characteristics ￿ and the
consistent high quality of such goods. Thus, tap-
ping developing-country markets is expected to
facilitate export diversification away from a nar-
row focus on primary commodities. It is gener-
ally agreed that the production and export of
manufactures, particularly high-skill-intensive
goods, have greater developmental effects owing
to the higher potential for demand and productiv-
ity growth in such products.
To analyse the shifts in composition of
developing-country exports, nine categories of
products have been selected. The primary com-
modities are classified according to their natural-
resource content (agricultural products; minerals,
ores and metals; and mineral fuels, lubricants and
related materials) and the manufactures accord-
ing to the mix of different skill- and technology
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factures; and low-, medium- and high-skill- and
technology-intensive manufactures7); parts and
components of electrical and electronic goods, and
electronics excluding parts and components con-
stitute two separate categories.8 As discussed in
some detail in TDR 2002, although the skill and
technology intensity of a product does not neces-
sarily indicate the productivity growth potential
of the sector producing it, the relationship is close
enough to focus the analysis on product catego-
ries based on their skill and technology intensity.
Over the past two decades, the shifts in the
composition of South-South trade have strongly
differed from those of devel-
oping-country exports to de-
veloped countries.9 In devel-
oping-country exports to de-
veloped countries, medium-
skill manufactures (such as
road motor vehicles) regis-
tered the most dynamic growth
in terms of export value be-
tween 1976 and 2003, fol-
lowed by electronics exclud-
ing parts and components; parts and components
of electrical and electronic goods; and high-skill
manufactures (fig. 4.3). Imported high-skill inter-
mediate production inputs in the context of inter-
national production networks clearly have played
a crucial role in shaping this pattern. Thus findings
based on trade statistics that rely on gross exports
cannot be taken at face value. Nonetheless, they
broadly indicate that relatively higher skill- and
technology-intensive manufactured product catego-
ries have also played some role in the growth of
developing-country exports to developed countries.
By contrast, regarding shifts in the composi-
tion of South-South trade over the period 1976 to
2003, the value of labour- and resource-intensive
manufactures (such as clothing) increased the most
strongly, followed by parts and components for
electrical and electronic goods, medium-skill
manufactures and agricultural products (fig. 4.3).
Hence, in the dynamism of South-South trade, pri-
mary commodities have played a more important
role than in South-North trade, and the most dynamic
manufactured product categories in South-South
trade tend to be less skill- and technology-intensive
than those in South-North trade. This implies that
the pattern of export dynamism by broad product
categories has not met the expectations for South-
South trade.10
Examining the dynamism of South-South
trade at a more disaggregated level shows that all
four product groups within the category ￿parts and
components of electrical and electronic goods￿
ranked among the seven most dynamic products
in South-South trade during the period 1990￿2003;
combined, they accounted for about one fourth of
total South-South trade in 2003 (table 4.7). But
the table also shows that several goods in all prod-
uct categories have experienced rapid growth in
such trade. For example, 10 primary commodities
(fur skins, briquettes, vegeta-
ble oils, ores and concentrates
of precious metals, synthetic
rubber, nickel, coal, residual
petroleum products, aluminium,
and pulp and waste paper)
were among the 30 most dy-
namic products in South-South
trade during the period 1990￿
2003, even though their growth
began from a low base. This,
again, demonstrates the dynamism of primary
commodities in South-South trade.
A second major difference in the compo-
sitional shifts in South-South trade compared to
South-North trade is that the sensitivity of the re-
sults to changes in the base year in South-North
trade is much lower. Changing the base year for
the calculation of export dynamism (from 1976
to 1985, 1990, 1995 or 2000) affects the ranking
of these four product categories in South-North
trade only for the period 2000 to 2003; parts and
components for electrical and electronic goods
rank last of all nine categories. Indeed, shifts in
the share of the nine product categories in total
developing-country exports to developed countries
show a clear trend away from primary commodi-
ties towards medium-skill manufactures and elec-
tronics, as shown in the top panel of table 4.8.
The ranking of broad product categories by
dynamic export growth in South-South trade var-
ies significantly with changes in the base year.
Growth in terms of export values of labour- and
resource-intensive manufactures in South-South
trade had already taken off in the late 1970s, but
was particularly dynamic between the mid-1980s
Primary commodities have
played a more important
role in the dynamism of
South-South trade than in
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and mid-1990s and between 2000 and 2003. The
first of these three periods broadly coincides with
the beginning of production-sharing in the textile
and clothing industry between the NIEs and the
ASEAN-4 (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines
and Thailand). The second period broadly coin-
cides with China￿s participation in production-
sharing in this sector. The third period probably
reflects an intensification of China￿s involvement
following its accession to the WTO and quota
Figure 4.3
EVOLUTION OF DEVELOPING-COUNTRY EXPORTS,
BY BROAD PRODUCT CATEGORY, 1976￿2003
(Index numbers, 1976 = 1)
Source: See table 4.1.Towards a New Form of Global Interdependence 149
Table 4.7
EXPORT VALUE GROWTH AND SHARE IN TOTAL SOUTH-SOUTH EXPORTS
OF THE 30 MOST DYNAMIC PRODUCTS,a 1990￿2003
(Per cent)
Average annual Memo item:
value growth of Share in total Share in total exports
South-South South-South from developing
exports exports countries
SITC
code Product group 1990￿2003 1990 2003 1990 2003
871 Optical instruments and apparatus 32.4 0.1 1.0 0.1 0.6
759 Parts of computers and office machines 22.1 1.6 5.3 1.6 4.3
681 Silver and platinum 22.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3
752 Computers and office machines 21.5 0.9 3.6 2.6 5.7
776 Transistors and semiconductors 21.3 3.8 12.5 3.5 8.0
212 Fur-skins, raw 19.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
772 Electrical apparatus such as switches 17.4 0.9 2.0 0.7 1.8
884 Optical goods nes 17.3 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.3
714 Non-electric engines and motors 17.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
718 Other power-generating machinery 16.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
323 Briquettes; coke and semi-coke; etc 16.7 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1
511 Hydrocarbons, nes, and derivatives 16.4 0.4 0.7 0.3 0.4
222 Seeds and oleaginous fruit 15.9 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.4
764 Telecommunications equipment, and parts 15.8 2.7 5.6 2.3 5.2
873 Meters and counters, nes 15.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
289 Ores and concentrates of precious metals 15.7 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
513 Carboxylic acids, and their derivatives 15.5 0.3 0.6 0.2 0.4
582 Condensation products 15.2 0.5 0.9 0.3 0.6
778 Electrical machinery and apparatus, nes 15.0 1.1 2.1 0.8 1.9
771 Electric power machinery, and parts thereof 14.6 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.8
233 Synthetic rubber, latex, etc 14.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
874 Measuring instruments 14.4 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.6
683 Nickel 14.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
872 Medical instruments and appliances, nes 14.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3
322 Coal, lignite and peat 13.9 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.4
335 Residual petroleum products 13.7 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
716 Rotating electric plants and parts thereof, nes 13.3 0.4 0.7 0.3 0.6
684 Aluminium 13.2 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.6
251 Pulp and waste paper 13.0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
781 Passenger motor vehicles (excluding buses) 13.0 0.4 1.0 1.0 2.1
Total for 30 most dynamic products 18.3 15.8 40.5 16.9 36.1
Parts and components of electronicsb 19.7 9.0 25.4 8.0 19.2
Memo items:
Total merchandise exports 9.8 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Manufactures 10.5 72.8 81.7 70.7 82.1
Fuels, minerals and metals 9.1 11.2 8.6 12.1 8.3
Agricultural products 6.1 16.1 9.6 17.2 9.6
Total world exports 6.1  -  -  -  -
Total developing-country exports 9.2  -  -  -  -
Source: See table 4.1.
a Includes SITC 0 through 8, except product groups 286, 351, 675, 688 and 333 because of poor data reporting for these
categories.
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Table 4.8
COMPOSITION OF DEVELOPING-ECONOMY EXPORTS TO DEVELOPED COUNTRIES,
BY BROAD PRODUCT CATEGORIES, 1980￿2003
Value change
Shares up to 2003
(Per cent) (Index numbers)
Exporting economies 1980 1990 2000 2003 1976 = 1 1990 = 1
All developing economies
Agricultural products 13.2 15.1 8.9 9.2  18.9 1.7
Minerals, ores and metals 4.7 4.6 2.7 2.5  10.6 1.5
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 65.0 23.7 14.2 12.2  4.4 1.4
Labour- and resource-intensive manufactures 9.4 24.6 20.3 20.7  56.9 2.4
Low-skill and technology-intensive manufactures 1.6 5.1 5.3 5.6  96.0 3.1
Medium-skill and technology-intensive manufactures 1.0 7.4 14.1 15.6  724.8 5.9
High-skill and technology-intensive manufactures 1.7 5.0 6.3 6.9  235.8 3.9
Electronics excluding parts and components 1.4 7.7 11.2 12.9  470.6 4.7
Parts and components of electrical and electronic goods 1.9 6.8 17.0 14.4  339.3 5.9
Total merchandise exports 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  25.7 2.8
Developing economies, excl. NIEs
Agricultural products 13.8 20.9 11.7 11.5  20.1 1.8
Minerals, ores and metals 5.2 7.0 3.7 3.2  10.3 1.5
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 75.2 36.3 19.1 15.5  4.2 1.4
Labour- and resource-intensive manufactures 3.8 19.1 21.4 22.0  274.2 3.8
Low-skill and technology-intensive manufactures 0.3 2.9 4.3 5.0  218.3 5.7
Medium-skill and technology-intensive manufactures 0.3 5.3 14.0 14.9 4 200.9 9.5
High-skill and technology-intensive manufactures 0.6 4.1 5.8 5.8  611.1 4.8
Electronics excluding parts and components 0.1 1.7 8.3 11.7 29 632.9 23.4
Parts and components of electrical and electronic goods 0.7 2.8 11.6 10.3 4 388.3 12.4
Total merchandise exports 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  22.0 3.4
Developing economies, excl. NIEs and China
Agricultural products .. 20.9 12.8 14.0  17.6 1.8
Minerals, ores and metals .. 7.3 4.2 4.0  9.2 1.4
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials .. 38.1 22.9 20.9  4.0 1.4
Labour- and resource-intensive manufactures .. 17.3 18.1 19.1  171.8 2.9
Low-skill and technology-intensive manufactures .. 2.6 3.4 3.7  117.4 3.7
Medium-skill and technology-intensive manufactures .. 5.3 14.3 15.8 3 193.8 7.8
High-skill and technology-intensive manufactures .. 3.7 5.3 5.5  413.2 3.9
Electronics excluding parts and components .. 1.7 7.1 7.6 13 943.7 11.7
Parts and components of electrical and electronic goods .. 3.0 12.1 9.5 2 902.6 8.3
Total merchandise exports .. 100.0 100.0 100.0  15.5 2.6
Source: See table 4.1.
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elimination associated with the implementation of
the second stage of the Agreement on Textiles and
Clothing (ATC) at the beginning of 2002. By con-
trast, production-sharing in the electronics sector,
mainly among the East Asian economies, broadly
began in the mid-1980s. As a
result, parts and components of
electrical and electronic goods
have been the most dynamic
product category in South-
South trade in terms of export
value growth for the period
1985￿2003. Hence, changes in
the pace of export dynamism
of labour- and resource-inten-
sive manufactures and of parts
and components of electrical
and electronic goods broadly coincide with dif-
ferent waves of production-sharing among devel-
oping countries in these sectors. Taken together,
these results further support the above finding, that
the statistical effects associated with production-
sharing have been a key determinant of the growth
of South-South trade in manufactures as reflected
in trade statistics.
However, the fact that in most products, rapid
growth of South-South trade started from a rela-
tively small base in the late 1970s has also played
a role in both the rapid rate of growth in export
values and the variety of broad product catego-
ries that have driven growth in South-South trade
over the past three decades.
For example, in 1976 the value
of developing-country exports
of labour- and resource-inten-
sive manufactures to developed
countries was about 200 times
higher than the value of their
exports of such products to
other developing countries,
and that of agricultural prod-
ucts was about 20 times higher,
while the same magnitudes
were 4 and 2 for parts and
components of electrical and electronic goods, and
electronics excluding parts and components, re-
spectively.
A characteristic common to the evolution of
both South-South and South-North trade is that a
few Asian developing economies have a strong in-
fluence on shifts in the broad export patterns of
developing countries taken together. If the exports
from the NIEs ￿ whose production and export pat-
terns have become very similar to those of devel-
oped countries, as mentioned above ￿ are excluded
from South-North trade, the
most dynamic product catego-
ries are electronics (both fin-
ished products and parts and
components), as shown in the
second panel of table 4.8. If
China is excluded as well (third
panel of table 4.8), the dyna-
mism of finished electronics
drops by more than half, even
though it remains the most dy-
namic product category. This,
of course, reflects the statistical effects of trian-
gular trade. Taken together, it indicates that much
of the expansion of relatively skill- and technol-
ogy-intensive manufactured exports from devel-
oping to developed countries is closely linked to
successful economic growth and industrialization
in East Asia.
Table 4.9 shows that in the segment of South-
South exports which excludes the NIEs and the
ASEAN-4, the two electronics categories recorded
the most dynamic growth. However, irrespective
of whether this growth performance is measured
over the period 1976￿2003 or 1990￿2003, it oc-
curred from a very low base, so that the share of
these two categories remains
low.
Turning to interregional
trade, the growth in the value
of developing country exports
to Asia stands out for two rea-
sons (third panel of table 4.9).
First, it expanded by more
than 155 times between 1976
and 2003, signifying that the
dynamism of this segment of
South-South trade has been
more than double the already impressive expan-
sion of South-South trade overall. Second, for the
period 1990￿2003, primary commodities have
been of crucial importance in this expansion, as
their various categories rank much higher here
than in the other segments of South-South trade
shown in the table.
￿ but industrialization in
East Asia accounts for
much of the expansion of
skill- and technology-
intensive exports from
developing to developed
countries.
The most dynamic
manufactures in South-
South trade tend to be less
skill- and technology-
intensive than those in
South-North trade ...Trade and Development Report, 2005 152
Table 4.9
COMPOSITION OF TRADE AMONG DEVELOPING ECONOMIES,
BY BROAD PRODUCT CATEGORIES, 1980￿2003
Value change
Shares  up to 2003
(Per cent) (Index numbers)
Exporting economies 1980 1990 2000 2003 1976 = 1 1990 = 1
Importing economies: all developing economies
All developing economies
Agricultural products 5.6 11.6 12.6 13.0  445.8  4.5
Minerals, ores and metals 10.0 22.5 16.8 15.2  153.2  2.7
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 2.6 3.3 3.3 3.3  87.9  4.0
Labour- and resource-intensive manufactures 1.8 4.2 4.6 5.6 2 360.3  5.3
Low-skill and technology-intensive manufactures 47.3 16.6 13.2 9.6  8.8  2.3
Medium-skill and technology-intensive manufactures 19.3 15.1 9.5 9.5  55.2  2.5
High-skill and technology-intensive manufactures 5.2 7.1 5.9 6.6  129.8  3.7
Electronics excluding parts and components 5.4 10.9 11.6 12.1  775.0  4.4
Parts and components of electrical and electronic goods 2.7 8.5 22.5 25.0 1 921.5  11.7
Total merchandise exports 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  67.4  4.0
Developing economies, excl. NIEs and ASEAN-4
Agricultural products 12.4 18.6 15.4 14.5  112.8  2.9
Minerals, ores and metals 2.4 4.7 5.0 5.2  59.9  4.1
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 71.9 24.7 22.9 14.9  5.6  2.2
Labour- and resource-intensive manufactures 4.6 19.8 19.1 20.3  678.0  3.8
Low-skill and technology-intensive manufactures 1.9 7.7 6.8 7.9  692.1  3.8
Medium-skill and technology-intensive manufactures 3.5 10.5 11.0 11.6  572.6  4.1
High-skill and technology-intensive manufactures 2.8 10.1 10.3 9.9  555.5  3.6
Electronics excluding parts and components 0.3 2.7 2.9 5.7 6 860.7  7.7
Parts and components of electrical and electronic goods 0.1 1.1 6.6 10.0 5 263.8  32.7
Total merchandise exports 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  34.9  3.7
Importing economies: Asia
Developing economies, excl. Asia
Agricultural products 48.6 31.6 31.2 35.3  174.9  4.6
Minerals, ores and metals 15.5 15.0 15.8 15.7  44.1  4.3
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 11.4 12.0 30.4 22.7  535.1  7.7
Labour- and resource-intensive manufactures 3.5 4.9 4.7 4.4  294.3  3.7
Low-skill and technology-intensive manufactures 3.6 20.1 6.0 9.6 2 259.5  2.0
Medium-skill and technology-intensive manufactures 0.7 3.7 3.0 4.2 1 134.5  4.6
High-skill and technology-intensive manufactures 16.1 11.9 6.3 5.5  259.4  1.9
Electronics excluding parts and components 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.1 8 471.0  1.3
Parts and components of electrical and electronic goods 0.1 0.3 2.5 2.5 36 396.0  33.0
Total merchandise exports 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  155.9  4.1
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While increased South-South trade is a fact,
recent developments for the developing countries
as a whole require a careful assessment of the sta-
tistical data. Indeed, such an assessment leads to
a number of qualifications to the prima facie im-
pression that trade among developing countries
has grown massively over the past decade or so,
and that exports of manufactures account for much
of this rise.
The trend towards a ￿new geography of
trade￿ appears to be the result, above all, of the
above-average growth performance of a few Asian
developing economies, and the associated shifts
in the level and composition of their external trade.
The fact that most developing countries outside
East Asia do not appear to have participated sig-
nificantly in the emerging ￿new geography of
trade￿ suggests that interpretations of this trend
need to be treated with caution in order to avoid
unrealistic expectations of its ultimate scope and
impact.
The outstanding growth performance of the
NIEs and China has had a significant impact on
international trade flows because it has further
increased the already sizeable weight of these
economies, which account for about 16 per cent
of world income (in terms of purchasing power
parity) and 22 per cent of the world population.
Perhaps most importantly, the production struc-
tures of some of the NIEs, namely the Republic
of Korea and Taiwan Province of China, have be-
come increasingly similar to those of the major
developed countries in terms of both production
and export of manufactures (TDR 2003). As a re-
sult, the rise in South-South trade has occurred in
a hierarchical way. On the one hand, the Republic
of Korea and Taiwan Province of China trade skill-
intensive manufactures directly with developed
countries. On the other hand, both domestic firms
and affiliates of foreign TNCs located in these
economies (and, to a lesser extent, in South-East
Asian countries such as Malaysia) take advantage
of increased intraregional cooperation and spe-
cialization among the East Asian economies. For
example, the Republic of Korea and Malaysia
export intermediate production inputs to China
where these inputs are assembled for export to
developed countries (i.e. in a triangular trade pat-
tern). The rising specialization of all these Asian
economies in manufacturing activities is, in turn,
associated with their growing import demand for
products with a high natural-resource content, such
as energy and industrial raw materials, required
for industrialization. Many of these products are
sourced from other developing countries.
The important role of triangular trade in the
measured rise of South-South trade in manufac-
tures implies that the bulk of such trade has not
reduced the dependence of developing countries￿
manufactured exports on aggregate demand in
developed-country markets. As long as demand
from developed countries ￿ notably the United
States, which is East Asia￿s most important ex-
port market ￿ remains high for products for which
production-sharing within East Asia plays an im-
portant role, triangular trade and, thus, South-
South trade, will remain strong. But this also im-
plies that a drastic reduction in United States im-
ports of such products may lead to a major decline
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in South-South trade of manufactures. A similar
outcome may result from an adjustment of the
current trade imbalances between the United
States and East Asian economies which would be
associated with at least a par-
tial offsetting of the gains in
competitiveness of East Asian
exporters in recent years.
For South-South trade in
manufactures, other than that
related to triangular trade, de-
veloping countries￿ pace of
economic growth and the
soundness of their liquidity
situation are of key importance. In particular, in-
stead of rapid capital accumulation and technical
progress, Latin America has recorded low invest-
ment performance in industry over the past two
decades, which has caused productivity growth to
be cyclical and related to labour shedding (TDR
2003). Thus industrial upgrading has been lim-
ited, and progress in certain industries, such as
aerospace and automobiles, has not been deep
enough to establish a dynamic momentum in in-
dustry. The macroeconomic environment of high
interest and exchange rates and volatile capital
flows has done little to support the new invest-
ment required for sustained industrial upgrading.
Moreover, the tendency towards sharp real cur-
rency appreciations, particularly during the early
1980s and the 1990s, has been a major factor in
the deterioration of the international competitive-
ness of these countries￿ manufacturers, including
their competitiveness vis-￿-vis East Asia. How-
ever, the recent improved growth performance of
a range of Latin American
countries probably improves
the scope for intra regional
trade in manufactures, as well
as for their trade with other de-
veloping regions.
The growth of South-
South trade has not reduced
the strong reliance of the vast
majority of developing coun-
tries on primary commodity exports. However, the
rise in their exports of primary commodities to
the rapidly growing Asian developing countries
is likely to evolve into the most resilient feature
of the ￿new geography of trade￿. Since two of the
most rapidly growing Asian developing countries
￿ China and India ￿ still are in the early phases of
industrialization, they will continue to source their
imports of primary products from the group
of natural-resource-abundant
countries. Thus there is sig-
nificant potential for coopera-
tion between China and India,
on the one hand, and other de-
veloping countries, on the other,
for strategic resources such as
energy products and minerals
(e.g. iron ore and copper). In-
deed, Chinese and Indian FDI
in such resources has gained
in importance over the past few years and evolved
as a complement to trade-related South-South co-
operation.
The promotion of South-South trade remains
a desirable objective for a variety of reasons. Firstly,
sluggish growth in developed countries and their
continued trade barriers against products of ex-
port interest to developing countries implies that
developing countries need to give greater atten-
tion to each other￿s markets to fill the gap in ex-
port growth consistent with achieving their eco-
nomic growth targets. This concerns both primary
commodities and manufactures. In the case of pri-
mary commodities, structural change away from
raw-material-intensive industrial production con-
tinues to reduce the intensity of raw material use
in the major developed countries; for manufac-
tures, the case for greater skill intensity in manu-
factures traded among developing countries re-
mains intact. Secondly, the vast size of the rap-
idly growing Asian economies
reduces the need for develop-
ing countries to seek devel-
oped country markets in order
to benefit from economies of
scale. Thirdly, continued de-
pendence on developed-coun-
try markets exposes develop-
ing countries to possible pres-
sure that link better access to
those markets with binding
commitments to rapid trade and financial liber-
alization, protection of intellectual property and
open-door policy for FDI. More generally, it also
entails the risk of increasingly narrowing the
policy space for developing countries.
While the increase in
South-South trade is a fact,
this trend requires a careful
assessment to avoid
unrealistic expectations.
The promotion of South-
South trade remains a
desirable objective for a
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To the extent that trade barriers present a
major impediment to the growth of South-South
trade, lowering tariffs and non-tariff barriers is a
priority. This holds within RTAs among develop-
ing countries, as well as for stimulating inter-
regional trade based on the Global System of Trade
Preferences among Developing Countries (GSTP).
However, attention needs to be given also to other
trade barriers, including inadequate transport fa-
cilities and the absence of established business and
banking linkages.
Indeed, the issue of finance remains of cru-
cial importance to the prospects for South-South
trade growth. For example, the absence of efficient
financing not only increases transaction costs for
South-South trade, but may also act as an effective
barrier to trade if neither of the two Southern part-
ners has access to adequate financing. Developed-
country export credit agencies can provide credits
and credit insurance for exports to most develop-
ing countries; but there are only a few such agen-
cies in developing countries and those that do exist
often are only able to cover exports to developed
countries (UNCTAD, 2005e). Moreover, regional
financial arrangements and cooperation frame-
works can support the stabilization of the exchange
rates of developing country currencies with respect
to each other. In particular, mechanisms of intra-
regional support against currency runs ￿ such as
the Chiang Mai Initiative (TDR 2001) ￿ can bring
considerable benefits to intraregional trade, as they
reduce exchange rate spreads and commissions in
currency trading associated with regional trade.
E.  Policies for managing the new forms
of global interdependence
A new form of global economic interdepend-
ence is taking shape, primarily as a result of the
increasing weight of the rapidly growing Asian
developing economies, in particular the large ones
of China and India, in the global economy.
The first-tier NIEs and China are already
playing a crucial role in global trade flows, not
only as suppliers of manufactures to the world
market and importers of primary commodities
from other developing countries, but also as im-
porters of developed countries￿ manufactures.
Moreover, through their large current-account
surpluses and their accumulation of foreign ex-
change reserves, they have also become influen-
tial actors in international financial and monetary
relations. India is set to join this group of East
Asian economies as a major importer of primary
commodities; its export growth has so far been
concentrated in services, but in the future this may
also extend to manufactures of similar kinds as
those produced in the East Asian economies when
they were at the earlier stages of their industriali-
zation process.
The analysis in this and the preceding chap-
ters shows a complex and nuanced picture of the
new features of global interdependence, which
pose new challenges for policy-makers in differ-
ent countries, depending on their stage of devel-
opment and their position in the global economic
landscape. The smooth integration of large
and rapidly growing economies into global eco-
nomic relationships has the potential to benefit all
countries. However, this will depend to a consid-
erable extent on how the new forms of interde-Trade and Development Report, 2005 156
pendence between these rapid industrializers, the
advanced industrialized countries and other de-
veloping countries is managed. Coherent policies
are required at both the international and national
levels.
Despite their rapid growth over the past two
and a half decades, both China and India still have
relatively low levels of per capi-
ta income. However, due to
their size ￿ with a combined
population representing two
fifths of the world population
and a combined GDP account-
ing for one fifth of the world
total ￿ their economic perform-
ance will inevitably have re-
percussions on international
trade patterns and global out-
put growth. Given their increas-
ing dependence on imports of
primary commodities for industrial output growth,
in particular fuels and industrial raw materials, the
growth performance of these large Asian econo-
mies will have greater repercussions on other
developing countries as their catching up process
advances. This inevitably raises the question of
the sustainability of the pace of growth of these
two economies in the medium and long term. Prob-
lems could arise from their heavy dependence on
exports, insufficient domestic demand, and a
sharply rising bill for imported raw materials, es-
pecially energy.
As discussed in chapter I, section E, China
has already acquired a solid manufacturing base,
and it has been able to maintain a broad balance
between growth impulses from domestic demand
and those from foreign demand. It should there-
fore be able to maintain GDP growth at a pace
that will permit a considerable further rise in per
capita income, and at the same time induce growth
in other developing countries. In India, it is the
services sector that has so far been leading eco-
nomic growth, but it is unclear for how long this
can be maintained. Historically, there has been no
case of economic catch-up based on the develop-
ment of the services sector (perhaps with the
exception of a few small island economies that
depend on tourism or financial offshore centres),
where the scope for productivity gains is more lim-
ited than in manufacturing. The IT-revolution has
certainly changed the potential for the services
sector to support rapid growth in developing coun-
tries, as has been the case in some developed
countries. However, the size of the world market
for IT-based services is smaller than that for manu-
factures, especially when the rising demand for
manufactures from developing countries them-
selves, not least as a result of poverty reduction
efforts, is taken into account.
Thus there can be little doubt
that India will substantially
improve its growth prospects
if it succeeds in accelerating
the development of its manu-
facturing industry.
In both China and India
it will be crucial to ensure that
all segments of the population
participate in income growth.
This is not only essential for
accelerating the eradication of poverty and gain-
ing broad-based social acceptance of the enormous
structural changes required; wage increases through-
out the economy, in line with rising productivity,
are also key to the expansion of domestic consump-
tion and, thus, to the sustainability and stability
of output growth. Fixed capital formation depends
on favourable demand expectations in general, and
not just on exports, which are subject to the va-
garies of the world market and to changes in inter-
national competitiveness. Among final demand,
private consumption is the most important stabi-
lizing factor of private investment.
Policy options for China and India may be
identified by drawing on the successful experi-
ences of earlier catching up episodes in Asia,
taking account of both the difference in the cur-
rent international environment relative to that
prevailing during these earlier episodes, and the
difference in the sizes of the Chinese and Indian
economies relative to those of the first-tier NIEs.
The effects of growth and changing trade patterns
in China and India are having a much stronger
impact on world markets, and thus on the terms
of trade of the two countries themselves. In any
case, a sustained growth process will require a
rapid and well sequenced upgrading of manufac-
turing production and exports, and a greater
emphasis on the domestic market for outlets of
labour-intensive production activities as well as
China and India need to
ensure further productivity
gains in manufacturing, and
the participation of all
segments of their
population in income
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for the supply of intermediate goods. In China, in
particular, an increase in labour productivity in
the rural areas and rising incomes in the agricul-
tural sector would contribute to generating the
demand needed to absorb greater domestic-ori-
ented production; it would also help secure a
higher degree of food self-sufficiency.
The availability of raw material imports, and
their prices, will be another critical factor for the
sustainability of the current pace of development
in the rapidly growing Asian economies. Domes-
tic policies in this regard will need to focus on the
provision of incentives to raise the efficiency of
raw material use, in particular of fuels. This is a
challenge that all countries, developed and devel-
oping alike, are facing, and it also has important
implications for global environmental sustain-
ability. But the supply of primary commodities de-
pends to a large extent on responses by producers
to the rise in the volume of global commodity con-
sumption and to the favourable price changes that
have occurred recently.
Other developing countries should seek to
adopt policy measures that will enable them to de-
rive the most benefits from the rising import de-
mand from the Asian industrializers, and to trans-
late the eventual gains into
stronger domestic investment
in support of greater diversi-
fication and faster industriali-
zation. Continuing growth in
East and South Asia and re-
covery in other developing re-
gions is likely to sustain the
demand for primary commodi-
ties. However, depending on
the pace of reduction in the in-
tensity of use of raw materi-
als, the extent and speed with
which new supply capacities come on-stream, and
the size of possible changes in primary commod-
ity demand of the developed countries, the rise in
primary commodity prices may come to a halt, or
may even be reversed.
Thus the basic problems of instability in pri-
mary commodity prices and of their long-term
deteriorating trend vis-￿-vis the prices of manu-
factures ￿ especially those exported by developed
countries ￿ cannot be considered as resolved. With
the boom in the fuels and mining sectors there is
a tendency for investment to shift into these sec-
tors, at a risk of neglecting further development
and upgrading of the manufacturing sector, includ-
ing the processing of locally available natural
resources. Exporters of primary commodities that
have recently benefited from higher prices and,
in some cases, from higher export volumes, would
be well advised to seek greater diversification, not
only within their primary commodity sector, but
also, and more importantly, by developing their
manufacturing and services sectors. Gains from
recent improvements in the terms of trade and
higher export earnings should be translated into
greater investment in infrastructure, education and
productive capacity with a view to accelerating
productivity growth and reducing commodity de-
pendence. This is not the time for complacency,
either at the national or at the international level,
with regard to the commodity issue.
In many developing countries, the recent
gains in the terms of trade have also led to re-
newed attention to the long-standing issue of the
sharing of export revenues, and especially rents
from the extraction of non-renewable fuels and
minerals. Increasing global demand and higher in-
ternational prices for fuels and mining products
have been attracting additional
FDI to these sectors in a number
of developing countries. How-
ever, government revenues from
taxes on profits in these sec-
tors have typically been very
low. Since the beginning of the
1990s, there has been increas-
ing competition among devel-
oping countries to attract FDI
by offering fiscal incentives.
Some potential host countries
have sometimes risked engag-
ing in ￿a race to the bottom￿. In order to ensure
that the considerable rents accruing in the extrac-
tive industries are used in a way that maximizes
the gains for development and social welfare, gov-
ernments need to strike a balance between the use
of fiscal incentives for stimulating investment,
including FDI, and realizing public revenue from
these industries.
Additional means of obtaining fiscal revenues
from primary export-oriented activities may be
Oil and mineral exporting
countries should cooperate
in the formulation of agreed
principles relating to the
fiscal treatment of foreign
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through royalties, the conclusion of joint ventures,
or full public ownership of the operating firms.
However, efforts to obtain adequate fiscal revenue
should not deprive the operators, private or pub-
lic, of the financial resources they need to increase
their productivity and supply capacity, or their
international competitiveness. Recent upward
trends in world market prices
of fuels and minerals and min-
ing products provide an oppor-
tunity to review the existing
fiscal and ownership regimes.
Such a review ￿ already under
way in several countries ￿ and
possible strategic policy ad-
justments, could be more ef-
fective if oil and mineral ex-
porting countries were to co-
operate in the formulation of
some generally agreed princi-
ples relating to the fiscal treat-
ment of foreign investors. But
it is crucial to ensure that the higher income accru-
ing to the public sector or to domestic consumers
from the rent generated by extractive industries
be used for purposes that enhance development
and progress towards the MDGs. Measures to in-
crease the domestic share of the rent from non-
renewable natural resources should be taken in the
context of a comprehensive strategy that ensures
the use of the proceeds for physical and human
capital formation.
Despite the fast pace of the catching up proc-
ess in Asian economies, and their growing impor-
tance in world output and trade, the performance
of most developing countries continues to depend
on growth as well as on macroeconomic and trade
policies of the major industrialized countries. The
role of the fast growing Asia has added another
dimension to these linkages: in addition to their
direct trade relations with the developed countries,
indirect relations, via exports to the Asian suppli-
ers of manufactures to the North, are gaining in
importance. Thus, the benefits that other devel-
oping countries will be able to reap from further
industrialization in East and South Asia would be
enhanced by further trade liberalization in the
developed countries, including in the agricultural
sector. Moreover, the attitude in these countries
towards increasing competition from Asia in the
markets for certain types of manufactures will
have important repercussions not only for the
Asian exporters of such products, but also for
those developing countries that are exporters to
the latter. Instead of giving in to protectionist pres-
sures, developed countries should adopt pro-
active policies to accelerate structural adjustment
towards high-technology-intensive sectors and a
greater share of services in
GDP. Obviously, such adjust-
ments are much easier to
achieve in a context of growth
(as in the United States) than
in a context of stagnation (as
in much of Western Europe
and Japan).
At the international level,
the main challenge is to find a
global approach to manage the
integration of the rapidly
growing, large, low-wage coun-
tries in Asia in a way that is
beneficial for all countries. One aspect is to ensure
that the boom in the markets for a number of pri-
mary commodities translates into real gains for
development in those countries that depend on the
exports of these commodities. The inherent vola-
tility of commodity markets, combined with the
economic dependence of many developing coun-
tries on a small number of primary commodities,
continues to be a major obstacle to development.
Over the past few decades, most internation-
ally traded commodities have experienced a long-
term decline in prices as well as a high degree of
short-term price volatility. Even though prices for
a number of commodities have surged recently,
productivity increases and low elasticity of de-
mand are likely to support the downward trend of
commodity prices in the long run. Overall price
volatility also appears to have declined since the
price shocks of the 1970s. Nonetheless, there are
several commodities, important to developing
countries￿ export earnings, for which price instabil-
ity has remained very high. In addition, commodity
export dependence and export concentration have
not decreased significantly in most developing
countries.
Wide fluctuations in commodity prices are not
in the interests of either producers or consumers.
This has also been recognized by the International
The international
community should review
mechanisms to reduce
price instability of a wider
range of commodities, not
just oil, so as to minimize
its adverse impact on
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Monetary and Financial Committee of the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF): at its April 2005
meeting, it underscored, inter alia, ￿the importance
of stability in oil markets for global prosperity￿
and encouraged ￿closer dialogue between oil ex-
porters and importers￿. Although instability in
markets for commodities other than oil may be
less of a problem for the developed countries, they
are equally, if not more, important for those de-
veloping countries that depend on their exports.
And since in many of these developing countries
extreme poverty remains a pressing problem, the
issue is of crucial importance for global prosperity,
particularly for attaining the MDGs. Consequently,
in the spirit of a global partnership for develop-
ment, the international community might consider
reviewing mechanisms at the global as well as the
regional level to reduce commodity price insta-
bility, thereby mitigating its impact on national
income in the exporting countries.
Commodity price risk management through
market-based instruments can offer some protec-
tion against price uncertainty; yet it has clear limi-
tations as far as developing countries are con-
cerned. Therefore, producer countries and inter-
national commodity organizations might recon-
sider the practical and political feasibility of sup-
ply management systems (based on information
networks), commodity-specific arrangements
among producers, and international cooperation
among producers and consumers. This could be
accompanied by a system of low-conditionality
finance to compensate for shortfalls in commod-
ity export earnings, which re-
sponds to the needs of devel-
oping countries better than the
instruments that have been
available in the past (see also
UNCTAD, 2003).
Another area for strength-
ened international cooperation
and policy coherence is the
search for an appropriate macroeconomic solution
to the large current-account imbalances that have
shaped the world economy in recent years. Such
imbalances represent the greatest short-term risk
for stable growth in the world economy and for
the sustainability of the recent growth performance
of the developing countries. These imbalances are
closely linked not only to the growth differential
between the United States and other major indus-
trialized countries, but also to the expansion of
United States imports from the highly competi-
tive suppliers in East and South Asia. Yet it would
be a mistake to treat these imbalances as bilateral
problems. Given their global dimension and the
repercussions of any adjustment on the world
economy as a whole, it appears that the safest way
to redress the global imbalances lies in an adequate
sharing of the adjustment burden between the defi-
cit countries ￿ especially the United States ￿ and
the surplus economies of Western Europe, Japan
and the rapidly growing developing economies of
East Asia, including China.
A solution sought exclusively through a fur-
ther sharp depreciation of the dollar and lower
absorption in the United States would imply a re-
duction of exports from the rest of the world, with
attendant effects on primary commodity export
earnings and fiercer competition in the markets
for certain manufactures. This would risk push-
ing out of the market those developing-country
producers whose productivity growth has been
slower than that of the fast growing Asian econo-
mies.
Similarly, correcting global imbalances, or
the external deficit of the United States, mainly
through massive exchange rate appreciation and
lower absorption in China and other developing
economies in Asia would have a strong deflation-
ary effect on the world economy as a whole. It
would not only render more difficult China￿s at-
tempts to integrate a vast pool
of rural workers and, more
generally, to reduce poverty in
the country, it would also im-
ply a setback to the efforts of
other developing countries to
make progress towards the
MDGs. Most of the surplus
countries in East Asia, and in
particular China ￿ on which
international pressure for revaluation has been the
strongest, from both financial markets and policy-
makers ￿ have actively managed the floating of
their currencies or have pegged them to the dollar.
The sizeable revaluation of any single currency
vis-￿-vis the dollar could destabilize regional trade
and financial relations, in particular, in light of
China￿s bilateral deficits with its trading partners
It would be a mistake to
treat the global current-
account imbalances as
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in Asia. It is essential to prevent greater exchange
rate flexibility vis-￿-vis the dollar from causing
higher intraregional volatility. Therefore, if a re-
valuation of China￿s renminbi is deemed inevitable
as a contribution to an internationally coordinated
solution to the global imbalances, it should be
sought in the context of a multilateral or regional
arrangement.
The stronger the contribution of faster growth
in the euro area and Japan, the less deflationary
the correction of the global imbalances will be.
Indeed, both the euro area and Japan have com-
pelling reasons to stimulate domestic absorption
with a view to solving their unemployment prob-
lems, especially since this entails a minimal risk
of overheating or accelerating inflation. Such an
action would also greatly help reduce their trade
surpluses, while at the same time supporting
growth momentum in the world economy.
Thus a well coordinated international macro-
economic approach would considerably enhance
the chances of the poorer countries to consolidate
the recent improvements in their growth perform-
ance. The Plaza Agreement of 1985, which was a
joint political effort among the major industrial-
ized countries, provides an example of how a
correction in large current-account imbalances
can be achieved at the global level. The world
economy has changed in the past 20 years, and a
new agreement of a similar kind would certainly
need to involve the developing countries that
have come to play a major role in the perform-
ance of the entire world economy and in its
stability.
Notes
1 Table 4.1, as well as tables 4.3￿4.9 and figure 4.3,
are derived from data that countries report to the
United Nations. The UN COMTRADE is the most
comprehensive database available for the purposes
of this chapter. However, given that some countries
do not (or not comprehensively) report trade data,
the tables are not an exhaustive listing of develop-
ing-country trade. This is the case mainly for the
early periods shown in the tables, when non-report-
ing countries accounted for a very small share in
world trade, and for recent years for some of the
major fuel exporters in West Asia. The latter has led
to an underrepresentation of developing-country
exports of fuels for recent years. However, these
data constraints do not affect the overall pattern of
the findings discussed in this chapter.
2 The strong involvement of transnational corpora-
tions (TNCs) in international production networks,
and the associated rise in intrafirm trade and trans-
fer pricing, has increased the difficulties in correctly
accounting for international trade in manufactured
goods. This is because the prices set by TNCs for
intrafirm transfers (i.e. transfer prices) are often not
the prices that would be negotiated between arm￿s-
length parties. Rather, TNCs tend to set transfer
prices in a way that minimizes tax and tariff pay-
ments, as discussed, for example, by Eden (2001).
3 UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on UN
COMTRADE database.
4 Sudan￿s exports to other developing countries have
also been boosted by the surge in oil exports to China.
5 Taking averages only for those countries for which
data for both periods are available slightly reduces
the numbers for Africa and Latin America for the
period 2000￿2003.
6 Data available at www.indec.gov.ar.
7 In what follows, these latter categories are called
low-, medium- and high-skill manufactures.
8 See TDR 2002, table 3.A1 for a complete list de-
tailing which products are included in each category.Towards a New Form of Global Interdependence 161
9 The following analysis complements the examina-
tion in TDR 2002, chap. III of dynamism in world
trade and dynamism in total developing-country
exports. Its main findings were that (i) manufac-
tures have been the sector in which values have
grown the most rapidly both in world trade and in
developing-country exports, and (ii) the higher the
skill and technology content of exports, the faster is
the growth of exports of developing countries com-
pared to growth in world trade. This latter finding
was attributed to the fact that rapid growth in de-
veloping-country exports of skill- and technology-
intensive goods started from a relatively low base
in the early 1980s, and, more importantly, that such
exports usually have stemmed from the involvement
of developing countries in international production
networks, where the most skill-intensive parts of
the exported product have often been imported from
developed countries.
10 These findings are based on trade flows at a high
level of aggregation and, therefore, may mask sub-
stantial variation across individual developing coun-
tries in terms of the contribution of South-South trade
in skill- and technology-intensive manufactures to
the dynamism of their exports. However, country-
specific analyses are beyond the scope of this Report.References 163
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